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Abstract 
 
The ownership, location and internalisation (OLI) framework introduced by 
Dunning (1977) explains why multinational enterprises (MNEs) establish subsidiaries 
overseas. According to the OLI framework, MNEs have advantages over companies that 
operate at the domestic level, including more power, such as patent, trademark and 
international reputation (ownership), more flexibility to choose locations for better access 
to customers and lower tariffs (location) and, most importantly, broader opportunities to 
set up intra-firm prices and processes (internalisation). While there have been strong 
indications that Indonesian affiliates of foreign MNEs have been using the internalisation 
aspects of the OLI framework, such as profit shifting, to avoid Indonesian corporate 
income tax (CIT), there are no peer-reviewed studies on the existence of profit shifting 
by MNEs in Indonesia. 
When an MNE shifts profit out of a host country, it simultaneously reduces both 
the taxable income and the accounting profit reported in the host country. Therefore, in 
this thesis, profit is represented by two measurements: taxable income and accounting 
profit before tax. 
Using confidential tax return data for the period 2009–2015, this thesis investigates 
the issue of profit shifting in Indonesia by conducting three related studies, which are 
outlined below. 
Study 1 investigates whether foreign-owned Indonesian companies (FOICs) shift 
profits out of Indonesia by examining the effect of the difference in statutory corporate 
tax rates (STR) between the source country of investment and Indonesia on the profit 
reported by FOICs in Indonesia. The regression results show that the lower the tax rate 
v 
of the parent country relative to Indonesia, the lower the profit reported by FOICs, 
providing empirical evidence consistent with the profit shifting occurring in Indonesia. 
Study 2 further investigates whether FOICs shift profits out of Indonesia by 
following an approach introduced by Hines and Rice (1994) based on the Cobb–Douglas 
production function with some modifications. The regression results show that a tax rate 
that is one percentage point lower in the parent country reduces the accounting profit and 
taxable income reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns by 2.56% and 2.89%, 
respectively. These findings are consistent with the findings of Study 1 and provide 
further evidence of profit shifting from Indonesia to low-tax countries. 
Study 3 attempts to provide more direct evidence of the existence of cross-border 
profit shifting in Indonesia by investigating whether FOICs use the two most commonly 
used channels to shift profits: intra-group transfer pricing and debt financing. This is done 
by matching FOICs with comparable domestic-owned Indonesian companies (DOICs) 
and comparing the paired sample in terms of (1) earnings before interest and taxes scaled 
by sales (to detect profit shifting using transfer pricing), and (2) long-term debt to related 
parties scaled by assets (to detect profit shifting using intra-group debt financing). The 
results suggest that while FOICs use both channels to shift profits, transfer pricing plays 
a more significant role than debt financing. 
This thesis contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence of profit 
shifting by MNEs to erode the CIT base of Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The number of corporations operating across countries, known as multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), has increased significantly since the 1980s (Markusen, 2002). The 
relationship between MNEs and the countries in which these companies operate (host 
countries) is deemed to be mutually beneficial. While MNEs seek lower production costs 
by investing in host countries, host countries benefit from several advantages offered by 
MNEs, including tax revenue, employment and transfer of knowledge and skills. 
However, the growth of MNEs has worried many policymakers and academics, who have 
identified MNEs as shifting profits to low-tax countries (Kind, Midelfart, & Schjelderup, 
2005). In response, governments have taken action to fight profit shifting by MNEs. For 
example, in 1998, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) published a report entitled ‘Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global 
Issue’ (OECD, 1998). Larger-scale action took place in 2013, when the OECD headed 
the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, which was initiated by the Group of 
Twenty (G20). Since then, the project—better known as the OECD/G20 BEPS project, 
or simply the BEPS project—has set the agenda for tax authorities in many countries to 
jointly combat profit shifting by MNEs. 
However, the incidence of profit shifting is still notable. For example, in May 2016, 
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that 100 French tax officials and 
police raided the Paris headquarters of Google, which was accused of owing €1.6 billion 
in unpaid taxes as a result of international tax arrangements (BBC, 2016). Prominent 
online sources such as the Financial Times (Thomson, Waters, & Houlder, 2016), 
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Associated Press (Satter & Liedtke, 2016), Guardian (Chrisafis & Garside, 2016), USA 
Today (Hjelmgaard, 2016), Reuters (Rose & Labbé, 2016) and the Telegraph (Titcomb, 
2016) also covered this story. For example, according to the Financial Times, Google 
allegedly used complex tax avoidance to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. 
Specifically, the Financial Times reports that Google set up its European headquarters in 
Dublin, Ireland (a country that imposes the lowest corporate tax rate in Europe), and 
channelled its profits through the country from all over Europe. As a result, in France in 
2014, the company paid only €5 million in corporate tax out of total revenues of €225.4 
million (Thomson, et al., 2016). This is a strong indication that large MNEs have been 
using BEPS to avoid paying taxes in host countries. 
BEPS is defined as strategies used by MNEs to exploit gaps and mismatches in tax 
rules in different countries by shifting profits to low-tax locations to reduce the corporate 
tax being paid (OECD, 2014a). By definition, BEPS is a tax-avoidance strategy and is 
therefore legal, whereas tax evasion is illegal: ‘Although tax avoidance is mostly legal 
and tax evasion is not, both result in loss of revenue to the government, and, by the 
definition, both defeat the intent of the government in enacting its taxing statutes’ (United 
Nations (UN), 2011, p. 437). Accordingly, many countries and prominent international 
institutions, including the OECD, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) 
and UN, consider BEPS an essential global issue that needs to be eliminated or at least 
restricted. They also agree that actions to address BEPS should involve both developed 
and developing countries because cross-border tax-avoidance activities are likely to occur 
in both. 
Most existing studies use data from developed countries, and almost none use data 
from developing countries—particularly firm-level tax return data. Some prior studies 
reveal that developing countries are victims of profit shifting by MNEs and argue that 
3 
BEPS may disadvantage developing countries more than developed countries (e.g. 
Christian Aid, 2009; Cobham, 2005; Oxfam, 2000; Baker, 2005). However, these studies 
are not peer-reviewed and therefore may not provide sufficiently rigorous empirical 
evidence to support their argument. 
Recently, some peer-reviewed studies (e.g. Crivelli, De Mooij, & Keen, 2015; 
Janský & Prats, 2015; Salihu, Annuar, & Obid, 2015) have used financial data for MNEs 
to examine the incidence of BEPS in developing countries. For example, in a working 
paper published by the IMF, Crivelli, et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence that 
developing countries are more vulnerable to cross-border profit shifting than developed 
countries because of lower tax inspection capacity and greater dependency on corporate 
tax revenues. However, according to the OECD (2015a), studies that use financial data to 
detect the incidence of BEPS may provide less reliable results than studies that use tax 
return data. Compared with financial data, tax return data can better capture the existence 
of profit shifting by MNEs because the latter can better capture the incidence of BEPS 
(OECD, 2015a). Therefore, while recent peer-reviewed studies have made a significant 
contribution to literature relating to BEPS in developing countries, further studies are 
needed to provide more reliable empirical evidence on the incidence of BEPS in 
developing countries. 
This thesis pursues empirical evidence of both the existence of cross-border profit 
shifting1 and the channels used to shift profits by analysing Indonesian confidential 
corporate tax return data. It is important to note that the data are obtained from the 
Directorate General of Tax (DGT)—the Indonesian tax authority—under a data 
nondisclosure agreement. The DGT removes all identifying particulars from the data 
                                                 
1 Cross-border profit shifting, profit shifting and BEPS are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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because of privacy protection requirements. As a result, firms are anonymised, and this 
thesis only uses tax return data supplied by the DGT. 
A key data item in tax returns is taxable income (TI), which is the tax base of income 
tax. Thus, any reduction in TI is a direct measurement of tax base erosion. Given that 
profit shifting reduces the TI reported to the tax authority, the use of TI data reported in 
tax returns will capture the incidence of profit shifting and the erosion of the income tax 
base better than financial data. Therefore, while this thesis measures profit in two ways—
TI and accounting profit (AP), which are both reported by foreign-owned Indonesian 
companies (FOICs) in their Indonesian tax returns—the key measurement of profit used 
as the dependent variable to investigate profit shifting is TI. 
This thesis derives evidence for the existence of profit shifting by foreign MNEs by 
examining whether the corporate tax rates of the parent companies affect the magnitude 
of profits reported by FOICs (i.e., entities through which foreign MNEs operate in 
Indonesia) in their Indonesian tax returns.2 Evidence for the channels used by FOICs to 
shift profits out of Indonesia is identified by comparing the profitability and debts to 
related parties between FOICs and matched domestic-owned Indonesian companies 
(DOICs). The findings of this thesis are expected to fill the gap in the literature by 
providing more reliable empirical evidence about the incidence of BEPS in a major 
developing country, namely, Indonesia. 
This thesis uses Indonesia as the focus of the research. As a G20 member, Indonesia 
is actively involved in the BEPS project. Further, Indonesia was among the top 20 foreign 
direct investment (FDI) destination countries in 2012, and it was the world’s fourth most 
prospective FDI destination country in 2013–2015 (UN, 2013a).3 Therefore, in terms of 
                                                 
2 Appendix 1 presents the Indonesian corporate tax return form known as Form 1771. 
3 This statistic is based on the World Investment Prospects Survey (WIPS) that was conducted by the UN 
in 2013. According to the UN (2013b), the survey results are based on 225 validated responses, and the 
survey was conducted among executives of the 5,000 largest nonfinancial MNEs, as well as professionals 
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the size of the economy and the magnitude of inbound FDI to the economy, studying 
cross-border profit shifting in Indonesia is substantially valuable, and the evidence 
provided will be beneficial to better understand the issue of profit shifting—particularly 
from the perspective of an emerging economy. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
The central research question of this thesis is: Do FOICs shift profits out of 
Indonesia to the parent’s country or other low tax countries? 
This thesis defines ‘parent’s country’ as the country in which the immediate parent 
of an FOIC is located—not the location of the ultimate parent. The DGT only provides 
the country of the immediate parents of FOICs. In addition, this thesis defines ‘parent’s 
tax rate’ as the statutory tax rate of the country in which the immediate parent is located. 
For example, PT Google Indonesia is an FOIC and a subsidiary of Google Asia Pacific 
Pte Ltd, which is located in Singapore. Google Asia Pacific is ultimately owned by 
Alphabet Inc. in the United States (US). Here, Google Asia Pacific Pte Ltd. is the 
immediate parent. Therefore, this thesis uses the Singaporean tax rate rather than the US 
tax rate to examine whether PT Google Indonesia shift profits out of Indonesia. 
Three studies are conducted to provide answers to the central research question. 
Study 1 and Study 2 detect whether FOICs use profit shifting strategies to avoid 
Indonesian corporate income tax (CIT). Study 3 identifies the channels used by FOICs to 
shift profits out of Indonesia. The research questions of the three studies are presented 
below. 
                                                 
working in 245 national and subnational investment promotion agencies. This information demonstrates 
the worthiness of choosing Indonesia as the subject of the study—particularly in terms of the magnitude of 
FDI. 
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Study 1: Does the tax rate difference between the country of residence of an 
FOIC’s parent and Indonesia affect the TI and pre-tax AP reported by FOICs in 
their Indonesian tax returns, after controlling for firm size, maturity and industry? 
Study 2: Does the tax rate of the country of residence of an FOIC’s parent affect 
the TI and AP reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns, after controlling 
for the true profit generated by capital and labour inputs? 
Although the research question of Study 2 is similar to that of Study 1, Study 2 uses 
a different approach to detect profit shifting. Specifically, Study 2 uses the Hines and Rice 
(1994) approach (hereafter HRA), which is a widely recognised technique used to detect 
the existence of cross-border profit shifting by MNEs. 
Study 3: How do FOICs shift profits from Indonesia? 
Study 3 attempts to find more direct evidence of the existence of BEPS in Indonesia 
by identifying the channels that FOICs are likely to use to shift profits by comparing the 
performance between FOICs and comparable DOICs in two indicators that are expected 
to capture the two most widely used channels by MNEs to shift profits: transfer pricing 
and high debt financing by related parties. The two indicators are: (1) earnings before 
interest and taxes scaled by total sales (to detect profit shifting using the transfer pricing 
channel) and (2) long-term debt to related parties scaled by total assets (to detect profit 
shifting using the debt financing channel). 
 
1.3 Major Findings 
Study 1 uses the statutory corporate tax rate (STR) difference between countries in 
which the parent companies are located and Indonesia (STRParent − STRIndonesia) as 
incentives for FOICs to determine the magnitude of profits they report in their Indonesian 
tax returns. The key finding is that the STR difference is positively associated with the 
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level of TI and AP reported by FOICs. That is, the lower the parent’s STR relative to the 
Indonesian STR, the lower the TI and AP reported by FOICs, and vice versa. This 
suggests that FOICs shift profits out of Indonesia to low-tax jurisdictions to avoid 
Indonesian CIT. More precisely, the regression result shows that an STR in the parent’s 
country that is one percentage point higher (lower) relative to Indonesia is associated with 
a 1.68% and a 1.27% increase (decrease) in the TI and AP respectively (both scaled by 
total sales) reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns. This finding provides 
preliminary evidence of the incidence of cross-border profit shifting in Indonesia and is 
further supported by the empirical evidence from the other two studies in this thesis. 
Study 2 further examines the presence of cross-border profit shifting in Indonesia 
by adopting the HRA with some modifications. This approach is widely used to 
investigate the incidence of profit shifting by MNEs. After analysing a final sample of 
more than 3,000 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2015, this study finds that the effect 
of a variation of one percentage point in the parent’s tax rate on reported AP (TI) by 
FOICs to the Indonesian tax authority is 2.56% (2.89%). 
Therefore, the results of Study 1 and Study 2 provide evidence that profit shifting 
occurs in Indonesia. Study 3 attempts to discover how FOICs shift profits. More 
specifically, it investigates whether FOICs use the two most widely used channels 
(transfer pricing arrangements and high debt financing) to shift profits by comparing 
profitability and debts to related parties between FOICs and DOICs. The first step of the 
investigation is to generate a dataset that contains a matched DOIC for each FOIC. This 
study uses the propensity score matching (PSM) technique for the matching procedure. 
Next, the matched dataset obtained from the PSM procedure is analysed using paired t-
tests and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The results of all tests suggest that 
FOICs use both transfer pricing and debt financing to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
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Further, the regression results indicate that transfer pricing plays a more important role 
than debt financing in FOICs avoiding Indonesian CIT. 
 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis in four sections. The first section provides the 
background and motivation of the study, and it describes the incidence and contemporary 
development of cross-border profit shifting around the world, as well as the importance 
of providing empirical evidence from a developing country’s perspective. The second 
section states the central research question of the thesis and the research question for each 
study. Section 3 presents the key findings of the three studies in this thesis. Finally, 
Section 4 outlines the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 explains taxation in Indonesia in two parts. The first part describes the 
Indonesian tax system, including how companies are taxed under Indonesian tax law, how 
Indonesian tax law defines FDI, how FOICs register in an Indonesia tax office and how 
Indonesian tax law treats income tax paid overseas. The second part explains tax 
administration in Indonesia, including the organisation structure of the DGT, how tax 
reforms have affected the structure of the Indonesian tax office and the quality of tax 
services and data, and the performance of tax revenue and tax compliance in Indonesia. 
Chapter 3 presents a literature review of cross-border profit shifting. First, it 
explains the theory of corporate tax avoidance, with an emphasis on the theory of tax 
avoidance by MNEs, and methods used to identify the existence of profit shifting by 
MNEs. It then provides a general review of studies that focus on tax avoidance by MNEs 
in developed countries and developing countries. Finally, it discusses profits shifting 
activities by FOICs and efforts undertaken by the DGT to fight profit shifting. 
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Chapter 4 presents Study 1 of the thesis. Prior studies allege that MNEs shift profits 
from both developed and developing countries. However, few empirical studies have used 
tax return data from developing countries. Study 1 fills this gap by investigating how the 
tax rate difference between the parent country of an FOIC and Indonesia affects the profit 
reported by the FOIC in its Indonesian tax return. This is the first step in identifying the 
existence of profit shifting by foreign MNEs operating in Indonesia. 
Chapter 5 presents Study 2 of the thesis. According to Fuest and Riedel (2012), 
there is limited knowledge of profit shifting in developing countries because the findings 
of most existing studies are difficult to interpret, mainly because of problems relating to 
data reliability and the method used to measure profit shifting. Study 2 reinforces the 
findings of Study 1, which finds that FOICs shift profits out of Indonesia, using the HRA 
with some modifications. The HRA is based on the Cobb–Douglas production function 
and has been widely cited in the literature of international tax avoidance—particularly in 
studies that focus on detecting the occurrence of cross-border profit shifting. 
Chapter 6 presents Study 3 of the thesis. Further to the findings of Study 1 and 
Study 2, which suggest that FOICs use profit shifting strategies to avoid Indonesian CIT, 
Study 3 attempts to provide more direct evidence of cross-border profit shifting in 
Indonesia by examining the channels used by FOICs to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
Most existing studies agree that MNEs use two channels to shift profits: transfer pricing 
and debt financing. Using transfer pricing, MNEs arrange prices for intra-firm 
transactions so they will end up paying lower income taxes than they should. Using debt 
financing, MNEs use debt rather than equity to finance their business in high-tax countries 
so they can claim interest expenses as a deduction, which leads to low tax liability. This 
study investigates whether FOICs use the two channels by comparing FOICs and 
comparable DOICs in terms of earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total sales (as 
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a proxy for profit shifting using the transfer pricing channel) and long-term debt to related 
parties scaled by total assets (as a proxy for profit shifting using the debt financing 
channel). 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It presents an overview and conclusion of the thesis, 
as well as contributions and limitations of the study, suggestions for future research and 
concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2:  
TAXATION IN INDONESIA 
 
This chapter discusses taxation in Indonesia in two sections. Section 2.1 describes 
the Indonesian tax system. In line with the topic of the thesis, this section mainly focuses 
on the tax system that is applicable to company taxpayers. Section 2.2 outlines tax 
administration in Indonesia, including Indonesian tax reforms, development of the 
Indonesian tax office structure and nationwide network, DGT performance in terms of 
tax revenue collected and the extent to which company taxpayers contribute to it, and 
performance of Indonesian tax to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio and tax compliance. 
 
2.1 Indonesian Tax System 
The general rules and procedures of taxation in Indonesia are regulated under Law 
No. 6/1983 (General Provisions and Procedures of Taxation Law) as lastly amended by 
Law No. 16/2009 (hereafter GPPTL). Article 1 (1) of GPPTL defines tax as a compulsory 
contribution to the state by individuals and entities that is enforceable by law, without 
direct benefit in return and is used for the purposes of the state for the greatest prosperity 
of the people. In the explanatory section, GPPTL states that the Indonesian tax system 
adheres to the self-assessment system, which aims at simpler tax administration.4 
The self-assessment system enables taxpayers to assess their own tax liabilities, 
such as computing TI and tax liability, paying tax owed and reporting the tax liabilities 
in their tax returns. Another important feature of the self-assessment system is that 
                                                 
4 As explained in Section 2.2, one of the most important results of the major tax reform in 1983 was that 
the Indonesian tax assessment system shifted from an official assessment system to a taxpayer assessment, 
or self-assessment, system. 
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taxpayers are expected to ‘comply willingly without the need for enquiries, obtrusive 
investigations, reminders or the threat or application of legal or administrative sanctions’ 
(James & Alley, 2002, p. 30). 
GPPTL Article 1 (2) defines a taxpayer as an individual or entity that possesses tax 
rights and obligations pursuant to the provisions in the tax laws. Further, GPPTL Article 
1 (3) refers to an entity as a group of people and/or capital that conducts business or not, 
such as a company, partnership, state or local government-owned enterprise, cooperative, 
pension fund, association, foundation, and social and political organisation, as well as 
other forms of entity, such as collective investment contract and permanent establishment. 
Therefore, entity basically includes any type of taxpayer other than individuals. 
The central government imposes a range of taxes through several Indonesian tax 
laws. Since the major tax reform in 1983,5 these taxes can be divided into four major 
types: (1) income taxes (imposed under Income Tax Law No. 7/1983 as lastly amended 
by Law No. 36/2008; hereafter ITL); (2) value-added taxes (imposed under Value Added 
and Luxury Goods Tax Law No. 8/1983 as lastly amended by Law No. 42/2009; hereafter 
VATL); (3) land and building taxes (imposed under Land and Building Tax Law No. 
12/1985 as lastly amended by Law No. 12/1994; hereafter Property Tax Law [PTL]);6 
and (4) other taxes (mainly stamp duty, which is imposed under Stamp Duty Law No. 
13/1985). This thesis only focuses on the first type of tax, namely income taxes—
particularly CIT. 
                                                 
5 Discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.1. 
6 PTL divides property taxes into two parts: (1) rural and urban property tax (known as PBB P2 in 
Indonesia); and (2) plantation, forestry and mining property tax (known as PBB P3 in Indonesia). On 
1 January 2014, the central government transferred the authority to manage and collect PBB P2 to local 
governments. Meanwhile, PBB P3 is still managed by the central government. 
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The rest of this section is divided into two subsections as follows. Section 2.1.1 
outlines the income tax system for company taxpayers as regulated in ITL and Section 
2.1.2 defines FDI and outlines how Indonesian tax law treats income tax paid overseas. 
 
2.1.1 Company Income Tax System in Indonesia 
According to ITL Article 1, income tax is imposed on income received or deemed 
to be received by a taxpayer in an income year. This provision contains three essential 
components. The first component is ‘taxpayer’. According to ITL Article 2, whether an 
entity or an individual is a resident taxpayer is determined based on residency; thus, a 
resident company taxpayer is a company established or domiciled in Indonesia.7 Given 
that FOICs domicile in Indonesia, they are considered resident taxpayers, similar to 
DOICs. FOICs and DOICs are therefore treated equally for tax purposes. In contrast, a 
non-resident company taxpayer is a company not established or domiciled in Indonesia, 
but that conducts business activity or receives income other than from business activity, 
either via or not via a permanent establishment such as a place of management, a branch 
or a representative office. If the business activity is run through a permanent 
establishment, ITL requires that the permanent establishment be treated as a resident 
company taxpayer for tax purposes.8 
The second component is ‘income’. ITL Article 4 (1) defines income as any 
additional economic capability derived by a taxpayer from Indonesia and outside 
Indonesia that can be used for consumption or to increase the wealth of the taxpayer under 
any name or any form, including compensation in any form, lottery prizes, business 
                                                 
7 Resident individual taxpayers are individuals who reside in Indonesia, individuals who have been present 
in Indonesia for more than 183 days within a 12-month period and individuals who have resided in 
Indonesia within a particular taxable year and who intend to reside in Indonesia. 
8 Non-resident taxpayers other than permanent establishments are not treated as resident taxpayers. For 
example, they do not need to file an annual tax return as resident taxpayers and permanent establishments 
do. 
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profits (including profits from sharia businesses), gain on sale of assets, tax refunds (that 
have been claimed as deductions), interest income, dividend in any form, royalties, rent 
income, gain on assets revaluation and insurance premiums received by insurance 
companies. 
The elucidation of ITL Article 4 (1) explains that ITL refers to income as a broad 
meaning and that the definition shall not be limited to examples mentioned in the Article. 
It further explains that the income tax shall be imposed on any increase in economic 
capability received or deemed to be received9 by a taxpayer from any source that can be 
used for consumption or for increasing the wealth of the taxpayer. ITL emphasises that 
the income definition focuses more on the presence of additional economic capability 
than the source of the income. In addition, ITL states that income can be divided into four 
categories: (1) income from employment (e.g., salary) and independent work (e.g., 
income received by accountants and lawyers), (2) income from business activities, (3) 
passive income (e.g., interest, dividends, royalties, gain on sales of assets) and (4) other 
income (e.g., discharge of debts, prizes). 
Further, ITL asserts that because the Law adopts the concept of income in a broad 
meaning, all types of income received or deemed to be received in an income year shall 
be combined to form the TI for that income year. Thus, if a company suffers a loss from 
a business in an income year, the loss can be used to offset income from the company’s 
other sources of income (i.e., horizontal compensation). However, this does not apply to 
a loss incurred outside Indonesia. Moreover, income that is taxed with a final withholding 
tax10 or that is exempt from income tax under ITL shall not be combined with other 
income that is subject to the non-final income tax rate. 
                                                 
9 Gain on assets revaluation is an example of income that is deemed to be received. 
10 Final tax is a special treatment in taxing income. It contains three features: (1) the party that pays income 
(first party) withholds tax on the income received by another party (second party); (2) the second party 
excludes the income from its TI; and (3) the second party cannot claim the tax paid (i.e., tax withheld by 
15 
The last component is ‘income year’. Both GPPTL (Article 1) and ITL (elucidation 
of Article 1) define income year as the period of the calendar year, unless the taxpayer 
uses a financial year. Most taxpayers in Indonesia adopt the calendar year as their 
financial year because it simplifies the preparation of tax reports. 
ITL lists not only types of income that should be taxed under the Law, but also 
several types that should be excluded (exempt) from TI. Article 4(3) of the Law lists the 
exempt incomes as follows: (1) donations to religious institutions that have been 
authorised by the government; (2) bequeathed assets received by religious, education and 
social institutions or individuals that run micro and small businesses;11 (3) inheritance; 
(4) assets received by company taxpayers in exchange for shares or equity contributions; 
(5) benefits in kind, unless given by non-taxpayers or given by taxpayers under final 
income tax and deemed-profit schemes;12 (6) insurance claims received by individual 
taxpayers;13 (7) dividend income received by resident company taxpayers if the following 
two criteria are satisfied: the recipient owns at least 25% of the shares of the company 
that distributes the dividends, and the company that distributes the dividends was 
established and is located in Indonesia; (8) pension contribution received by pension 
funds; (9) gain from investment received by pension funds in (8); (10) profit distribution 
received by partners of a partnership and by members of a cooperative, foundation, 
                                                 
the first party) to offset against its tax payable (non-creditable). The rate of final tax varies depending on 
the type of business activity. For instance, the final withholding tax rate for interest income received from 
any deposits held with banks and the final withholding tax rate for prizes won in lotteries is 20% and 25%, 
respectively. 
11 Micro, Small and Medium Business Law No. 20 Year 2008 Article 6 states that a business is classified 
as a micro or small business based on two criteria: net asset and revenue. A micro business is a business 
that possesses net assets and revenue of Rp50 million or less and Rp300 million or less, respectively. A 
small business is a business that possesses net assets and revenues of more than Rp50 million but not more 
than Rp500 million, and more than Rp300 million but not more than Rp2.5 billion, respectively. Rp is the 
symbol for Rupiah, which is the official currency of Indonesia. The currency code is IDR (Indonesian 
Rupiah). Rupiah, IDR and Rp are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
12 For instance, facilities (e.g., housing, car) received by a resident taxpayer who works for a foreign 
diplomatic representative office in Jakarta are regarded as income because a diplomatic office does not 
meet the definition of taxpayer under ITL. 
13 As explained in elucidation of ITL Article 4(3e), this is consistent with ITL Article 9 (1d), which 
disallows insurance premiums paid by individual taxpayers as deductions. 
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association and organisation, because under GPPTL Article 1 (3), all entities, including 
cooperative, partnership, foundation, association and organisation, are treated as 
taxpayers; (11) income generated by small, micro and medium venture capital companies 
that do not trade shares in stock exchanges;14 (12) scholarship allowances; (13) existing 
surplus in non-profit organisations and (14) aids or compensation paid by social 
institutions. 
ITL Article 6 (1) states that TI shall be derived from total assessable income less 
expenses incurred to generate, collect and maintain the income.15 Therefore, taxpayers 
can claim any expenses incurred for the sake of generating, collecting or maintaining 
income as a deduction. According to ITL, deductible expenses include expenses that are 
incurred that directly or indirectly have a nexus with assessable income. The word used 
in the definition is ‘includes’ rather than ‘means’, implying that it does not really define 
‘deductions’. Therefore, from the definition and wording, it can be interpreted that a 
deductible expense implies a broad meaning of deductions for tax purposes, even though 
the elucidation of deduction provision in ITL Article 6 (1) does not specifically mention 
that the deductions are not limited to the examples listed in the following paragraph, as 
in the elucidation of income provision in ITL Article 4(1). 
ITL provides the following examples of deductible expenses: purchase costs of 
goods, salary expenses, administrative expenses, taxes other than income tax, 
depreciation and amortisation, contributions to a pension fund, losses incurred from the 
sale or transfer of assets used in the business, losses on foreign exchange, research and 
                                                 
14 President Regulation No. 9 Year 2009 Article 1 (3) defines a venture capital company as a type of 
financing company that invests capital in another company (investee company) in the form of shares, 
convertible bonds or profit sharing for a certain period. Whether a venture capital is a micro, small or 
medium business depends on the two criteria (net asset and revenue) as set in Micro, Small and Medium 
Business Law No. 20 Year 2008 Article 6. While micro and small business criteria have been stated 
previously, a medium business is a business that possesses net assets and revenues of more than Rp500 
million but not more than Rp10 billion, and more than Rp2.5 billion but not more than Rp50 billion, 
respectively. 
15 ITL uses the term ‘expenses’ instead of ‘deductions’, which is used in countries such as Australia. 
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development (R&D) if conducted in Indonesia, scholarships, apprenticeships and training 
expenses, uncollectible receivables, donations for national disasters, donations for R&D 
conducted in Indonesia, costs of social infrastructure development, donations in the form 
of education facilities stipulated by a government regulation, and donations for sport 
enhancement. If there is a loss after subtracting the deductions from the gross income, 
ITL allows the loss to be carried forward for a maximum of five succeeding years. 
The Indonesian CIT rate was 30% between the enactment of ITL in 1984 until 2008. 
It then decreased to 28% in 2009 and 25% in 2010.16 
According to ITL, income tax is applicable to different types of income at different 
rates, as follows: 
1. Article 4(2) 
To promote investment and saving and to simplify tax collection by the tax office 
and tax reporting by taxpayers, the government made the following incomes subject 
to final withholding tax: interest income from savings and bonds, lottery prizes, 
dividend income received by individual taxpayers, income from selling shares and 
other securities, and income from selling/renting land and buildings. The tax rates 
imposed on such incomes are diverse and are regulated in specific government 
regulations. For example, Government Regulation No. 19/2009 imposes 10% final 
withholding tax on dividend income received by individual resident taxpayers. 
2. Article 21 
                                                 
16 For individual taxpayers, ITL levies a progressive income tax rate of 5% to 30%, which has remained 
unchanged since 2009. The progressive income tax rate structure consists of four layers: (1) 5% for TI up 
to Rp50 million; (2) 10% for TI above Rp50 million to Rp250 million; (3) 25% for TI above Rp250 million 
to Rp500 million; and (4) 30% for TI above Rp500 million. 
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Employers including government treasurers, pension funds and other entities are 
obliged to withhold tax17 on income received by individual resident taxpayers 
resulting from employment, services or any other activities performed by taxpayers. 
The tax rates used are the progressive income tax rates for individual taxpayers. 
3. Article 22 
The finance minister is authorised to assign: (1) treasurers in government bodies to 
withhold tax on income received by suppliers resulting from the supply of goods to 
government bodies; (2) certain entities to withhold income tax on imports or other 
activities (e.g., automotive and cement industries); and (3) certain entities to withhold 
income tax on the sale of luxury goods. Luxury goods are determined based on the 
type and prices of the goods. Examples include cruise ships, luxury houses, luxury 
condominiums and apartments, and luxury vehicles. The tax rates imposed on such 
incomes depend on the type of transaction, and the rates are regulated in specific 
Finance Minister Regulations. 
4. Article 23 
If resident taxpayers or permanent establishments (i.e., non-resident taxpayers that 
are treated equally as resident taxpayers for tax purposes) pay the following income 
to other resident taxpayers, they are obliged to withhold tax on the income received 
by the other taxpayers: dividend income received by company taxpayers, interest 
income other than that mentioned in Article 4(2), income from royalties and prizes 
(other than the lottery), awards and bonuses that are not taxed under Article 21 (the 
tax rate imposed is 15%), and rent income other than that mentioned in Article 4(2) 
(the tax rate imposed is 2%). 
                                                 
17 Withholding tax is a special treatment in taxing income other than final withholding tax. The only 
difference between withholding tax and final withholding tax is that the party who receives the income can 
claim the tax paid by the party who pays income to offset against its tax payable (creditable). 
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5. Article 24 
This article is about foreign income tax offset and is discussed in detail in Section 
2.1.2. 
6. Article 25 
As Articles 21–23 cover employment income and passive income, ITL Article 25 
mainly refers to instalment payments of tax on income from businesses. It requires 
taxpayers to pay instalments based on the difference between the previous year’s tax 
payable and income taxes already paid for ITL Articles 21–24. Accordingly, the 
formula to compute the monthly income tax instalment is: 
Monthly income tax instalment = 
last year’s tax payable− tax paid for Article 21,22,23,24
12
 
7. Article 26 
If resident taxpayers or permanent establishments pay the following income to non-
resident taxpayers other than permanent establishments,18 they are obliged to 
withhold tax: dividend income, interest income other than that mentioned in Article 
4(2), income from royalties, income from renting assets, salaries from employment, 
delivering services, and other activities, prizes and rewards. The applicable tax rate 
is 20% unless stated otherwise in a tax treaty between Indonesia and the taxpayer’s 
country of domicile (Section 2.1.2 discusses the tax treaty in more detail).19 
                                                 
18 Other types of non-resident taxpayers are non-resident individual taxpayers and non-resident entity 
taxpayers other than permanent establishments. ITL Section 4(b) defines non-resident individuals as 
individuals who receive income from Indonesia but do not reside in Indonesia, or who live in Indonesia for 
not more than 183 days within a 12-month period, and defines non-resident entity taxpayers other than 
permanent establishments as entities that receive income from Indonesia but are not established or located 
in Indonesia. 
19 Based on this explanation, dividends can be taxed on three different tax rates: (1) 10% if received by 
resident individual taxpayers (under Article 4(2) of ITL); (2) 15% if received by resident company 
taxpayers (under Article 23 of ITL), but disregarded if received from a resident company taxpayer and the 
recipient controls at least 25% of the shares of the distributing company (under Article 4(3) of ITL); and 
(3) 20% if received by non-resident taxpayers, unless stated otherwise in the tax treaty between Indonesia 
and the domicile country of the recipient (under Article 26 of ITL). 
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According to Article 26(5) of ITL, the tax withheld on income received by a non-
resident taxpayer is final tax unless: 
a. the non-resident taxpayer is a parent company of a permanent establishment in 
Indonesia and the income received by the parent company is derived from 
business activities that are similar20 or effectively related21 to those of the 
permanent establishment 
b. the status of the non-resident taxpayer changes to a resident taxpayer in the same 
income year as the period in which the income was received. 
8. Article 29 
ITL Article 29 requires resident taxpayers (including permanent establishments) to 
compare the total tax credit with tax payable in that income year before they file their 
annual income tax return. Tax credits are taxes already paid on income in a particular 
income year that can be used to offset the tax payable in that income year. According 
to ITL Article 28(1), tax credits are income tax paid for ITL Articles 21–25 and 
26(5a,b). Tax credit Article 24 is about foreign income tax offset and is explained in 
more detail in Section 2.1.2. 
Total tax credit is the sum of taxes already paid for ITL Articles 21–25 and 26(5a,b). 
Tax payable is TI multiplied by the CIT rate. If the tax paid is greater than the tax 
payable, the taxpayer can file a request for a tax refund. In contrast, if the tax paid is 
                                                 
20 For example, if a parent company overseas receives income from selling products that are similar to those 
sold by its permanent establishment in Indonesia, the income is deemed to be received by the permanent 
establishment instead of the parent company. The tax withheld on such income is not final tax; therefore, it 
can be claimed as tax credit by the resident company that withholds the tax. 
21 For example, if a parent company overseas receives income from royalties and provides management 
services in connection with the royalties through a permanent establishment to a resident taxpayer in 
Indonesia, the income received from selling the royalties is deemed to be received by the permanent 
establishment instead of the parent company because the royalties are effectively connected to the activities 
of the permanent establishment. The tax withheld on such income is not final tax; therefore, it can be 
claimed as tax credit by the resident company that withholds the tax. 
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lower than the tax payable, the taxpayer is required to pay the shortage under Article 
29 before submitting their annual income tax return. 
No ITL articles allow the CIT paid on company profit to be attached to the 
dividends and claimed by shareholders as a tax credit. This implies that Indonesia adopts 
the classical system of company taxation (as in the US) rather than the dividend 
imputation system (as in Australia). In the classical system of company taxation, income 
tax paid by a company cannot be passed on to its shareholders, whereas the dividend 
imputation system allows this to occur. Tran (2015, p. 575) explains the Australian 
dividend imputation system as follows: ‘Under the imputation system, income tax paid 
by companies can be passed on to resident equity-holders as tax credits when profits are 
distributed as dividends’. He adds: ‘consequently, corporate tax is not necessarily a real 
cost, and publicly owned Australian firms with predominantly domestic ownership may 
have less incentives to manipulate taxable income to avoid tax’. As Indonesia adopts a 
classical system that taxes company profit and shareholders’ dividend income separately, 
Indonesian companies have incentive to avoid CIT to maximise shareholders’ wealth. 
Further, Tax avoidance literature suggests that foreign-owned companies avoid paying 
taxes in the countries where they run their business by shifting profits to lower-tax 
jurisdictions. This reasoning applies to FOICs. 
In Indonesia, consolidation only applies to financial reporting and is not adopted 
for tax purposes. As a result, all intra-group transactions, including transfer pricing and 
debt financing, are eliminated only in consolidated financial reports, but remain reflected 
in corporate tax returns. This institutional arrangement allows the investigation of intra-
group transactions using tax return data in Study 3 which examines whether FOICs use 
intra-group transfer pricing and/or debt financing to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
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2.1.2 Definition of Foreign Direct Investment and the Foreign Income Tax Offset 
in Indonesia 
To understand and appreciate international tax planning by MNEs, one must have 
a basic knowledge of the elements of international commerce foundation within a country 
(Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, & Shevlin, 2009). However, before discussing 
this knowledge, this section will define FDI under Indonesian law and then outline the 
registration procedures of an FOIC in an Indonesian tax office to lay the foundation for 
an explanation of how a foreign affiliate becomes a taxpayer in the country. 
An MNE consists of a group of companies operating in different countries under 
the control of a parent company. Foreign MNEs are foreign companies that operate in 
Indonesia via direct investment, known as ‘FDI firms’ (DGT, 2011, p. 62)22 or, more 
popularly, FOICs (DGT, 2015a). That is, an FOIC is a company that is established or 
acquired by an MNE to conduct business in Indonesia; therefore, it is part of a foreign 
MNE. Given that many of the FOICs included in the dataset used in this thesis were 
established many decades ago, it is important to trace back the FDI regulations imposed 
by the government in the first place. 
On 10 January 1967, the President of Indonesia signed Foreign Direct Investment 
Law No. 1/1967.23 According to Article 1 of the Law, FDI encompasses foreign 
investments in the form of conducting business in Indonesia whereby foreign investors 
                                                 
22 This is consistent with tax literature (e.g. Markusen, 1995, as discussed in Subsection 3.1.2), which uses 
the terms MNEs and FDI firms interchangeably. 
23 Laws and Regulations Establishment Law No. 12 Year 2011 regulates the process of a bill becoming law 
in Indonesia (previously regulated under Law No. 10 Year 2004 and Law No. 2 Year 1950). Basically, a 
bill can be filed either by the parliament or the president (Article 43). The bill proposed by the president is 
prepared by the minister or the head of non-ministerial government in accordance with the scope of duties 
and responsibilities (Article 47). The bill is then sent to the head of the parliament (Article 50 (1)). If a bill 
is prepared by the parliament, the head of the parliament is required to send the bill to the president (Article 
47 (1)). The parliament or the president (represented by a relevant minister) is required to start discussing 
the bill within a maximum period of 60 days from the receipt of the bill (Article 49 (2) or Article 50 (3), 
respectively). If the parliament and the government jointly approve the bill, the head of the parliament is 
required to send the bill to the president for enactment (Article 72 (1)). Subsequently, the president is 
required to sign the bill within a maximum period of 30 days from the day the bill was approved (Article 
73 (1)). This marks the entry into force of the law. 
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directly bear the risk of the investments. However, neither the Law nor the lower-level 
regulations (i.e., government regulation, presidential regulation and presidential decree) 
specified any ownership limitations. On 16 April 1992, the government issued 
Government Regulation No. 17/199224 regarding the ownership requirement for FDIs. 
Some important features of the regulation are: (1) the investment should not be less than 
USD250,000; (2) domestic investors should possess at least 5% of the total shares at the 
time the company is established; and (3) domestic investor shares should increase to at 
least 20% in 10 years and 51% in 20 years. On 19 May 1994, the government revoked 
Government Regulation No. 17/1992 by imposing Government Regulation No. 20/1994. 
A key change made in the new regulation was that the government kept feature (2) above 
and removed features (1) and (3), suggesting that the government relaxed the investment 
requirements to boost FDI inflow to Indonesia. On 20 July 2000, Presidential Decree No. 
96/2000 regarding FDI was made. The new decree differentiated business sectors closed 
to FDI from sectors open to FDI. The business sectors that are open to FDI were divided 
into two categories based on maximum ownership by foreign direct investors (i.e., 49% 
and 95%). 
On 26 April 2007, the government and the parliament revoked Law No. 1/1967 and 
signed new Law No. 25/2007. Article 1 of the new Law redefines FDI as capital 
investment activity in the form of business in Indonesia by foreign investors either fully 
using foreign capital or partly using domestic capital. The enforcement of the new Law 
was followed by several other government regulations (i.e., No. 77/2007, 111/2007, 
36/2010 and 39/2014).25 Although these regulations contain broader sectors and a wider 
                                                 
24 Government Regulation No. 17/1992 Article 12 revokes all previous decrees of the head of the Indonesian 
Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) regarding FDI, suggesting that until the early 1990s, the 
ownership limitation had been regulated under decrees of the head of BKPM, which are relatively low-
level regulations in the Indonesian law structure (even compared with a government regulation). 
25 The latter government regulation revoked the previous one (i.e., Government Regulation No. 111/2007 
revoked Presidential Decree No. 77/2007, Government Regulation No. 36/2010 revoked Government 
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range of ownership limit, they basically follow the two principles in Presidential Decree 
No. 96/2000: (1) they differentiate sectors that are open for FDI from those that are not; 
and (2) the ownership limit is more diverse, but still in the range of 49%–95%. 
As explained in Section 2.2.1, DOICs and FOICs are resident-company taxpayers 
and are therefore equally treated for tax purposes in Indonesia. However, there is a minor 
difference regarding their registration in a tax office because of the presence of foreign 
investment tax offices (FTOs). Figure 2.1 illustrates the tax registration procedures of an 
FOIC in Indonesian tax offices. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Registration of an FOIC in Indonesian Tax Offices 
 FOIC 
 
 
 
 
 No Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
An FOIC is registered in a small taxpayer office (STO) for the first time. The 
company’s registration status can be changed to either a regional medium taxpayer office 
                                                 
Regulation No. 111/2007 and Government Regulation No. 39/2014 revoked Government Regulation No. 
36/2010), which means that Government Regulation No. 39/2014 is still in force today. Government 
Regulation No. 39/2014 significantly changes the previous regulations by broadening the ownership range 
to 30%–100%. However, as the latter regulation came into force on 24 April 2014 and all FOICs included 
in this thesis were established before that date, the regulation is not relevant to this thesis. Therefore, this 
thesis uses Government Regulation No. 36/2010. 
STO Go 
Public? 
RMTO/FTO 
PLCTO 
LTO 
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(RMTO) or an FTO by a decree of the Director General of Tax. If the company is listed 
on the stock market (very few are), the Director General of Tax issues another decree to 
declare the registration change of the company to a public-listed company tax office 
(PLCTO). FOICs with certain revenue, total assets and total tax paid may be transferred 
to a large taxpayer office (LTO) by a decree of the Director General of Tax. 
According to Scholes, et al. (2009), there are three elements of international 
commerce foundation. The first element is the ways in which foreign income is taxed. 
The tax literature groups countries by taxation of foreign income into two broad 
categories: territorial and worldwide systems (Markle, 2015). Countries that adopt the 
territorial system exempt foreign income from income tax calculations. In contrast, 
countries that adopt the worldwide system tax foreign income at their domestic rates and 
allow credits for tax paid on foreign income to avoid double taxation. As discussed in 
Section 2.2.1, ITL Article 4 (1) states that all income from Indonesia and outside 
Indonesia are subject to Indonesian income tax, suggesting that the country has adopted 
the worldwide income system. 
Markle (2015) finds that, on average, MNEs subject to territorial tax systems shift 
more profits than those subject to worldwide tax systems when the parent country is 
involved, and the two groups appear to shift equally among their foreign affiliates. 
Different from Markle (2015), Scholes et al. (2009) suggest that MNEs in countries that 
impose worldwide tax systems may have incentive to shift profits as those in countries 
that impose territorial tax regimes. The reason for this is that, while most countries with 
worldwide tax systems allow resident taxpayers to claim tax paid in foreign countries as 
an offset against their domestic tax liability, in some cases the full amount of tax paid 
overseas cannot be claimed because of the tax offset limit imposed by the government. 
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Indonesian foreign income tax offset policy is discussed in more detail at the end of this 
section. 
The second element is the ways in which foreign operations can be structured by 
MNEs. As Scholes et al. (2009) suggest, MNEs can choose to operate their foreign 
affiliate as a branch, a partnership or a subsidiary company because most countries 
impose income tax on branches, partnerships and subsidiaries differently. This is also true 
in the case of Indonesia. For example, profit distribution received by partners in a 
partnership is exempted from income tax. In contrast, income distributed to shareholders 
in a subsidiary will be taxed as dividend income. Under ITL Article 2(5), MNE branches 
are categorised as permanent establishments. Further, ITL Article 2(1a) states that 
permanent establishments are treated as resident company taxpayers for tax purposes. For 
instance, permanent establishments are required to lodge an annual tax return, similarly 
to domestic companies. Nonetheless, permanent establishments are different from 
subsidiaries because permanent establishments are required to report income derived 
from Indonesia only. In contrast, subsidiaries are required to report worldwide income in 
their Indonesian annual tax returns. 
The focus of this thesis is foreign MNEs that operate their affiliates in Indonesia in 
the form of subsidiaries (i.e., FOICs). There are several reasons for focusing on 
subsidiaries: (1) subsidiaries are usually larger: they have larger capacity in terms of 
production, sales and technology; (2) FDI inflow to Indonesia mostly takes the form of 
establishing or acquiring subsidiaries; and (3) more importantly, subsidiaries as separate 
legal entities are more suitable for complex transactions designed to shift profits. 
The third and most important element of international commerce foundation is how 
foreign tax credits can be structured by MNEs. As explained earlier, Indonesia has 
adopted the worldwide tax system. This means that all income received from Indonesia 
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and outside Indonesia is assessable income under Indonesian tax law. However, losses 
incurred outside Indonesia cannot be used to offset against assessable income. 
To avoid double taxation of foreign income, ITL Article 24 allows tax already paid 
offshore by resident taxpayers to be credited in the same year against tax payable in 
Indonesia as long as it does not exceed a certain level. The foreign tax credit (FTC) limit 
or foreign income tax offset (FITO) limit is intended to prevent taxpayers from obtaining 
tax relief in excess of the domestic tax payable on the foreign income. Indonesian Finance 
Minister Decree No. 165/2002 specifies that the FITO limit is calculated as follows: 
FITO limit = 
income from overseas 
global TI
 X total tax payable 
In addition, the decree requires that the FITO limit calculation be performed for 
each country if the foreign income is derived from several countries. 
According to ITL Article 24, the tax paid overseas that can be claimed as FITO is 
the tax directly imposed on income obtained by Indonesian taxpayers from overseas. 
Therefore, tax paid overseas may not be eligible to be claimed as FITO if the income after 
tax is not transferred to the Indonesian taxpayer. The income tax imposed on the income 
transferred to the Indonesian taxpayer is the tax that can be considered FITO. An example 
is presented below to explain how much FITO can be claimed for the tax paid overseas.26 
Indonesian Company A is the sole shareholder of X Inc. in Country U. The income- 
and tax-related information of X Inc. in 2013 is as follows: 
(1) TI of X Inc. Rp20,000,000,000 
(2) Corporate income tax (25%)       5,000,000,000 
(3) Income after tax (paid out as dividends) 15,000,000,000 
(4) Withholding tax on dividends (20%)      3,000,000,000 
                                                 
26 All foreign currency amounts have been converted into Indonesian Rupiah at the appropriate exchange 
rate for tax purposes. In practice, the exchange rate for tax purposes is regulated by the Finance Minister 
decree on a weekly basis. 
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(5) Dividends received by Company A 12,000,000,000 
Suppose that the TI of Company A’s Indonesia operations in 2013 is 
Rp50,000,000,000. The tax payable is computed as follows: 
(6) TI from Indonesia operations Rp50,000,000,000 
(7) Dividends (before withholding tax)      15,000,000,000 
(8) Total TI 65,000,000,000 
(9) Tax payable (25%) 16,250,000,000 
FITO limit = 
15,000,000,000 
65,000,000,000
 ×  16,250,000,000 = Rp3,750,000,000 
Given that the amount of withholding tax paid in Country U (Rp3,000,000,000) is 
less than the FITO limit (Rp3,750,000,000), Company A can claim the withholding tax 
Rp3,000,000,000 on the dividends received as FITO. Therefore, in 2013, Company A’s 
final tax liability (liability after including FITO) is Rp16,250,000,000 − Rp3,000,000,000 
= Rp13,250,000,000.  
 
2.2 Indonesian Tax Administration 
The DGT is a single directorate within the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (OECD, 
2013a).27 The DGT’s head office is led by the Director General of Tax, an Echelon 1 
structural position within the Ministry of Finance.28 
Figure 2.2 depicts the organisational structure of the DGT head office. 
 
                                                 
27
 The OECD (2013a) classifies four broad categories of institutional setups for conducting tax 
administration: a single directorate within the Ministry of Finance (MoF); multiple directorates within the 
MoF; unified semi-autonomous body in which the head of the tax authority reports to a government 
minister; and a unified semi-autonomous body with a board, in which the head of the tax authority reports 
to a government minister and an external official oversees the board. 
28 The Indonesian MoF is headed by the Finance Minister. There are five structural levels under the 
minister’s supervision: Echelon 1, 2, 3, 4 and staff (non-echelon). The lower the number of the echelon, the 
higher the position in the ministry. For example, within the DGT, the Director General, a Director, a Deputy 
Director and a Head of Section are Echelon 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. 
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Figure 2.2 
Organisational Chart of the DGT Head Office29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Directorate General of Tax (2015b) 
 
In the head office, the Director General of Tax is assisted by one secretary, four 
senior advisors and 12 directors. The vision of the DGT is ‘to become the best state tax 
                                                 
29 This chart is valid to 20 December 2015. On 21 December 2015, the Indonesian Finance Minister signed 
Regulation No. 234/PMK.01/2015, which set up three new directorates within the DGT: Directorate of Law 
Enforcement, Directorate of International Taxation and Directorate of Tax Intelligence. The Directorate of 
Tax Intelligence and the Directorate of Law Enforcement were formerly a single directorate called the 
Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation. 
Director General 
Secretary of the Directorate 
General 
Director of Taxation Regulations I 
(General Provision, VAT, Land and Building) 
Director of Taxation Regulations II 
(Income Tax and International Taxation) 
Director of Tax Audit and 
Collections 
Director of Tax Intelligence and 
Investigation 
Director of Tax Extensification and 
Valuation 
Director of Tax Objection and 
Appeals 
Director of Tax Potency, 
Compliance and Revenue 
Director of Tax Dissemination, 
Services and Public Relations 
Director of Tax Information 
Technology 
Director of Internal Compliance 
and Apparatus Transformation 
Director of Information and 
Technology Transformation 
Director of Business Process 
Transformation 
Senior Advisors 
30 
administrator’. The missions of the DGT are to (1) collect tax revenue based on high 
voluntary tax compliance and fair law enforcement; (2) improve tax compliance through 
modern technology-based services; (3) equip tax officials with integrity, competency and 
professionalism; and (4) set up compensation for employees based on a performance 
management system (DGT, 2015b, p. 40). Indonesian tax offices throughout the country 
are expected to efficiently deliver tax services, disseminate tax information and monitor 
taxpayers, which boils down to the desire to have a higher level of tax compliance and 
therefore a greater collection of revenue from taxes. 
The rest of this section is organised as follows. Section 2.2.1 lays the foundation of 
tax administration in Indonesia by summarising tax reform history in the country and its 
effect on the structure of the Indonesian tax office. Section 2.2.2 discusses the 
performance of Indonesian tax revenue and tax compliance during the study period of this 
thesis (2009–2015). 
 
2.2.1 Tax Reforms in Indonesia 
Efforts to improve the DGT’s capacity to become an efficient tax collection 
institution began many years ago. In January 1981, the Indonesian Finance Minister 
received support from the Indonesian Planning Agency to initiate a major tax reform. 
According to Asher (1997), the main reason behind the government initiating the tax 
reform was the inefficiency of the tax system rather than pressure to increase tax revenue, 
because the government was receiving substantial revenue from oil at that time as a result 
of high oil prices. Subsequently, the minister asked the Harvard Institute of International 
Development to conduct technical studies and draft tax reform regulation for Indonesia 
(Asher, 1997). As a result, a technical expatriate team led by Professor Malcolm Gillis 
was formed in 1981. The team consisted of 28 experts in various areas (i.e., economists, 
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lawyers, tax administrators, accountants and computer scientists) from eight different 
countries—mostly the US. They worked on a major project known as the Indonesian tax 
reform project (hereafter the 1983 tax reform) under the Indonesian government’s 
financing plan during 1981–1984 (Gillis, 1985). 
In late 1983, the Indonesian government officially adopted the major tax reform 
recommended by the team. The recommendations included introducing the following 
legislations and tax information system: 
1. General Provisions and Procedures of Taxation Law No. 6 Year 1983 (or GPPTL, 
known as ‘Undang-undang Ketentuan Umum dan Tata Cara Perpajakan’ or ‘UU 
KUP’ in Indonesia), entered into force on 1 January 1984. 
2. Income Tax Law No. 7 Year 1983 (or ITL, known as ‘Undang-undang Pajak 
Penghasilan’ or ‘UU PPh’ in Indonesia), entered into force on 1 January 1984, 
replacing income tax laws enacted decades earlier by the former Dutch colonial 
administration. 
3. Value Added and Luxury Goods Tax Law No. 8 Year 1983 (or VATL, known as 
‘Undang-undang Pajak Pertambahan Nilai’ or ‘UU PPN’ in Indonesia), entered into 
force on 1 July 1984,30 replacing Sales Tax Law enacted in 1951. 
4. Land and Building Tax Law No. 12 Year 1985 (or PTL, known as ‘Undang-undang 
Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan’ or ‘UU PBB’ in Indonesia), entered into force on 1 
January 1986. 
5. Stamp Duty Law No. 13 Year 1985 (known as ‘Undang-undang Bea Meterai’ in 
Indonesia), entered into force on 1 January 1986. 
6. A new computerised tax information system. 
                                                 
30 However, the government postponed the VATL’s effective date until no later than 1 January 1986. 
According to Gillis (1985), the reason for the postponement was that the Indonesian tax authority needed 
more time to prepare the new tax forms required by the newly enacted tax law. 
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According to Gillis (1985), the new laws and information system proposed by his 
team contained two essential changes that were vital to achieve the objectives. The first 
change was a major simplification of the tax structure, which was achieved by unifying 
the tax rates, broadening the tax base and discontinuing ineffective tax incentives. The 
second change was depersonalisation of tax administration, which aimed to minimise 
interactions between tax officials and taxpayers by relying more on withholding methods, 
electronic data processing of tax information and a shift from the official assessment 
system to a taxpayer assessment or self-assessment system. This shift changed the culture 
of taxation in Indonesia. Therefore, the changes proposed by the tax reform team were 
considered revolutionary. 
The 1983 tax reform has arguably significantly improved the capability of the 
Indonesian tax administration. However, many things still need to be done to achieve the 
central objectives of the tax reform. Asher (1997, p. 163) summarises the challenges that 
the DGT is likely to encounter after completing the major tax reform: 
While the Indonesian tax reform represents a substantial improvement over the pre-
reform situation… there is however a need to ensure that the tax environment 
remains internationally competitive. The key problems that remain to be solved are 
improving the technical capabilities of the tax administration, improving equity and 
putting into practice new techniques to improve enforcement and compliance. 
Following the importance of improving tax administration capabilities, coupled 
with the need to respond to the 1997 Asian economic crisis (Widihartanto, 2014), the 
Indonesian Finance Minister launched the DGT Tax Administrative Reform Phase I 
(better known as ‘Modernisasi’ (modernisation) in Indonesia) in July 2002. ‘Modernisasi’ 
was aimed at ‘promoting voluntary compliance among taxpayers, enhancing the 
efficiency of administration and restoring taxpayers’ trust in the tax administration 
system’ (OECD, 2010, pp. 42–43). As a result, the DGT claimed that the tax 
administration reform equipped its tax office units nationwide with a ‘more efficient, 
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simplified and transparent business process, more advanced system and information 
technology, better human resources, improved good governance and more efficient 
structure of organisation’ (DGT, 2009, p. 38). 
The Tax Administrative Reform Phase I was completed at the end of 2008. The 
completion of the project was marked by the implementation of a new system (called 
‘SAPM—Sistem Administrasi Perpajakan Modern’ or ‘Modern Tax Administration 
System’) throughout the DGT office network and the establishment of a new tax office 
structure nationwide. The DGT claimed that the SAPM promotes ‘effectiveness and 
efficiency by improving the business processes and developing data processing units and 
a call centre’ (DGT, 2009, p. 17). Within the new system, the DGT introduced standard 
operating procedures (SOP) as a guide for employees to perform their tasks consistently, 
and as a manual for taxpayers to become familiar with the service procedures (DGT, 
2009). Since 2009, all employees have been equipped with the national tax service 
standards. Therefore, all tax officials and work units within the DGT have been expected 
to be ‘modernised’ because all employees have had knowledge of the novel SOP; thus, 
they have been expected to maintain high-quality performance in all tax offices 
nationwide. As a result, the quality of data has been much more reliable since 2009. For 
this reason, the study period in this thesis begins in 2009. 
The tax administration reform has also changed the structure of the Indonesian tax 
office. Table 2.1 shows the composition of the Indonesian tax office during 2009–2015. 
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Table 2.1 
Number of DGT Offices by Type, 2009–2015 
Type of Office 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
Regional taxpayer office (RTO) 31 31 31 31 31 31 33  
Large taxpayer office (LTO) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
Medium taxpayer office (MTO) 28 28 28 28 28 28 28  
Small taxpayer office (STO) 299 299 299 299 299 299 309  
Tax service, dissemination and 
consultation office (TSDCO) 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 
 
Technical implementing unit (TIU) 1 1 3 5 5 5 5  
Total 570 570 572 574 574 574 586  
Source: DGT annual reports, various years. 
 
Before the modernisation, the Indonesian operational tax offices had been divided 
into three types based on the functions of the office: (1) tax service office (to administer 
general tax services and perform small-scale tax auditing for taxes other than property 
taxes); (2) land and building tax service office (to administer property tax services and 
perform small-scale property tax auditing); and (3) tax audit office (to perform 
comprehensive tax auditing for all taxes). 
After the tax administration reform, the DGT unified all existing operational office 
types and established a new tax office structure based on the following taxpayer 
segmentations: (1) LTO to administer and perform tax auditing for the largest company 
taxpayers; (2) MTO to administer and perform tax auditing for medium company 
taxpayers; and (3) STO to administer and perform tax auditing for individual taxpayers 
and small company taxpayers (including start-up FOICs). 
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As Table 2.1 illustrates, the DGT changed its vertical units at least three times 
between 2009 and 2015. First, two new TIUs were set up in 2011: a Taxation Data and 
Document Processing Office (TDDPO) in Makassar and an External Data Processing 
Office in Jakarta. Second, two more TIUs were established in 2012: a TDDPO in Jambi 
and an Information and Complaint Service Unit in Jakarta. Finally, the DGT established 
two regional offices (South Jakarta II and West Java III) and 10 STOs (four in Jakarta, 
four in Java and two in Sumatra) in 2015 as a result of increased workload and the 
growing number of taxpayers (DGT, 2015b). 
As shown in Figure 2.1, a company taxpayer is registered in either an LTO, an MTO 
or an STO. These three types of office are known as the operational units of the DGT. 
Therefore, the remainder of this section focuses on these three types of Indonesian tax 
office. The DGT completed the Tax Administration Reform Phase I in 2008. As a result, 
the numbers of LTOs and MTOs remained the same during the period 2009–2015. The 
number of STOs increased from 299 in 2014 to 309 in 2015, but this change does not 
affect this thesis because none of the final samples used in the studies in this thesis are 
obtained from the 10 newly established STOs. This is another reason why this thesis uses 
data from 2009. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the structure of the operational office of the DGT. 
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Figure 2.3 
Organisational Chart of the Operational Units of the DGT31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pakpahan (2012, February) 
 
The study period (2009–2015) includes four LTOs (all located in the capital of 
Jakarta), 28 MTOs and 299 STOs (309 STOs nationwide in 2015). The 28 MTOs consist 
of 19 RMTOs (located in big cities nationwide, with five in Jakarta) and nine special 
MTOs (SMTOs, all located in Jakarta). 
                                                 
31 This chart is valid to 2014. On 10 December 2014, the government enacted Finance Minister Regulation 
No. 206.2/PMK.01/2014 concerning the DGT organisation structure, which was in effect for income year 
2015 and beyond. The regulation has changed the number of Regional Offices, STOs and TSDCOs to 34, 
303 and 206, respectively. The numbers of the other operational offices remained the same. However, the 
changes do not affect the structure of samples used in this thesis. TIUs are excluded from the chart because 
they do not perform direct tax services to taxpayers. 
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The nine SMTOs consist of six FTOs,32 one PLCTO, one permanent establishment 
and expatriate tax office, and one oil and gas company tax office. In terms of the number 
of tax offices, STOs outnumber the other two office types. However, in terms of tax 
revenue contributions, STOs contribute a smaller amount. For example, contributions to 
the 2013 national tax revenue were 35.9%, 39.3% and 24.8% for LTOs, MTOs and STOs, 
respectively (IMF, 2014a). 
In June 2009, Tax Administrative Reform Phase II was launched. It focused on two 
aspects: human resources and information and communication technology (DGT, 2010). 
Through the tax reform, the DGT conducted more training and renewed information and 
technology equipment in its offices nationwide. Unlike Tax Administrative Reform Phase 
I, which significantly changed the structure of the DGT’s operational unit and improved 
the quality of the national tax database, Tax Administrative Reform Phase II is more like 
a minor or routine improvement to the organisation; therefore, it has an insignificant 
effect on the selection of the period of study in this thesis. 
 
2.2.2 Tax Revenue and Tax Compliance in Indonesia 
Tax revenue in Indonesia is still considered low despite the fact that the tax 
administration has been substantially upgraded since 2002 (OECD, 2012). Table 2.2 
shows the composition of tax revenue collected by the DGT. All numbers are rounded to 
the nearest billion Rupiah. As shown in the table, CIT revenue (Article 25/29—
Corporate) has been second only to domestic value-added tax (domestic VAT), except 
for 2014, where CIT revenue came in third place after domestic VAT and import VAT. 
 
                                                 
32 To avoid confusion with the acronym ‘FITO’, which is a globally accepted acronym for foreign income 
tax offset, this thesis uses ‘FTO’ as the acronym for foreign investment tax offices of Indonesia. 
38 
Table 2.2 
Central Government Tax Revenue in Billion Rupiah Collected by the DGT, 2009–
2015 
Type of Tax 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
Non-oil and gas income tax 267,571 297,860 358,013 381,605 417,691 459,085 552,222  
Article 4(2) 
Final income tax 
33,847 40,116 50,813 60,386 71,570 87,318 119,666  
Article 21 
Income tax on salary 
52,073 55,178 66,748 79,595 90,163 105,625 114,044  
Article 22 
Income tax on payment by the 
government 
4,369 4,738 4,946 5,507 6,837 7,256 8,478  
Article 22 
Income tax on import 
19,203 23,600 28,292 31,610 36,331 39,454 40,249  
Article 23 
Income tax on passive income 
16,033 16,315 18,703 20,304 22,206 25,535 27,882  
Articles 25 and 29 
Business income tax—
Individual 
3,347 2,935 3,287 3,763 4,383 4,704 8,258  
Articles 25 and 29 
Business income tax—
Corporate 
120,313 131,951 154,603 152,132 154,292 148,719 182,274  
Article 26 
Income tax on passive income 
paid by non-resident taxpayers 
18,365 22,985 27,239 24,611 27,985 34,728 43,002  
Other* 23 32 41 31 37 89 189  
Borne by the Government**     3,339 3,665 3,886 5,655 8,180  
VAT and STLG 193,068 230,580 277,792 337,583 384,718 408,830 423,710  
 Domestic VAT 126,812 131,016 157,370 192,097 226,896 240,938 280,203  
 Import VAT 66,256 84,164 107,000 126,609 138,990 152,313 130,132  
39 
 Domestic STLG   7,609 8,049 10,453 11,550 10,243 9,367  
 Import STLG   4,791 5,374 8,423 7,281 5,336 4,008  
Land and building tax  30,735 36,607 29,892 28,968 25,305 23,476 29,251  
Stamp duty 3,116 3,968 3,928 4,211 4,937 6,293 5,568  
Oil and gas income tax 50,044 58,873 73,096 83,461 88,747 87,446 50,109  
Total 544,533 627,888 742,720 835,828 921,398 985,130 1,060,860  
* An example of other non-oil and gas income tax is income tax on asset revaluation. ITL Article 19 
authorises the finance minister to set the regulation on income tax on asset revaluation. Under Finance 
Minister Regulation No. 79/PMK.03/2008, a company taxpayer can revalue its depreciating assets after 
being authorised by the Director General of Tax. The excess of the fair market value over the carrying value 
will be taxed at 10%.  
** There are several types of income for which the income tax is borne by the government, including 
income tax on salary received by civil servants, members of Indonesian armed forces and pensioners. 
Although this income brings no actual flow of money, it has been included as an item under non-oil and 
gas income tax for many years for reporting purposes. See Section 2.1.1 of this chapter for explanations of 
the type of taxes. 
Sources: 2009 is from Tax Revenue (Indonesian Ministry of Finance, 2010, pp. 162-165); 2010 is from 
2010 Tax Revenue (Indonesian Ministry of Finance, 2011, pp. 66-67); 2011 and 2012 are from Net Tax 
Revenue 2012–2011 (DGT, 2013, p. 129); 2013 and 2014 are from Tax Revenue (DGT, 2015b, pp. 94-95) 
and 2015 is from Revenue Performance by Type of Tax (DGT, 2016a, p. 107). 
 
Indonesian CIT revenue (bold in Table 2.2) consists of two articles: (1) Article 25, 
which is monthly income tax instalments; and (2) Article 29, which is underpaid income 
tax paid by taxpayers at the end of the income year. The CIT revenue contribution is 
relatively low considering Indonesia is a developing country in which corporate tax 
revenue is expected to contribute a more significant percentage. The Indonesian CIT 
revenue contribution is even lower than that of a developed country such as Australia, 
with corporate tax revenue accounting for 22.6% of the total tax revenue in the income 
year of 2012–2013.33 
While CIT revenue collected has steadily increased, the contribution to the total tax 
revenue collected by the DGT decreased from 22.09% in 2009 to 15.1% in 2014. It then 
increased in 2015 but is still below the 2012 level. The Indonesian CIT rate decreased 
                                                 
33 http://www.treasury.gov.au/Policy-Topics/Taxation/Pocket-Guide-to-the-Australian-Tax-System/Pock-
et-Guide-to-the-Australian-Tax-System/Part-2 accessed 4 January 2016. 
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from 28% in 2009 to 25% in 2010 and remained the same afterwards. This suggests that 
the downwards trend of the CIT revenue contribution is not caused by a decrease in CIT 
rates. Figure 2.4 illustrates the contribution of corporate income to the tax revenue of 
Indonesia over the period 2009–2015. 
 
Figure 2.4 
Corporate Income Tax Revenue Contribution, 2009–2015 
 
 
Central government tax revenue (i.e., the sum of tax revenue collected by the DGT, 
and customs and excise revenue collected by the Indonesian Directorate General of 
Custom and Excise (DGCE)) has never been less than 60% of the total central government 
revenue from year to year and is therefore the main source of revenue in the national 
budget.34 However, the country’s tax-to-GDP ratio (the ratio of tax revenue to GDP in a 
particular year) is considered low. Table 2.3 illustrates the tax-to-GDP ratio performance 
in Indonesia during 2009–2015. 
                                                 
34 Revenue collected by the DGT and DGCE constantly contributes approximately 85%–90% and 10%–
15%, respectively, of the state revenue every year. 
22.09%
21.02% 20.82%
18.20%
16.75%
15.10%
17.18%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
CIT (Corporate income tax revenue)
TR (Total tax revenue collected by DGT)
Ratio of CIT to TR
41 
Table 2.3 
Tax-to-GDP Ratio in Indonesia, 2009–2015 
Description 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
GDP (at current price) 5,606 6,864 7,832 8,616 9,546 10,570 11,532  
Central tax revenue (A) 620 723 874 981 1,077 1,147 1,240  
Local tax revenue (B) 38 47 63 73 87 103 108  
Nat. resources revenue (C) 139 169 214 226 226 241 101  
Tax-to-GDP ratio (%)         
 A+B+C to GDP 14.22 13.68 14.70 14.86 14.56 14.11 12.57  
 A+B to GDP 11.74 11.22 11.96 12.23 12.19 11.83 11.69  
 A to GDP 11.06 10.53 11.16 11.39 11.28 10.85 10.75  
Sources: GDP 2009, 2010–2011 and 2012–2015 are from BPS (2013; 2015 and; 2017a , respectively). 
Central tax revenue and natural resources revenue are from Statistics Indonesia/Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) 
(https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1286; local tax revenue is from https://www.bps.go.id/ 
linkTabelStatis/view/id/1288). GDP and revenues are in trillion Rupiah (rounded). 
 
Indonesia’s low tax-to-GDP ratio has been noted by prominent international 
institutions such as the OECD and the WB. Their reports (e.g. OECD, 2012; WB, 2014) 
show that the nation’s tax-to-GDP ratio was much lower than that of other countries in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For example, Malaysia and the 
Philippines consistently reached a tax-to-GDP ratio of more than 15%. The gap is much 
greater when compared with the OECD average of 33.8% (OECD, 2012). The WB (2014) 
notes that Indonesia’s tax-to-GDP ratio of 11.39% in 2012 was below the average of low-
income countries’ tax-to-GDP ratio of 12.8% and was one of the lowest in the G20 
economies. Figure 2.5 illustrates the performance of the Indonesian tax-to-GDP ratio 
compared with Malaysia, the Philippines and the OECD from 2009 to 2015. 
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Figure 2.5 
Tax-to-GDP Ratio for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and the OECD,  
2009–2015 
 
Note: Tax-to-GDP ratios are in percentages. 
Source: Table 3.1, Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP, 1990–2015 (OECD, 2017). 
 
However, it should be noted that Indonesia’s tax-to-GDP ratio excludes tax revenue 
collected by local governments and revenue from natural resources. For example, in 2013, 
the tax-to-GDP ratio increased to 12.23% when the total revenue included tax revenue 
collected by local governments throughout Indonesia. Further, the ratio increased to 
14.86% when the total revenue included tax revenue collected by local governments and 
revenue from natural resources. The performance of the Indonesian tax-to-GDP ratio is 
not as good as that of its peers, even after including other revenues in the tax-to-GDP 
ratio calculation. To some extent, the relatively low tax-to-GDP ratio likely results from 
the low level of tax compliance in the country. Table 2.4 presents the proportion of 
taxpayers filing tax returns in Indonesia during 2009–2015. 
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Table 2.4 
Proportion of Taxpayers Filing Tax Returns, 2009–2015 
Description 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
No. of taxpayers 9,996,620 14,101,933 17,694,317 17,659,278 17,731,736 18,357,833 18,159,840  
Corporate 1,373,383 1,534,933 1,590,154 1,026,388 1,141,797 1,166,036 1,184,816  
Individual 8,623,237 12,567,000 16,104,163 16,632,890 16,589,939 17,191,797 16,975,024  
Tax return filed 5,413,114 8,202,309 9,332,626 9,482,480 10,781,103 10,807,624 10,972,529  
Corporate 559,791 501,348 520,375 547,659 592,373 548,676 681,331  
Individual 4,853,323 7,700,961 8,812,251 8,934,821 10,188,730 10,258,948 10,291,198  
Compliance ratio 54.15% 58.16% 52.74% 53.70% 60.80% 58.87% 60.42%  
Corporate 40.76% 32.66% 32.72% 53.36% 51.88% 47.05% 58.00%  
Individual 56.28% 61.28% 54.72% 53.72% 61.72% 59.67% 60.63%  
Note: No. of taxpayers is the number of taxpayers obliged to file a tax return (i.e., the number of taxpayers 
obliged to submit an annual income tax return as of 1 January of the income year). 
Sources: 2009–2012 are from ‘Annual Income Tax Return—Filing Compliance Ratio, 2008–2012’ (DGT, 
2013, p. 178), 2013 and 2014 are from ‘Compliance Ratio of Annual Income Tax Return Filing, 2010–
2014’ (DGT, 2015b, p. 133) and 2015 is from ‘Ratio of Annual Income Tax Return Submission Compliance 
2011–2015’ (DGT, 2016a, p. 141). 
 
As shown, the level of compliance for company taxpayers was below 50% before 
2011.35 Afterwards, it increased to more than 50%, except in 2014. The level of tax return 
filing compliance reached the highest level of 58% in 2015. Although major efforts were 
made by the office, such as conducting a tax census in 2011 and 2012,36 the compliance 
level is still far from what the DGT expected. A low level of compliance can also be found 
among LTOs, which is surprising given that taxpayers are well managed and tax officials 
                                                 
35 See Rosid, Evans, and Tran-Nam (2016) for a discussion of the level of compliance for individual 
taxpayers. Overall, they find that the high levels of perceived corruption in Indonesia have significantly 
undermined tax compliance behaviour. 
36 The tax census (known as ‘sensus pajak’ in Indonesia) is a national tax program that was run by the DGT 
in 2011 and 2012. The program enabled tax officials to visit taxpayers, ask questions and directly observe 
business activities at the taxpayers’ premises. It was aimed at broadening the tax base by exploring tax 
potency and reinforcing tax fairness by directly reminding taxpayers to fulfil their tax obligations (DGT, 
2013). 
44 
are well trained compared with other types of taxpayers and tax offices. For example, 
over the period 2009–2013, while taxpayers registered in LTOs and SMTOs showed 
considerably higher filing rates than those in RMTOs and STOs, there was a high 
incidence of not only late filing, but also non-filing of annual tax returns by LTO 
taxpayers (IMF, 2014a).37 
Another important point that can be drawn from Table 2.4 is that the corporate level 
of compliance was always below the individual level of compliance over the period 2009–
2015. According to the IMF (2014a), the fact that corporations have worse filing 
compliance than individuals is troublesome and may be a major factor in the nation’s 
small income tax revenue relative to its regional peers. In line with the IMF’s report, the 
OECD (2015b) confirms that the low compliance level has resulted in low tax-to-GDP 
ratios for the past decade and has contributed to a small government budget compared 
with peer countries. 
The OECD (2015c, p. 10) summarises the tax administration reform and future 
challenges in Indonesia as follows: 
The work undertaken to date in modernising aspects of the tax administration, 
including HR Management, IT systems and audit and filing processes has resulted 
in significant growth in the tax revenue collected. Despite this however, Indonesia 
faces the challenge of addressing low rates of registration and voluntary 
compliance, and high rates of tax evasion. Strengthening enforcement activities and 
improving performance in the collection of tax arrears remain priority areas for the 
administration. 
In addition to the challenges listed by the OECD (2015c) above, another major issue 
that Indonesia may face is the lack of capacity of its tax authority to tackle cross-border 
profit shifting by MNEs that conduct business through their subsidiaries in the country. 
The OECD (2012, p. 73) recommends that ‘further increasing the authorities’ capacity to 
                                                 
37 The late filing and no-filing rates are as follows: large taxpayer offices 18.0 percent and 4.6 percent, 
respectively; special tax office: 13.5 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively; medium taxpayer offices 13.9 
percent and 14.6 percent, respectively, and small taxpayer offices 48.6 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively 
(IMF, 2014a p. 26). 
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avoid profit-shifting and transfer pricing in the case of multinational enterprises would be 
useful’. Chapter 3 elaborates more on the issue of cross-border profit shifting by MNEs 
in general. 
 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter describes the tax system in Indonesia in two parts. First, it describes 
how the tax system in general, and income tax system in particular, works under 
Indonesian tax law. In the case of company income tax, Indonesia adopts the classical tax 
system, so company profit and shareholders’ dividend income are taxed separately. 
Indonesia has not adopted consolidation for tax purposes, so companies in a group are 
taxed separately. Indonesia adopts the worldwide income system: all income derived by 
a taxpayer worldwide is subject to Indonesian income tax. To avoid double taxation, 
Indonesian tax law allows taxpayers to claim taxes paid overseas as tax credits. However, 
according to ITL, the amount of taxes paid overseas that can be claimed as tax credits is 
limited to the amount of tax payable on the foreign income under ITL.  
Second, this chapter describes the Indonesian tax administration. The 1983 tax 
reform brought about fundamental changes to the Indonesian tax system and 
administration. For example, after adopting the new tax laws recommended by the tax 
reform team, Indonesia introduced a self-assessment system to replace the official 
assessment system. The tax reform also led to simpler but more modernised tax 
administration in Indonesia. The five tax laws produced by the tax reform are still 
operational today. 
In the early 2000s, Indonesia undertook another tax reform, known as the Tax 
Administration Reform Phase I, which aimed to reform tax administration and provide 
cleaner and more transparent and reliable tax services. This reform changed the face of 
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tax offices nationwide by focusing on how to better serve taxpayers. The DGT’s 
employees were better trained and information technology was drastically upgraded. The 
DGT claims that it is now a more trustworthy tax authority. The reform was completed 
nationwide in 2008; thus, the DGT began its new operations in 2009—the year used in 
this thesis as the start of the period of study. The Tax Administration Reform Phase II has 
changed neither the tax system nor tax administration; rather, it was more like a routine 
improvement of an institution. 
Nevertheless, despite the tax reforms, the DGT does not appear to have become as 
effective as expected. The tax revenue collected from company taxpayers by the DGT is 
relatively low and is reflected in the tax-to-GDP ratio, which has been lower than that of 
its ASEAN peers for many years. The low level of tax compliance is considered the cause. 
One would normally expect the compliance ratio of company taxpayers—calculated as 
the ratio of the number of taxpayers who file an annual tax return to the number of 
taxpayers obliged to file an annual tax return—is higher than that of individual taxpayers. 
However, it is the opposite in the case of Indonesia. Further, LTOs, which are a type of 
tax office that administers the largest taxpayers in the country, suffer from a low level of 
tax compliance because the number of large taxpayers that fail to file their annual tax 
return is still significant. 
Institutionally, the DGT is deemed to have relatively few resources to tackle 
international tax avoidance. With only two small units in charge of defending the country 
from all cross-border tax misbehaviour, Indonesia is likely to lose tax revenue because of 
international tax avoidance strategies. Unfortunately, as a single directorate under the 
Indonesian Ministry of Finance, the DGT has little independence and no power to change 
the structure of the organisation.  
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In summary, the Indonesian tax system and tax administration may have given 
FOICs more opportunities to avoid Indonesian CIT by using cross-border tax avoidance 
schemes such as profit shifting strategies. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
PROFIT SHIFTING BY MNEs 
 
This chapter discusses theories that are applicable to corporate tax avoidance and 
presents a general review of previous studies relating to profit shifting by MNEs in 
developed countries, developing countries and Indonesia. With regard to the country 
classifications, this thesis follows the WB’s (2016) income group classification,38 which 
divides the world economies into four groups: low, lower–middle, upper–middle and 
high. The WB refers to low- and middle-income economies as developing economies. 
While the country classifications may change over time because they are determined once 
a year (i.e., on 1 July each year), Indonesia was consistently classified as a lower–middle-
income country over the period 2009–2015. Following the WB classifications, Indonesia 
is categorised as a developing country for the purpose of the studies in this thesis. 
This chapter consists of four sections and is organised as follows. The first section 
discusses the theories of tax evasion and tax avoidance, with an emphasis on the theory 
of tax avoidance by MNEs. In addition, it briefly discusses the methods used by previous 
studies and this thesis to identify profit shifting by MNEs. The second section reviews 
prior studies that focus on MNEs’ profit shifting in developed countries, while the third 
section does the same for developing countries. The last section deals with the issue of 
profit shifting by MNEs in Indonesia, including the DGT’s efforts to fight profit shifting. 
                                                 
38 Other than by income group, the WB also categorises all 188 WB member countries plus 26 other 
economies with populations of more than 30,000 by geographic region and by operational lending. For 
more detail, see https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-world-
bank-classify-countries. 
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3.1 Theory of Tax Avoidance and Methods Used to Identify the Incidence of 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
3.1.1 Theory of Corporate Tax Avoidance 
According to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p. 137), one challenge for researchers in 
the area of tax avoidance is that ‘there are no universally accepted definitions of, or 
constructs for, tax avoidance or tax aggressiveness; the terms means different thing to 
different people’. Therefore, before discussing the theory of corporate tax avoidance and 
indicators of profit shifting by MNEs, this section will briefly define tax avoidance, 
explain how it differs from tax evasion and outline the definition of tax avoidance used 
in this thesis. 
Tresch (2015, p. 265) defines tax avoidance and tax evasion as follows: 
Tax avoidance refers to taxpayers taking advantage of the provisions of the tax laws 
to reduce their tax liability, such as arranging to take income in the form of lightly 
taxed capital gains or untaxed fringe benefits rather than as fully taxed wages and 
salaries. Avoiding taxes is legal and its consequences are certain. 
Tax evasion refers to hiding sources of taxable income from the tax authorities to 
reduce one's tax liability, such as not reporting gambling winnings or failing to file 
a tax return when required to do so. Evading taxes is illegal and its consequences 
are uncertain; they depend on the probability of the taxpayer being caught. 
These definitions provide a clear line between tax avoidance and tax evasion: tax 
avoidance is legal and tax evasion is illegal. Consistent with such definitions, Sandmo 
(2005) argues that, unlike a taxpayer that commits tax evasion (a tax evader) and should 
worry about the risk of being detected by the tax authority, a taxpayer that commits tax 
avoidance (a tax avoider) can be much less concerned about the possibility of being 
noticed by the authority because their actions simply exploit loopholes in the tax law; 
therefore, they are within the legal framework of the law. However, Sandmo (2005) also 
contends that from a moral point of view, distinguishing between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion is not an important issue because tax avoiders and tax evaders are likely to behave 
indifferently. After all, Sandmo (2005, p. 646) mentions that ‘the borderline between what 
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seems morally right and wrong does not always coincide with the border between what 
is legal and illegal’, suggesting that there is no line that clearly separates the two. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that several studies that focus on corporate tax 
avoidance (but not specifically tax avoidance by MNEs) do not distinguish between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion. This is because there are difficulties in determining the 
legality of the behaviour surrounding the transactions and a clear-cut differentiation 
between tax avoidance and tax evasion is over-simplified (e.g. Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; 
Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008; Weisbach, 2003). Some studies avoid using the two 
terms and choose another expression to represent the tax-reporting misbehaviour. For 
example, Slemrod (2004, p. 878) uses the word ‘selfishness’ ‘to avoid getting bogged 
down trying to distinguish between what technically is (illegal) tax evasion and what is 
(legal) tax avoidance’. 
As explained in Section 1.1, BEPS is defined as strategies used by MNEs to exploit 
gaps and mismatches of tax rules in different countries by shifting profits to locations 
where tax rates are low to reduce the overall corporate tax being paid (OECD, 2014a). 
The fact that BEPS is legal and yet defeats the intent of tax law means that it is not an 
exaggeration to say that BEPS is a tax misbehaviour. Nonetheless, unlike other tax 
misbehaviours that cannot be clearly categorised as tax avoidance or tax evasion, BEPS 
is relatively easier to classify. Following Tresch (2015) abovementioned definitions of 
tax avoidance and tax evasion, BEPS can be categorised as a tax avoidance strategy. In 
the Indonesian context, BEPS is defined as a cross-border profit shifting strategy used by 
FOICs without breaking Indonesian tax rules. The next paragraph provides examples that 
may clarify the concept. 
BEPS arrangements include suppressing selling prices for goods and services sold 
to affiliates overseas and inflating the costs of goods sold, royalty payments, management 
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fees and interest paid to affiliates overseas. For example, an FOIC owned by a 
Singaporean company exploits the Indonesian transfer pricing rules gap by lowering the 
export sales price to the parent in Singapore. In another typical example, the parent 
finances the FOIC’s (the subsidiary’s) operation in Indonesia with debt rather than equity 
to suppress profits reported by the FOIC in Indonesia. By doing so, the FOIC can claim 
more deductions because interest expense is a deduction under ITL. Although interest 
income earned by the parent might be TI under Singaporean tax law, MNEs are better off 
overall because the Singaporean corporate tax rate is considerably lower than the 
Indonesian corporate tax rate. For the FOIC, cross-border profit shifting reduces both TI 
and book (accounting) income at the same time. The effect of simultaneously reducing 
TI and book income makes BEPS a book-tax conforming tax avoidance strategy (Hanlon 
& Heitzman, 2010).39 
A number of theoretical papers analyse the theory of tax avoidance and tax evasion 
by individuals. For example, a seminal paper by Stiglitz (1986) presents a general theory 
of income tax avoidance by individuals. Another example is a widely cited paper by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) that theoretically analyses the extent to which an 
individual taxpayer decides to evade taxes by intentionally underreporting income. The 
latter paper is extended by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), who present theoretical models 
that integrate tax avoidance and tax evasion into the overall decision problem encountered 
                                                 
39 Another form of tax avoidance is book-tax nonconforming tax avoidance. This strategy reduces TI 
without lowering book income by exploiting the differences between tax law and financial reporting rules, 
causing book-tax differences (BTDs). In general, BTDs can be divided into two categories: (1) temporary 
BTDs are generated from differences in the timing of recognition between accounting income and TI, which 
will therefore reverse over time. For example, a firm may use the straight-line depreciation method for 
accounting purposes and the accelerated depreciation method for tax purposes to depreciate machinery; (2) 
permanent BTDs result from non-taxable revenues and/or non-deductible expenses provided in tax rules, 
and the BTDs will therefore never reverse. A typical example in the US is non-taxable government bond 
interest. Many studies examine the relationship between BTDs and tax avoidance—for example Blaylock, 
Shevlin, and Wilson (2011) examine the relationship between temporary BTDs and tax avoidance, and 
Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) examine the relationship between permanent BTDs and tax reporting 
aggressiveness. 
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by individuals. Another paper by Sandmo (2005) extends Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
work by reviewing the existing theory of tax evasion by individuals and connecting it 
with other central issues in the theory of public finance.40 
Many studies discuss the theory of tax evasion by corporations. For example, Chen 
and Chu (2005) model income tax evasion by corporations, and Crocker and Slemrod 
(2005) develop an economic theory of corporate tax evasion. Both studies connect the tax 
evasion strategy used by managers with the aim of gaining the wealth of the owners or 
shareholders. Both studies define tax evasion as an illegal tax avoidance strategy. 
However, few theoretical studies have specifically discussed the theory of tax 
evasion by large international corporations. According to Gordon and Hines (2002), 
unlike individual taxpayers, it is uncommon for large corporations to commit tax evasion 
(e.g., deliberately underreporting income to tax authorities). Further, Gordon and Hines 
(2002, p. 1970) conclude that ‘very little is known about the determinants or magnitude 
of international tax evasion, since the self-reported data that serve as the basis of analysis 
not surprisingly reveal nothing about it’. To a large extent, this conclusion suggests that 
MNEs use international tax avoidance rather than international tax evasion as an 
alternative to lessen their income tax liability. 
In contrast, a number of studies discuss the theory of tax avoidance by corporations. 
In a review of tax research, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) briefly discuss the theory of 
corporate tax avoidance by citing four papers that ‘provide theory and predictions about 
the relationships and incentives of the various parties (i.e., insiders, outside shareholders, 
                                                 
40 While theoretical papers about tax evasion by individuals are relatively abundant, empirical evidence on 
this issue is limited. According to Houston and Tran (2001), the reason is that most empirical evidence that 
describes evasion behaviour is based on surveys because directly observing such behaviour is almost 
impossible. Further, the authors explain that because tax evasion is a sensitive topic, individuals are less 
likely to take part in the survey (i.e., non-response bias), and even if they take part, they may not tell the 
truth (i.e., response bias). As a result, such biases undermine the validity and reliability of the study 
(Houston & Tran, 2001). 
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and the state) in corporate tax avoidance settings’. According to Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010), three of the four papers (i.e. Slemrod, 2004; Chen & Chu, 2005; Crocker & 
Slemrod, 2005) lay a theoretical foundation for understanding corporate tax avoidance in 
connection with agency framework, and one paper (i.e. Desai, Dyck, & Zingales, 2007) 
introduces another perspective to the literature. However, only Slemrod (2004) and Desai, 
et al. (2007) are relevant to the discussion of the theory of tax avoidance by corporations.41 
Some other relevant studies are included in the discussion to clarify the idea introduced 
by the two papers. 
Slemrod (2004) suggests that ownership–control separation means that a different 
conceptual framework is required to understand tax noncompliance of large firms (i.e., 
tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance). In a large firm, managers rather than owners 
make operational decisions, including tax-related decisions. Therefore, a manager’s 
personal views on paying taxes as a civic duty affect their corporation’s aggressiveness 
in avoiding taxes (Slemrod, 2004). However, some studies state that managers are likely 
to focus on maximising profits as the owners expected. In an extensively cited statement, 
Friedman (2007, pp. 173-174) writes that: 
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee 
of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That 
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom. 
According to Slemrod (2004), while Friedman’s statement suggests that managers 
should not engage in corporate tax evasion, it encourages managers to perform tax 
                                                 
41 While Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that Chen and Chu (2005) examine corporate tax avoidance 
under the agency model, Chen and Chu (2005) and Crocker and Slemrod (2005) merely discuss the 
theoretical model of CIT evasion. As discussed previously in this section, both studies clearly define that 
tax evasion is illegal. Therefore, the tax avoidance–tax evasion definition bias is unlikely to be an issue in 
the two studies. For this reason, this thesis considers that these two papers lack a connection with the theory 
of corporation tax avoidance discussed in this thesis; therefore, they are excluded from further discussion. 
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avoidance. However, managers should be less aggressive if the behaviour endangers the 
value of the corporation (Slemrod, 2004). Accordingly, Slemrod (2004) suggests that the 
owners (i.e., shareholders) of the corporation need to clearly define the acceptable level 
of tax aggressiveness so that managers can make appropriate decisions to achieve the 
owners’ desired level of wealth. 
In a widely cited study, Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop the agency 
relationship theory, which theorises that the equilibrium contractual form (positive 
aspects) rather than the structure of the contractual relation, such as compensation 
incentives (normative aspects), between the manager and the owner should be the focus 
aspects of an agency relationship. Positive aspects include ‘incentives faced by each of 
the parties and the elements entering into the determination of the equilibrium contractual 
form characterising the relationship between the manager and the owners’ (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976, p. 310). This theory implies that a compensation incentive is not the 
most important factor in the manager–owner relationship. In the context of tax avoidance, 
the equilibrium contractual form between the manager and owner regarding the level of 
tax aggressiveness may be a key positive aspect in the relationship. That is, the manager 
and the owner should sit together to determine the level of tax aggressiveness that will 
maximise both parties’ interests (tax-aggressiveness equilibrium). 
Desai, et al. (2007) propose a new perspective to the literature on corporate 
governance and corporate taxation by including two variables that they believed had been 
omitted in previous studies. The first omitted variable is the state. In addition to the 
manager and the outside shareholders, the state should be part of the standard analysis of 
corporate governance. The second factor that is allegedly omitted in previous studies is 
the effect of corporate governance on the functioning of the corporate tax system. 
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Desai et al. (2007) integrate the analysis of corporate governance and corporate 
taxation by analysing the interaction between three parties, i.e., state, manager and 
owners. They theorise that corporate governance (i.e., the relationship between the 
manager and shareholders) and the corporate tax system (i.e., how the state designs and 
enforces corporate taxes, or how tax revenue responds to changes in tax rates) influence 
one another. Specifically, their theoretical and empirical analysis provides two new 
insights. First, higher tax rates deteriorate corporate governance, but strong tax 
enforcement can strengthen it. Second, good (bad) corporate governance positively 
(negatively) affects the sensitivity of tax revenue to tax rate changes. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) extend the work of Desai, et al. (2007) and posit that including 
corporate governance as an important determinant of corporate tax avoidance strategies 
provides a more nuanced prediction as opposed to the traditional view of corporate tax 
avoidance, suggesting that tax avoidance increases the wealth of owners (shareholders) 
only in the presence of good corporate governance. 
The theory of corporate tax avoidance discussed in this section applies to 
corporations in general, which could be multinational enterprises or domestic enterprises. 
The next section discusses the theory that underlies tax avoidance by MNEs according to 
existing literature. 
 
3.1.2 Definition of Multinational Enterprises and Theory of Tax Avoidance by 
Multinational Enterprises 
Before discussing the theory that underlies tax avoidance by MNEs based on some 
relevant theoretical papers, this section begins by defining MNEs and identifying the 
reasons why MNEs make foreign direct investment and establish foreign affiliates. 
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Markusen (1995, p. 170) defines MNEs as ‘firms that engage in direct foreign 
investment, defined as investments in which the firm acquires a substantial controlling 
interest in a foreign firm or sets up a subsidiary in a foreign country.’ He proposes that 
the fundamental reasons why investors may choose to establish an affiliate overseas is 
that MNEs are different from domestic companies: ‘If foreign multinational enterprises 
are exactly identical to domestic firms, they will not find it profitable to enter the domestic 
market’ (Markusen, 1995, p. 173). Further, he suggests several inherent disadvantages 
and advantages that MNEs commonly encounter. The disadvantages include higher costs 
of doing business in a different country (e.g., higher communication and transportation 
costs, higher costs of posting personnel abroad) and adapting to the new environment 
(e.g., unfamiliarity with language and customs, and being outside their domestic business 
and government networks). 
The inherent advantages that MNEs have are superior technology and lower costs 
resulting from economies of scale (Markusen, 1995). In addition, Markusen (1995) refers 
to the ownership, location and internalisation (OLI) framework proposed by Dunning 
(1977). The framework posits that the advantages of OLI must be present for MNEs to 
undertake FDI. The two paragraphs below describe the three conditions according to 
Markusen (1995) explanation. 
First, ownership is any advantage that represents valuable market power that other 
firms do not possess, including a patent, blueprint, trade secret, trademark or reputation 
for quality. Second, location refers to the advantage that an MNE can obtain by producing 
goods in a foreign country. Lower tariffs, quotas, cheaper transport costs and factor prices, 
and better access to customers are some advantages of a location for MNEs. 
The third and probably the most decisive advantage is internalisation. For some 
MNEs, possessing the first two advantages (i.e., ownership and location) may be 
57 
insufficient to set up a foreign affiliate because they have alternative options such as 
giving a licence to a domestic firm in the foreign country to produce goods or use their 
production method. In doing so, the parent company can simply sell the blueprints to a 
domestic firm in the target foreign country rather than setting up an affiliate in that 
country and facing costly and difficult processes. The advantage of internalisation 
encourages MNEs to set up affiliates in foreign countries. Internalisation is defined as an 
opportunity to exploit a product or process internally among companies within the same 
ownership. That is, internalisation gives MNEs affiliates located in different countries the 
opportunities to arrange internal prices and processes for products that are traded within 
the same group of companies. This explains why internalisation is the most decisive 
advantage for some MNEs setting up a foreign subsidiary. Citing Rugman (1986), 
Markusen (1995, p. 174) writes that ‘internalisation is really the only thing that matters 
to understanding the multinational’. 
Gordon and Hines (2002) extensively discuss theories that underlie the tax 
avoidance behaviour of MNEs. They state two theories of MNE behaviour: (1) MNEs as 
financial intermediaries; and (2) MNEs as corporate tax avoiders. In the first, or initial, 
theory, setting up a foreign affiliate is considered an investment alternative overseas for 
resident taxpayers. It assumes that MNEs do not possess the three advantages in the OLI 
framework. The theoretical analysis reveals that under the initial theory, all MNEs would 
be indifferent to the countries of foreign affiliates, and they should be indifferent to tax-
rate differences between domestic and foreign countries. However, they also reveal that 
the results of existing studies oppose this theory, that existing studies demonstrate that 
tax rates in host countries are negatively related to FDI inflow to countries, and that 
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reported profits by MNEs are negatively related to tax rates (or higher profits reported by 
MNEs in low-tax jurisdictions and tax havens).42 
The second theory in Gordon and Hines’s (2002) paper states that MNEs are 
corporate tax avoiders. They start by emphasising the significant difference between a 
closed economy and an open economy and posit that the growing cross-border trade in 
goods and services increases the contributions of MNEs to the economy. Further, they 
argue that the more integrated capital market worldwide has forced researchers to modify 
the existing work on tax policy by considering several factors that are unique to an open 
economy setting. 
Further, Gordon and Hines (2002) theorise that a much broader complication that 
has been excluded in a closed economy setting needs to be considered in an open economy 
setting. According to the authors, this complication exists because of tax rate differences 
between countries that influence the behaviour of MNEs both operationally and 
financially. This behaviour includes the preference of where to locate affiliates overseas, 
the decision to determine the optimal scale of affiliates’ operations, and decisions 
regarding the preference of locating debt, research activity and exports (Gordon & Hines, 
2002). Lastly, consistent with internalisation in the OLI framework, a unique 
characteristic of an open economy setting is that MNEs possess flexibility to choose 
certain prices to be used in transactions among their affiliated group members, which 
allows them to report an overall lower income tax burden (Gordon & Hines, 2002). 
                                                 
42 The definition of tax havens in this thesis follows that of Scholes, et al. (2009). They describe that, in 
addition to the low tax rates that attract people and companies interested in legal tax avoidance, tax havens 
offer ‘strong bank secrecy laws and limited tax information-sharing agreement’. The authors posit that 
‘strong privacy laws increase the attractiveness of tax havens to those laundering illegal income and those 
interested in evading taxes on their legal income’ (Scholes, et al., 2009, p. 329). 
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In analysing the behaviour of MNEs, Gordon and Hines (2002) review some 
evidence provided by the existing literature.43 First, the existing literature confirms that 
debt financing is more attractive for affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions and that equity 
financing is more attractive for affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions. Second, the literature 
confirms that MNEs use transfer prices regardless of the requirement of the OECD for 
MNEs to use an arm’s-length principle.44 Based on the evidence provided by the existing 
literature, Gordon and Hines (2002) conclude that while MNEs contribute a significant 
payment in taxes each year, they successfully avoid income taxes by means of profit 
shifting. 
Gordon and Hines (2002) then reconcile the evidence provided by prior studies with 
the evidence from their own theoretical framework using the theory of MNEs as corporate 
tax avoiders. They find that while some aspects of MNEs’ behaviour are consistent with 
the theory, others are not. Rather, they are consistent to the extent that MNEs’ behaviour 
in reallocating income explains the low profits reported in high-tax jurisdictions and the 
high profits reported in low-tax jurisdictions.45 
Theoretical papers, mostly in economic literature, discuss the economic behaviour 
of MNEs—particularly because transfer prices have been constrained by tax regulations 
                                                 
43 Other strategies that can be used by MNEs to lower tax obligations are to adjust the timing to repatriate 
dividends (as in some countries, including the US and Indonesia, income from foreign affiliates are taxed 
only when the income is repatriated as dividends), by choosing the form of business organisation that offers 
higher tax incentives and by conducting more R&D activity in affiliates with excess foreign tax credits 
(Gordon & Hines, 2002). 
44 In general, the arm’s-length principle is the market price of a similar transaction between independent 
parties. This principle is described in more detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
45 Gordon and Hines (2002) also explain that a further complication in regard to MNEs is that firms can 
avoid taxes not only on their capital income, but also on other income. For example, entrepreneurs (owners 
who are also managers) leave their wage payments in the firm so it is corporate income rather than personal 
income. According to Gordon and Hines (2002), through such income reallocation, entrepreneurs may end 
up with a tax rate on earnings that is as low as one available in a tax haven. Although they do not explicitly 
suggest that this complication is a motivation for MNEs to set up a foreign affiliate in a high-tax country, 
they presume that it is likely. To some extent, this may explain why MNEs tend to invest more significantly 
in both low- and high-tax countries. For example, Chari, Chen, and Dominguez (2012) find a significant 
increase in FDI by emerging markets (particularly China and India) in the US over the period 1980–2006.  
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for decades. Brief summaries of five of these papers—including four theoretical studies 
in economics and one theoretical study in accounting—are presented below. 
Horst (1971) posits that one of the distinguishing characteristics of MNEs is that 
they use ‘optimal transfer price’ rather than ‘open market’ prices to value intra-firm 
transactions, consistent with the internalisation advantage in the OLI framework. Further, 
his theoretical analysis reveals that MNEs’ decisions to produce, sell and set the transfer 
prices in Country A or B largely depend on the marginal costs of production and 
differences in tariffs and tax rates between the two countries. Assuming that the firm is 
burdened by tariffs on its imports and taxes on its profits in addition to production costs, 
Horst (1971) also finds that MNEs minimise their global tax liability by always choosing 
either the lowest or highest possible transfer prices. For example, to maximise its global 
after-tax earnings, an MNE will choose the lowest possible transfer price if the relative 
tax rate difference between the importing and exporting countries is lower than the tariff 
rate in the importing country. 
Copithorne (1971) posits that MNEs have greater opportunities to mobilise capital 
and profits than smaller national companies. He argues that while transfer prices cannot 
be used to maximise global before-tax earnings, they are commonly used by MNEs to 
shift profits from one company to another, depending on the preference of management 
to show more of the profits in a particular affiliate than in others. The degree of profit 
shifting is larger when corporations ship a larger number of products to their subsidiaries 
because they have greater freedom in setting the prices used in intra-firm transactions. 
Two other conclusions from Copithorne (1971) theoretical analysis are: (1) that 
international corporations do not change the levels of prices and outputs if corporation 
taxes remain unchanged; and (2) that MNEs are likely to shift profits out of a country 
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(and are likely to pay less CIT in a country) in which marginal tax rates are high, currency 
is weak or capital movements are controlled. 
Eden (1983) notes that existing literature (including Horst 1971, discussed above) 
uses the tax differential–tariff rate relationship to show how MNEs set the optimal transfer 
price. She argues that the existing literature assumes that MNEs are free to set transfer 
prices, but in fact they are not. According to Eden (1983), transfer pricing settings depend 
on customs and tax regulations; therefore, they are restricted by legislation in most OECD 
countries. Subsequently, she theoretically examines the effects of regulation restrictions 
on resource allocation decisions by MNEs in Canada and finds that customs valuation 
methods affect transfer prices, which eventually affect MNEs’ output, sales and trade 
flows. 
The last example of the studies in economic literature that theoretically discuss tax 
avoidance by MNEs is that of Grubert and Slemrod (1998), who posit that parent 
corporations in high-tax countries tend to shift profits to their affiliates in low-tax 
countries. Specifically, they theorise that tax rate differences between countries affect the 
choice of locating real activity by MNEs, which will in turn affect the location in which 
the profit is reported. Thus, in addition to the theory of tax avoidance by MNEs (i.e., 
MNEs are international tax avoiders), Grubert and Slemrod (1998) theorise that the tax 
structure (i.e., tax rates and tax systems) affects MNEs’ decision to locate investment and 
the decision to shift profits. They complement their theoretical analyses with empirical 
analysis by examining micro-level data for 1987 relating to US corporations and their 
investments in Puerto Rico. Consistent with their theory, the empirical results show that 
a large proportion of the investment of US MNEs in Puerto Rico results from 
opportunities to shift profits, suggesting that the advantages of income-shifting activity 
are the predominant reason why US MNEs invest in Puerto Rico. 
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In accounting literature, Merville and Petty (1978) theoretically examine transfer 
prices as the tool for achieving MNEs’ goals. They posit that MNEs benefit from tax rate 
differences in different countries because it allows them to locate profits in the lowest tax 
countries. They argue that transfer prices can be used by MNEs not only to minimise 
costs, but also to optimise financial resources and shift assets to have a more favourable 
business prospect. However, they realise that MNEs cannot set a transfer pricing 
mechanism to achieve all of these goals simultaneously. Therefore, they design two 
approaches to analyse the role of the transfer pricing mechanism. In the first approach, 
the mechanism is assessed as a tool to maximise profits in the lowest tax rate jurisdiction 
(single-objective approach). In the second approach, they treat the transfer pricing 
mechanism as a tool to accomplish three main goals that an MNE can achieve through 
transfer prices (multiple-objective approach): (1) maximising worldwide profits; (2) 
achieving subsidiary profits goals; and (3) maintaining pricing bounds. In addition to 
proposing the mathematical models, Merville and Petty (1978) provide numerical 
examples (using US MNEs as parent firms) to facilitate an understanding of the proposed 
models.46 They find that the multiple-objective approach offers a significantly more 
robust outcome in combining the profit-maximising goal with other prospective goals. 
According to the OLI framework, internalisation is the most decisive factor that 
MNEs possess in setting up foreign affiliates. Moreover, studies that analyse tax 
avoidance by MNEs provide evidence consistent with the theory of MNEs as tax avoiders. 
In conclusion, the theory of tax avoidance by MNEs and the relevant theoretical studies 
suggest that MNEs use tax avoidance strategies by exploiting opportunities to shift profits 
between affiliates within the same group. 
                                                 
46 In the numerical example analysis, the authors use hypothetical parameter estimates and acknowledge 
that it would be preferable to use actual firm data because the parameters should be unique to each firm. 
However, as they admit, this is impossible for confidentiality reasons. 
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3.1.3 Methods and Indicators Used to Identify the Incidence of Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting 
Existing literature that reviews studies on tax avoidance by MNEs (e.g. Fuest & 
Riedel, 2010; Gravelle, 2010) identifies two major groups of empirical studies that focus 
on the issue of tax avoidance by MNEs. In the first group, researchers observe the 
association between reported profitability and tax rate differences across countries (e.g. 
Weichenrieder, 2009; Clausing, 2016). In the second group, researchers examine the 
different channels used by MNEs to shift profits (e.g. Clausing, 2003 investigates transfer 
pricing; Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008 study income shifting through debt). 
However, some studies examine both. For instance, Mills and Newberry (2004) not only 
examine whether the tax rate differences between the US and the parent countries of 
foreign MNEs affect income reporting by foreign-controlled companies in the US, but 
also whether those MNEs use debt financing as the channel for shifting profits from the 
US. 
The OECD (2015a) suggests that six indicators exhibit the incidence of BEPS and 
its magnitude. The following points summarise the descriptions of the six indicators and 
how they indicate that BEPS is occurring:47 
1. Concentration of FDI relative to GDP 
This is a macroeconomic indicator that measures real economic activity. A 
significantly high ratio of FDI to GDP may indicate the occurrence of BEPS. 
2. High profit rates of low-tax affiliates of top global MNEs 
This indicator compares the profit rate (i.e., profits/assets) with the effective tax 
rate (ETR i.e., tax expense/profit) of MNE affiliates for top global MNEs. For 
each affiliate, a profit rate differential (the difference between the affiliate’s profit 
                                                 
47 The summary is based on the OECD (2015a, pp. 49-64). 
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rate and its MNE group’s worldwide profit rate) is compared with the affiliate’s 
ETR differential (the difference between the affiliate’s ETR and its MNE group’s 
worldwide ETR). A positive profit rate differential and a negative ETR 
differential infer the incidence of BEPS. 
3. High profit rates of MNE affiliates in lower-tax locations 
This indicator compares the profit rate (i.e., profits/assets) of top global MNE 
affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions with the MNEs’ worldwide profit rate. A higher 
number indicates that stronger profit shifting into low-tax jurisdictions is 
occurring. 
4. Effective tax rates of large MNE affiliates relative to non-MNE entities with 
similar characteristics 
This indicator compares the ETRs of large MNE affiliates with local companies 
with similar characteristics. A lower ETR of the MNE’s affiliates compared with 
the ETR of local companies may indicate the incidence of BEPS. 
5. Concentration of royalty receipts relative to R&D spending 
The indicator compares the average ratio of royalties received with R&D 
expenditure for a group of high-ratio countries to the average ratio for the other 
countries in the sample. A higher indicator suggests a greater possibility of the 
incidence of BEPS. 
6. Interest expense to income ratios of MNE affiliates in countries with above 
average statutory tax rates 
The OECD (2015a) believes that debt allocation is one of the BEPS strategies 
used by MNEs to decrease their worldwide tax liability. Substantial interest paid 
by affiliates in countries with STRs above the weighted average indicates the 
incidence of BEPS. 
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The OECD (2015a, p. 16) also emphasises that the six BEPS indicators confirm the 
conclusions of existing studies that ‘profit shifting is occurring, is significant in scale, is 
likely to increase, and creates adverse economic distortions’. As discussed below, even 
though evidence from a developing country’s perspective on the incidence of BEPS is 
still rare, it is likely that developing countries also suffer from cross-border profit shifting 
strategies. The next two sections of this chapter discuss studies that have been conducted 
regarding profit shifting by MNEs in developed countries and developing countries. 
 
3.2 Profit Shifting by Multinational Enterprises in Developed Countries 
Empirical studies that focus on tax avoidance strategies by MNEs using data from 
developed countries are relatively well documented. They encompass a wide range of 
strategies used by MNEs to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions using intra-
firm transfer mispricing, high corporate debt financing and the strategic location of assets 
and overhead costs (Janský & Kokeš, 2015). The increasing availability of data in 
developed countries plays an important role in conducting empirical studies. Early studies 
on profit shifting in developed countries used country-level data or industry-group data. 
Empirical studies then used MNEs’ firm-level financial reporting data. Recently, the 
development of research that uses the tax return data of MNEs in developed countries has 
become fairly advanced, as shown in Christian and Schultz (2005), Dowd, Landefeld, and 
Moore (2017) and Grubert (2012). 
Empirical studies on profit shifting by MNEs in developed countries began in the 
1970s, when oil and gas companies expanded their operations overseas. It is therefore not 
surprising that the studies mainly focus on examining whether oil and gas MNEs adopt 
profit shifting strategies to minimise their overall CIT. Most of the studies focus on the 
US and have identical findings, that is, MNEs exploit cross-border profit shifting 
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strategies to reduce their overall tax burden. For instance, Jenkins and Wright (1975) use 
US petroleum corporation data during 1969–1972 to provide evidence that multinational 
petroleum companies use international operations arrangements to minimise their tax 
obligations. In another study, Bernard and Weiner (1990) use data from the US petroleum 
industry during 1973–1984 and find little evidence to support the claim that multinational 
petroleum companies shift profits because of differences in average effective CIT rates 
between importing and exporting countries. 
The availability of data—both in terms of quantity and quality—allows the study 
of profit shifting in developed countries to improve over time. Weakness and limitations 
of previous studies are often improved by subsequent studies. For example, Klassen, 
Lang, and Wolfson (1993) examine geographic income shifting by 191 US MNEs in 
response to changes in tax rates in four regions: the US, Europe, Canada and Others 
during 1984–1990. After controlling for changes in the underlying profitability of MNEs 
(i.e., using a control sample of US and non-US firms, geographic area, size and multi-
nationality), they find that US MNEs shift profits to the country in which the tax rate 
decreased from the country in which the tax rate increased. For instance, in 1985, they 
find that MNEs shifted profits to the US from Canada, where the tax rates increased in 
that year. In 1986, they find that the MNEs shifted profits from the US to Europe, where 
tax rates decreased in that year. 
However, according to Jacob (1996), the incidence of profit shifting found by 
Klassen, et al. (1993) may result from two mechanisms: (1) MNEs use transfer pricing 
schemes; and (2) MNEs deliberately change their business methods (e.g., locating more 
profitable operations in low-tax jurisdictions) in response to tax rates changes. However, 
Klassen, et al. (1993) do not clearly express which one has been used by US MNEs to 
shift profits (Jacob, 1996). Using data on the volume of intra-firm international trades as 
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a proxy for profit shifting occurrences, Jacob (1996) improves Klassen, et al. (1993) by 
investigating how US MNEs shift their profits. He finds that they used transfer prices to 
shift profits both before and after the US Tax Reform Law in 1986. 
In terms of the magnitude of the revenue loss caused by profit shifting activities, 
the existing literature also provides robust and ample evidence that the size of revenue 
loss caused by profit shifting in advanced economies is substantial. For example, Pak and 
Zdanowicz (2002) evaluate US MNEs and US subsidiaries of foreign parents and estimate 
that the US Government experienced revenue losses of USD53 billion from the transfer 
pricing of exports and imports of goods in 2001. In a study that covers US multinational 
firms and their foreign affiliates, Clausing (2009) empirically estimates that USD180 
billion profit from corporations is shifted out of the US, leading to more than USD60 
billion in revenue losses in 2004. Several years later, Clausing updated this work and 
found a revenue loss of around USD90 billion (around 30% of the country’s corporate 
tax revenue) resulting from income shifting by US affiliates of foreign MNEs in 2008 
(Clausing, 2011). 
More current research shows that the findings from the earlier studies remain valid. 
For example, using a unique panel dataset48 of US tax returns during 2002–2012, Dowd, 
et al. (2017) examine the effect of profit shifting behaviour of US MNEs on profits 
reported by their affiliates abroad. While they find that the reported profits significantly 
depend on whether the foreign countries have a low or high tax rate, under linear 
specification, they provide evidence that a one percentage point reduction in the tax rate 
will result in a 1.4% increase in reported profits, regardless of whether the original tax 
rate is low or high. Beuselinck, Deloof, and Vanstraelen (2015) scrutinise the effect of 
tax enforcement and public listing status on income shifting by European MNEs during 
                                                 
48 Panel data (also called longitudinal data) refers to data for n different entities observed at T different 
periods: (𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡), i = 1, …, n and t = 1, …, T (Stock & Watson, 2015, p. 397). 
68 
1998–2009. They find that European MNEs shift profits from high-tax countries to low-
tax countries, and they provide evidence that income shifting is greater when local tax 
enforcement is weak. 
Theoretical research in corporate tax avoidance is discussed mostly in economic 
literature, as shown in Section 3.1. In contrast, empirical studies on corporate tax avoidance 
have been conducted for decades in many disciplines, including economics, accounting, 
finance and law.49 However, empirical studies mostly focus on developed countries. 
The issue of profit shifting by MNEs in developed economies has been discussed 
in economic and accounting literature for many years. Most studies focus on profit 
shifting by means of transfer pricing. Transfer pricing tax issues were previously 
extensively discussed in economic literature, but not in accounting literature (Halperin & 
Srinidhi, 1987). However, recently, the number of studies in accounting literature has 
been steadily increasing. The following paragraphs discuss the development of the profit 
shifting–tax avoidance issue by MNEs in economic literature and accounting literature. 
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, studies that theoretically model the profit shifting 
behaviour of MNEs have existed since the early 1970s. However, it was not until the 
works of Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) that empirical evidence of 
profit shifting by MNEs was quantitatively provided. According to Dharmapala (2014a, 
p. 424), the methods introduced by the two papers are the primary approach to the 
empirical estimation of BEPS in the economic literature. They are early pioneering 
research on multinational income shifting and are important because they establish a 
                                                 
49 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p. 127) summarise how the multidisciplinary nature of tax research gives rise to 
research difficulties in the tax area as follows: ‘The multidisciplinary nature of tax research is what makes tax 
research exciting (yes, exciting), yet difficult. Tax research can be difficult not only because one has to follow tax 
studies in accounting, finance, economics, and law (through academic institutions, governmental agencies, and 
policy think tanks), but also because different disciplines often use different languages and have different 
perspectives.’ Therefore, to avoid complexity, this thesis bases its discussion on economic and accounting 
literature only. 
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conceptual framework that continues to be highly influential. In addition, the two studies 
are among the most widely cited papers in tax avoidance research and have inspired 
subsequent studies in economic literature (e.g. Desai, Foley & Hines, 2006; Hong & 
Smart, 2010; Julio & Yook, 2016) and accounting literature (e.g. Lisowsky, 2010; Sikka 
& Willmott, 2010; De Simone, 2016). Therefore, brief summaries of the two seminal 
economic papers are provided below. 
Using 1982 data on a cross-section of 33 countries, Grubert and Mutti (1991, p. 
285) examine three related aspects of US MNEs’ activity: (1) the ability to shift profits 
from high-tax countries to low-tax countries; (2) the effect of host country taxes and 
tariffs on the distribution of real capital; and (3) the influence of tax and tariff policies on 
international trade patterns of the US and host countries. To examine whether companies 
shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions, they regress profitability (using two measures: the 
ratio of book income to sales and the ratio of book income to equity) on tax rate (both 
statutory marginal corporate tax rate and average ETR; the latter is measured as a ratio of 
foreign taxes paid to book income of US-controlled corporations with positive profits) 
and growth in the US’s GDP as an indicator of economy-wide profitability. As companies 
may disproportionally shift profits to the lowest-tax jurisdiction, they also include the 
inverse of the two tax rates in their empirical estimates to allow for the effect that is 
concentrated in the lowest-tax countries. They find that, in all cases, the reported profits 
are negatively correlated to tax rates, suggesting that the companies shift profits to lower-
tax jurisdictions. 
Hines and Rice (1994) posit that MNEs have the ability to shift not only profits, but 
also the use of productive factors (e.g., employment) to low-tax jurisdictions. They 
examine this premise by evaluating the 1982 data on the use of 41 tax haven countries 
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(THCs)50 by US MNEs in reported profit–tax incentive regressions. Hines and Rice 
(1994) identify the pre-tax income of an affiliate as the sum of ‘true’ income and ‘shifted’ 
income (Dharmapala, 2014a, p. 424). True income is generated by means of capital and 
labour inputs. To predict the level of the true income, they include measures of capital 
inputs (e.g., fixed tangible assets) and labour inputs (e.g., employment compensation) in 
the estimation model. In contrast, shifted income is determined by tax incentives (i.e., tax 
rate difference between the parent and the affiliate) to shift income in or out of the 
affiliate. They find that, even though US MNEs place a substantial amount of activities 
in THCs, the profits reported by affiliates in the THCs seem to be too high, suggesting 
that the level of reported profits is significantly influenced by lower tax rates in the 
THCs.51 
Tax research in accounting literature that includes tax avoidance shares the same 
research questions as tax research in economics and finance literature. Nonetheless, 
according to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), accounting literature offers three comparative 
advantages. Two of the comparative advantages that are relevant to this thesis are as 
follows.52 First, tax research in accounting uses specific knowledge of financial 
accounting rules and an understanding of the institutional details of tax and financial 
reporting to identify and examine research questions. Second, in regard to tax avoidance 
research, accounting researchers benefit from understanding tax return data and income 
tax data in financial reports to derive measures of firms’ tax avoidance activities and address 
                                                 
50 Hines and Rice (1994, p. 175) argue that the four common attributes of tax havens (low corporate or 
personal tax rates, legislation that supports banking and business secrecy, advanced communications 
facilities and self-promotion as an offshore financial centre) are vague characterisations that make the 
process of classifying tax haven countries somewhat arbitrary. They then set up their own approach to 
identify the 41 tax haven countries. See Hines and Rice (1994) for more detail. 
51 Study 2 of this thesis (presented in Chapter 5) detects the incidence of cross-border profit shifting in 
Indonesia by adopting the approach introduced by Hines and Rice (1994) with some modifications. 
Therefore, a more detailed explanation of the HRA can be found in Chapter 5. 
52 The third comparative advantage is that accountants benefit by studying asymmetry problems (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). This advantage is less relevant to this thesis and therefore is not discussed further. 
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important questions about the determinants and consequences of tax avoidance. A brief 
summary is presented below of three papers in the accounting literature that empirically 
examine the issue of profit shifting by MNEs in developed countries. 
Halperin and Srinidhi (1987) examine the effect of the two most commonly used 
transfer pricing rules by MNEs for tax purposes in the US (i.e., resale price method and 
cost plus method)53 on resource allocation decisions by MNEs when the tax rate abroad 
is lower than in the US. Assuming that the tax rate abroad is lower than in the US, they 
document that both transfer pricing rules distort resource allocation, which results in 
lower overall pre-tax profits for the firm. They also document that MNEs in the US 
intentionally change the level of resource allocation to shift taxes to affiliates in lower-
tax jurisdictions. 
Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998) extend previous studies and suggest that they 
contain limitations because of data constraints (as in Harris, Morck, & Slemrod, 1993), 
period constraints (as in Klassen, et al., 1993; Harris, 1993) and differences in sample 
composition across countries that cannot be controlled because foreign subsidiary data in 
a given country are aggregated (as in Hines & Rice, 1994; Grubert & Mutti, 1991). Using 
a larger dataset on US MNEs’ manufacturing companies and including a longer period of 
study (1984–1992), the authors examine the cross-sectional relation between firm-level 
foreign profit margins and average foreign tax rates. They find that an affiliate located in 
a higher-tax jurisdiction will shift around USD25–USD30 million income to the US each 
year. 
                                                 
53 According to Halperin and Srinidhi (1987), under the US Tax Regulations Section 1.482-2(e) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, there are three methods for determining the appropriate transfer price: (1) 
comparable uncontrolled price method (i.e., the transfer price is the market price of the intermediate 
product); (2) resale price method (i.e., the applicable transfer price is the selling price of the final product 
minus an appropriate mark-up on the sale); and (3) cost plus method (i.e., the transfer price is the 
intermediate product’s cost plus an appropriate mark-up on the cost). 
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Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall (2016) use a survey of tax executives from MNEs 
to investigate the differences in their transfer pricing strategies in an effort to minimise 
the tax burden of MNEs. They set two categories of transfer pricing strategies: avoiding 
disputes with tax authorities (indicative of the tax compliance transfer pricing strategy) 
and avoiding cash taxes paid (indicative of the tax minimisation transfer pricing strategy). 
After analysing the responses of 219 tax directors regarding their transfer pricing 
strategies and practices, they document that more corporations choose to avoid disputes 
with tax authorities (49%) rather than avoid cash taxes paid (41%). Their analysis shows 
that MNEs that choose the tax minimisation transfer pricing strategy use tax avoidance 
schemes significantly more often than those that choose the tax compliance transfer 
pricing strategy. On average, MNEs using the tax minimisation strategy report lower 
effective tax rate of 6.6% (implying tax savings of USD43 million) through transfer prices 
compared with MNEs that use the tax compliance transfer pricing strategy. 
In sum, there are numerous empirical studies of cross-border profit shifting by 
MNEs in developed countries, especially the United States and the European Union, using 
country-level data, industry-level data, firm-level financial reporting data and tax return 
data. Prior studies find evidence of profit shifting in response to tax rate differences 
between countries and identify intra-group transfer pricing and debt financing as the main 
channels used to shift profits across country borders. 
 
3.3 Profit Shifting by Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries and the 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 
The studies discussed in the previous section focus on developed countries and 
confirm that MNEs shift profits. However, MNEs operate not only in developed 
countries, but also in developing countries. As a result, when MNEs commit profit 
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shifting strategies, both developed and developing countries are likely to be affected. This 
makes BEPS a global issue, and developed countries alone cannot sufficiently address it. 
Unfortunately, while empirical studies on developed countries are abundant, few studies 
have focused on developing countries. This section discusses some studies that have 
developing countries as their focus. It also examines why there are limited empirical 
studies in developing countries. 
Profit shifting within MNEs has been an issue in developed countries for decades. 
However, it has only recently come to the attention of policymakers in developing 
countries (Janský & Kokeš, 2015). To a large extent, reports of some international 
institutions and empirical studies that suggest and argue that developing countries may 
suffer from BEPS strategies by MNEs have considerably contributed to the attention. For 
example, the OECD (2013b) argues that MNEs are being accused of avoiding taxes 
worldwide—particularly in developing countries, where tax revenue is critical to promote 
sustainable development. 
In line with the OECD’s report, Dharmapala (2014b) claims that developed 
countries do not rely on corporate tax revenues and therefore do not consider BEPS 
activity by MNEs a major determining factor to their overall level of tax revenue. In 
contrast, developing countries rely on corporate tax revenue because it contributes a 
significant proportion of their total tax revenue, and they may find it difficult to switch to 
other forms of taxation (Dharmapala, 2014b). As a result, ‘developing countries are 
especially vulnerable to BEPS activity’ (Dharmapala, 2014b, p. 10). This statement is 
consistent with the OECD’s (2014b) view that some of the lowest-income countries rely 
on income tax from the operations of foreign MNEs. 
Indonesia is not an exception. From economic surveys on Indonesia, the OECD 
(2012, 2015b) finds that the nation’s budget relies heavily on revenue from corporate tax. 
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Another international institution that finds that developing countries rely on corporate tax 
revenue is the IMF, which estimates that the global annual corporate tax revenue loss 
caused by BEPS is approximately 5% of the total CIT revenue (IMF, 2014b). Moreover, 
the IMF estimates that the loss is as high as 13% in developing countries, confirming the 
high vulnerability of developing countries to profit shifting. 
In 2012, the G20 initiated a global project to tackle profit shifting by MNEs and 
asked the OECD to undertake the project. The OECD agreed and launched the project, 
called Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, in February 2013. The G20 countries which are 
not OECD members (e.g., Indonesia) became associates that have equal footing with 
OECD members in the project and agreed to adopt an Action Plan54 to address BEPS in 
September 2013 (OECD, 2013c). Since its launch, the project has received consistent 
support from the G20 and is known as the OECD/G20 BEPS project or the BEPS project. 
The OECD continues to encourage developing countries to be involved in the project. For 
example, in its ‘Economics Surveys: Indonesia 2015’ report (OECD, 2015b, p. 15), the 
OECD recommends that Indonesia ‘continue to be actively engaged in the OECD’s Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project’ because the OECD believes that the project 
is an efficient tool to ‘facilitate and improve corporate taxation for multinationals which 
should benefit Indonesia’s tax collection’ (OECD, 2016, p. 100). 
The main purpose of the BEPS project is to provide an internationally coordinated 
approach that facilitates and reinforces domestic actions to protect tax bases and provide 
comprehensive international solutions to address the issue (OECD, 2014a). The reason is 
that, although most BEPS strategies are legal, according to the OECD (2014a), it 
generates several undesirable consequences. First, BEPS distorts competition because 
MNEs may gain competitive advantages from BEPS opportunities that domestic 
                                                 
54 See the OECD’s report entitled ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ for details of the 15-
point action plan proposed by the OECD (2013c). 
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companies do not have. Second, it may cause the inefficient allocation of resources by 
distorting investment decisions towards activities that have lower pre-tax rates of return, 
but higher after-tax returns. Finally, it discourages voluntary compliance of most 
taxpayers because they observe that MNEs legally avoid income tax. The three potential 
distortions are compounded by the fact that most developing countries heavily rely on 
CIT revenue and have positioned studies on BEPS—particularly studies that focus on 
developing countries—as significantly important. 
 
3.4 Profit Shifting by Foreign-owned Indonesian Companies and How the 
Directorate General of Tax Fights It 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the two completed tax reforms in Indonesia have 
changed the nation’s taxation system. The 1983 tax reform has introduced novel 
approaches, such as allowing taxpayers to calculate, pay and report their tax liabilities 
(self-assessment system), and it has introduced technology to replace the previous paper-
based system. The tax administration reform that commenced in 2002 and was completed 
in 2008 has also significantly improved taxation in Indonesia—particularly in upgrading 
the face of the country’s tax services. For instance, tax data recordings have been more 
reliable, tax officials have been more professional and the structure of the DGT 
organisation has been simplified. 
However, the success of the two major tax reforms was not followed by satisfactory 
revenues collected from CIT. While the CIT amount collected has increased from year to 
year, the percentages of the CIT in total revenue collected consistently decreased from 
2009 to 2014 and slightly increased in 2015. Moreover, the tax-to-GDP ratio of Indonesia 
has been lower than that of other ASEAN countries. In fact, the level of tax compliance 
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ratio (the ratio of corporate taxpayers that file a tax return to the number of corporate 
taxpayers that must file a tax return) were below 60% during 2009–2015. 
As in other developing countries, taxation in Indonesia suffers from substantial tax 
evasion and tax avoidance. Further, until very recently, the Indonesian tax system is 
characterised by the absence of anti-avoidance provisions—particularly effective transfer 
pricing and debt financing (thin capitalisation) provisions. The lack of provisions to curb 
cross-border profit shifting along with the lack of power and flexibility of the DGT has 
made Indonesia vulnerable to international tax avoidance. Consequently, FOICs—the 
Indonesian affiliates of foreign MNEs—have an opportunity to avoid Indonesian CIT by 
using cross-border profit shifting strategies. 
Based on data provided by the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), 
there were 22,000 FOICs in 2014 (DGT, 2015a). These FOICs contributed more than 
25% of the corporate tax revenue in 2014 (Indonesian Ministry of Finance, 2015). 
Despite this significant contribution, Indonesian government officers have 
expressed concern that FOICs may have shifted profits out of Indonesia. For example, in 
2013, Agus DW Martowardojo, Indonesian Finance Minister, stated that at least 4,000 
FOICs have not paid CIT over the last seven years by claiming losses during that period 
(Jefriando, 2013). Two years later, his successor, Bambang PS Brodjonegoro, revealed 
that thousands of foreign-owned companies in Indonesia had never paid CIT since 
commencing their businesses in the country. The finance minister argued that the 
companies have used transfer pricing and debt financing to avoid taxes (Jefriando, 2015). 
The fact that numerous FOICs have avoided Indonesian CIT by allegedly using profit 
shifting schemes indicates that the 1983 tax reform and the 2002 tax administration 
reform have not been sufficient to support the DGT to fight cross-border profit shifting. 
However, there is almost no empirical evidence to support such claims. While some peer-
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reviewed papers55 have specifically discussed tax avoidance in Indonesia, they do not 
demonstrate sufficient empirical evidence regarding whether FOICs use profit shifting 
strategies to minimise their tax liability. The remainder of this section summarises two 
peer-reviewed papers that focus on the tax avoidance issue in Indonesia,56 presents a tax 
avoidance provision to mitigate the incidence of BEPS in Indonesia and discusses some 
issues related to BEPS encountered by the DGT. 
Lerche (1980), a peer-reviewed study on tax avoidance in Indonesia, does not 
specifically investigate tax avoidance—in particular, using profit shifting strategies—by 
foreign MNEs in Indonesia. However, it pioneers the empirical study of tax misbehaviour 
in Indonesia. By comparing the legal potential (i.e., the amount of tax revenue raised if 
all taxpayers pay taxes according to Indonesian tax law) and the real amount of tax 
revenue collected between 1969 and 1979, Lerche evaluates the efficiency and equity of 
the Indonesian tax system. He finds that Indonesia had suffered from low tax revenue for 
three main reasons: tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax collection inefficiency. 
Specifically, using a hypothetical calculation (i.e., not based on real-world data), he posits 
that, of an ideal tax revenue of USD1,500, the government can only collect USD250 
(16.67%). The remaining USD1,250 (83.33%) is the potential revenue lost and is 
dispersed in three taxation gaps: USD500 (33.33%) caused by tax avoidance, USD550 
(36.67%) caused by tax evasion and USD200 (13.33%) caused by inefficient tax 
collection procedures. While this finding is based on a hypothetical calculation, it 
indicates that tax avoidance strategies have been a major option for taxpayers in Indonesia 
to lower their tax burden. 
                                                 
55 This thesis bases the criteria on the Australian Business Deans Council (ABDC) Journal Quality List 
2013: http://www.abdc.edu.au/pages/abdc-journal-quality-list-2013.html. 
56 In fact, the two peer-reviewed papers discussed here are the only peer-reviewed papers that could be 
found in the literature on tax avoidance in Indonesia. 
78 
An empirical study that focuses on tax avoidance by foreign MNEs in Indonesia is 
that of Gramlich and Wheeler (2003). However, unlike this thesis which investigates 
whether FOICs avoid Indonesian CIT, Gramlich and Wheeler examine how Indonesian 
affiliates of US MNEs are used by their parent companies to avoid US CIT. Specifically, 
they study how two giant oil MNEs—Chevron and Texaco, collectively known as 
Caltex—used their Indonesian subsidiaries to avoid US CIT from 1964 to 2002. They 
find that the parent companies of Chevron and Texaco in the US suppressed their US CIT 
for decades by asking their subsidiaries in the US to pay higher market prices for 
Indonesian crude oil exported from Indonesian subsidiaries. The higher market price 
increased the cost of goods sold, which eventually reduced the parents’ income taxes in 
the US. The authors also find that, as a result of the overpricing of oil exported to the US, 
the high income of Caltex—the subsidiary in Indonesia—is further distributed to the 
parents (Chevron and Texaco) in the US in the form of a higher dividend income along 
with foreign tax credit paid for the dividend in Indonesia. While it appeared that the 
Indonesian government collected higher income taxes because of the overpricing, 
Gramlich and Wheeler (2003) document that the Indonesian government granted Caltex 
extra oil to compensate for the extra taxes received. Although the study is less relevant to 
the issue of whether FOICs shift profits to avoid Indonesian income taxes, the study 
suggests that Indonesian affiliates are used by their parents in a profit shifting scheme to 
avoid the overall, or group, CIT. 
Although there is little supporting empirical evidence, the DGT is aware that the 
incidence of international tax avoidance has increased because of the borderless economy. 
The following statement depicts the DGT’s concern about tax avoidance by FOICs—
particularly by means of transfer pricing arrangements (DGT, 2010, p. 80): 
Under the current globalisation, the intensity and magnitude of transnational 
transactions are more dominant in the economy either by related parties or 
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independent parties. This brings different tax implications and should receive 
serious concerns. Transfer pricing is closely related to transactions between 
affiliated parties, which must be strictly supervised since it can be used to reduce 
the tax that must be paid (tax avoidance).  
The concern of the government can also be observed in the ITL amendments that 
have been passed by the legislature to date. The government has amended the ITL four 
times since it came into force on 1 January 1984. In the amendments, ITL Article 18 
regarding international tax issues has been included three times. The tax avoidance 
provisions—especially those related to company tax avoidance—according to ITL 
Article 18 and its elucidation, as lastly amended in 2008 and took effect on 1 January 
2009, are outlined below: 
(1) The finance minister is authorised to issue a decree on the debt-to-equity ratio for 
tax purposes. 
More debt generates higher interest expense. Given that interest is a deduction 
under ITL, a higher interest expense results in lower tax payable. Thus, companies 
have incentives to use debt rather than equity to finance their business activities. 
ITL Article 18(1) is therefore intended to restrict companies from treating equity as 
debt. ITL refers to equity as defined in the Indonesian accounting standards. 
Following the authority mandated by ITL Article 18(1), the finance minister 
enacted Finance Minister Regulation (PMK) number 169/PMK.03/2015 (PMK 
169/2015) about Debt to Equity Ratio for Income Tax Computation Purposes in 
2015. The regulation came into effect on 9 September 2015 and was implemented 
in 2016. It is known as the Indonesian anti-thin capitalisation provisions and is 
intended to restrict the practice of profit shifting by means of high debt financing 
by FOICs. Under the regulation, taxpayers can claim the maximum debt-to-equity 
ratio of four to one for tax purposes. PMK 169/2015 replaced Finance Minister 
Decree (KMK) number 1002/KMK.04/1984 (KMK 1002/1984). Under KMK 
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1002/1984, the maximum debt-to-equity ratio is three to one. Although KMK 
1002/1984 should have come into effect on 8 October 1984, but on 8 March 1985, 
the finance minister released a decree (254/KMK.01/1985) to postpone the 
implementation of 1002/KMK.04/1984 until an unspecified time. 
(2) The finance minister is authorised to determine when a resident taxpayer is deemed 
to receive dividends from a non-listed foreign company provided that the taxpayer 
(or together with other resident taxpayers) controls at least 50% of the shares of the 
foreign company. 
This provision is known as the Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules in 
Indonesia.57 As explained in Section 2.2.2, under ITL Article 24, foreign income is 
included in the TI of a resident taxpayer only when foreign income is received by 
the resident taxpayer. The purpose of Article 18(2) is therefore to minimise tax 
avoidance by resident taxpayers that invest in non-listed foreign companies, but not 
to distribute or repatriate dividend income to the resident taxpayers. The following 
is an example of the implementation of the CFC rule according to the elucidation 
of ITL Article 18(2): 
Company A and Company B, both are resident taxpayers, own shares of 40 percent 
and 20 percent respectively in X Ltd., a non-listed company domiciled in country 
Q. X Ltd. had generated profits after tax in the last few years but had not distributed 
dividends to its shareholders. In this case, Finance Minister has full authority to 
determine the time and the amount the dividends deemed to be received by Company 
A and Company B. 
                                                 
57 According to the UN (2013c, p. 23), ‘CFC rules are designed to prevent tax being deferred or avoided by 
taxpayers using foreign corporations in which they hold a controlling shareholding in low-tax jurisdictions 
and “parking” income there. CFC rules treat this income as though it has been repatriated and it is therefore 
taxable prior to actual repatriation’. 
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Following the authority given by ITL, the finance minister issued Finance Minister 
Regulation No. 158/2008 in 2008 (PMK 158/2008). It states that the dividends are 
deemed to be received either in the fourth month after the deadline of tax return 
submissions in the host country (the country in which the foreign income is 
generated) or in the seventh month if the tax law in the host country does not require 
the submission of tax returns. The amount the dividend deemed to be received 
should refer to the ownership interests. Using the example of the implementation 
of the CFC above, if X Ltd made an income after tax of Rp1 billion in 2009 and the 
finance minister decided that Company A and Company B should receive a 
dividend from X Ltd, both companies should include an income of Rp400 million 
(40% ownership interest in X Ltd multiplied by X Ltd’s profit after tax of one 
billion Rupiah) and Rp200 million (20% ownership interest in X Ltd multiplied by 
X Ltd’s profit after tax of one billion Rupiah) respectively in their TI. 
(3) The Director General of Tax is authorised to re-determine income and deductions 
and to reclassify debt as equity for TI computation purposes for transactions 
between related parties using several methods that are internationally recognised, 
such as the price comparison method between independent parties (known as the 
comparable uncontrolled price method), resale price method and the cost-plus 
method.58 
The government understands that transactions between related parties tend to result 
in a lower TI. The purpose of this provision is to prevent tax avoidance by 
deliberately suppressing income or boosting deductions from transactions between 
related parties. Similarly, the government notices that company taxpayers may 
report equity as debt. This provision allows the Director General of Tax to reclassify 
                                                 
58 Elucidation of ITL Article 3 defines uncontrolled price method, resale price method, cost-plus method as 
defined by Halperin and Srinidhi (1987). See Section 3.2 for brief definitions of the three terms. 
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the debt as equity in accordance with ITL Article 18 and the related Finance 
Minister Regulation. ITL also authorises the DGT to make the reclassification by 
comparing the debt-to-equity ratio of the related parties with that of non-related 
parties. Therefore, the party that pays the interest on the debt may or may not claim 
the outgoing, or part of the outgoing, as a deduction. Accordingly, the party that 
receives the interest may or may not be taxed as if they receive a dividend income. 
Following the authority mandated by ITL Article 18, the Director General of Tax 
issues the Director General of Tax Regulation PER-43/PJ/2010 about the 
Implementation of Arm’s Length Principle for Transactions with Related Parties, 
in 2010 and was in effect on 6 September 2010. On 11 November 2011, the DGT 
amended PER-43/PJ/2010 by issuing PER-32/PJ/2011. PER-32/PJ/2011 is the 
current Indonesian transfer pricing provisions and is intended to ensure that related 
parties apply a fair market price in their business transactions. Among other things, 
PER-32/PJ/2011 requires related parties to provide detailed transfer pricing 
documentation regarding their pricing and profiting procedures. 
(3a) The Director General of Tax is authorised to conclude an agreement with a taxpayer 
and collaborate with tax authorities from other countries to determine pricing for 
transactions between related parties. 
 A pricing agreement (known as an Advance Pricing Agreement or APA) is a deal 
between a taxpayer and the Director General of Tax regarding fair selling prices for 
taxpayers’ products before taxpayers sell their products to their related parties. ITL 
specifically mentions that the objective of the agreement is to reduce the practice 
of transfer mispricing by MNEs. 
 An APA is considered advantageous for both taxpayers and tax authorities. It is 
beneficial for taxpayers because it provides legal certainty as well as simpler tax 
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computation documentation. For tax authorities, an APA is advantageous because 
it reduces the need to perform tax audits and subsequent corrections and 
adjustments. According to ITL, an APA can be a unilateral agreement or a bilateral 
agreement. If the parties involved are the Director General of Tax and a taxpayer, 
the agreement is called a unilateral APA. If the parties involved are the Director 
General of Tax and the tax authority of another country, it is called a bilateral 
agreement. 
(3b) Taxpayers that buy shares or assets of other companies through a special-purpose 
company can be considered the actual party that purchases the shares or assets, 
provided that the taxpayers and the special-purpose company are related parties and 
the price of the transaction does not satisfy the arm’s-length principle. 
 This provision is intended to prevent resident taxpayers from avoiding taxes by 
purchasing shares/equity of another resident company taxpayer using a foreign 
company that was established specifically for that purpose, known as a special-
purpose company (in tax literature, a special-purpose company is also known as a 
special-purpose vehicle (SPV), a conduit company or a shell company). 
(3c) The sale or transfer of shares of a special-purpose company that was established or 
domiciled in a THC and is a related party of a resident taxpayer could be deemed 
as the sale or transfer of shares of the resident company taxpayer. Figure 3.1 
provides an example of this provision based on the elucidation of ITL Article 18 
(3c). 
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Figure 3.1 
Selling a Special-purpose Vehicle in a THC by a Foreign Company Deemed as 
Selling a Resident Company under Income Tax Law 
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    100% Money 
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 (THC) 
    95% 
      100% 
 Indonesia 
 
 As shown in Figure 3.1, X Ltd is a company that was incorporated and domiciled 
in Country A, a THC. It controls 95% of the shares of Company Z, a resident 
company taxpayer. X Ltd is wholly owned by Y Co., a company domiciled in 
Country B and established as a conduit company to obtain the majority shares of 
Company Z in Indonesia. If Y Co. sells all of its shares in X Ltd to Company W, 
another Indonesian resident company taxpayer, the transaction is legally a transfer 
of shares of a foreign company by a foreign taxpayer. However, according to ITL 
Article 18 (3), the essence of this transaction is the transfer of shares of a resident 
company taxpayer by a foreign taxpayer. The reason is that, by acquiring X Ltd, 
Company W, which is an Indonesian resident company taxpayer, will 
simultaneously acquire Company Z, which is also an Indonesian resident company 
taxpayer. Consequently, any gain from the sale by Y Co. is subject to Indonesian 
income tax. 
(4) ITL refers to two or more taxpayers that are connected by at least one of the 
following situations as related parties: 
Y Co. 
X Ltd. 
Company Z Company W 
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a. Ownership. This includes directly or indirectly owning at least 25% of the equity of 
other taxpayers or a relationship among taxpayers through ownership of at least 
25% of the equity. Figure 3.2 illustrates related parties based on ownership 
according to the elucidation of ITL Article 18 (4a). 
 
Figure 3.2 
Related Parties Based on Ownership 
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 As shown, Company A directly owns 50% of the shares of Company B. If Company 
B owns 50% of the shares of Company C, Company A indirectly has ownership of 
25% of the shares in Company C. Further, Company A also owns 25% of the shares 
of Company D. In this case, the four companies are considered related parties. For 
example, Company A and Company B are related parties because of direct 
ownership. Company A and Company C are related parties because of indirect 
ownership, and Company C and Company D are related parties because of the 
common ownership by Company A. 
b. Control of management or technology. Two or more companies are considered 
related parties if they are under the same control of management or technology. This 
provision implies that to be considered related parties, companies do not have to 
have ownership. The presence of control of management and technology in one 
Company A 
Company B 
 
Company C 
 
Company D 
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company by another company can also indicate that the two companies are related 
parties for tax purposes. 
The amendments of ITL Article 18 above are the major provisions in combating tax 
avoidance by MNEs in Indonesia. These new provisions came into force on 1 January 
2009 and have not been further amended. That is, the cross-border tax avoidance 
provisions remained unchanged from 2009 to 2015. This is another reason for the study 
period in this thesis to begin in 2009 and end in 2015. 
Although ITL Article (18) contains relatively complete international tax avoidance 
provisions, it leaves some potential problems that arise because of the delay in issuing the 
operating regulations by the minister of finance and the Director of General Taxes as 
mandated by ITL Article 18(1) and (3), respectively. First, since the finance minister only 
issued 169/PMK.03/2015, which was effectively enacted on 9 September 2015, Indonesia 
did not have a specific thin capitalisation provision until that date. While the provision 
was in effect in September 2015, it is arguable that the new provision was not effectively 
in force until 2016 or even 2017 because taxpayers may need more time to become 
familiar with it. Therefore, practically thin capitalisation provisions did not exist during 
2009–2015. Second, since the transfer pricing provision was in effect on 6 September 
2010, it can be assumed that company taxpayers effectively began applying the new 
provision in 2011. Therefore, during the period of study of this thesis (2009–2015), 
Indonesia effectively did not possess transfer pricing provisions until 2011. 
Previous studies find that transfer pricing rules effectively increase the use of the 
‘arm’s-length principle’ on intra-firm trade (e.g. Halperin & Srinidhi, 1987; Schjelderup 
& Weichenrieder, 1999)59 and that thin capitalisation rules effectively lessen the incentive 
                                                 
59 However, some studies find that transfer pricing rules may lower the income tax paid by MNEs in 
countries where transfer pricing rules are enacted. For example, Halperin and Srinidhi (1987) find that the 
US transfer pricing rules result in less taxes paid in the country because the firm’s overall pre-tax profit 
would be lower under the rules than in an unconstrained situation. They also find that such restrictions 
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to use internal loans for tax avoidance (e.g. Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber, & Wamser, 
2012; Buslei & Simmler, 2012). Therefore, the absence of such rules may have increased 
the opportunities for FOICs to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
Another potential problem encountered by the DGT that is likely to affect its 
efficiency in combating alleged cross-border profit shifting is that the Indonesian tax 
authority is deemed to have insufficient resources to handle international tax issues. The 
DGT once had the Directorate of International Taxation Relations (an Echelon II unit), 
which exclusively dealt with issues of international taxation. The directorate was 
established in 1993, but it only existed for around one decade. Afterwards, while the DGT 
acknowledged that international tax avoidance was the main issue to overcome, it had 
only two relatively small units that watched international tax matters. One is the Sub 
Directorate of International Tax Treaty and Cooperation. This unit is an Echelon III unit 
under the Directorate of Tax Regulation II and focuses on drafting regulations on 
international taxation and the exchange of information with other tax authorities.60 The 
other unit is the Sub Directorate of Special Transaction Audit, which is an Echelon III 
unit under the Directorate of Tax Audit and Collection. The total tax officials in both units 
numbered less than 50. The structure of the units that handle international tax cases 
remained the same until 2015.61 
The small numbers of tax units and tax officials in charge of monitoring cross-
border transactions has affected the number of cross-border tax cases detected. For 
example, only one transfer pricing case was handled by the DGT in 2008. As discussed 
                                                 
prompt MNEs to shift taxes from the US to lower-taxed affiliates overseas by changing the level of resource 
allocation. 
60 See Figure 2.2 for the structure of the head office of the DGT. 
61 In 2016, the DGT restructured the organisation and established three new directorates—one of which is 
the Directorate of International Taxation. This directorate is in charge of several fields in international 
taxation issues, such as formulating and implementing international tax policies, drafting the exchange of 
information, advance pricing agreements and mutual agreement procedures norms, standards, procedures 
and criteria, and providing mentoring, monitoring, control and evaluation of international tax policies 
(DGT, 2016b). 
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in Section 2.2, the DGT is a single directorate under the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. 
As a result, it does not have the authority to expand its own institution. Therefore, the 
DGT must optimise existing resources to tackle the progressive development of 
international tax avoidance. For instance, under the supervision of the Sub Directorate of 
Special Transaction Audit, the DGT conducted a transfer pricing management program 
in 2009. As part of the program, 1,000 tax officials (in particular, tax auditors) were 
trained in transfer pricing topics (Directorate General of Tax, 2010). As a result, transfer 
pricing cases handled by the Sub Directorate significantly increased in 2009 compared 
with the previous years. Table 3.1 shows the transfer pricing cases handled by the DGT 
in 2008 and 2009. 
The significant increase that occurred after the training program indicates that 
transfer pricing is probably a common strategy used by FOICs to shift profits. It also 
explains the small number of transfer pricing cases detected in 2008. Indonesian tax 
auditors/officials did not have sufficient knowledge to understand that international 
transfer pricing was occurring. 
 
Table 3.1 
Transfer Pricing Cases, 2008–2009 
Type of Case 
2008 
Semester 1 
2008 
Semester 2 
2009 
Semester 1 
2009 
Semester 2 
Supervision 0 1 11 32 
Audit 1 3 8 12 
Objection 0 2 2 3 
Appeal 0 2 5 10 
Total 1 8 26 57 
Source: DGT (2010, p. 81) 
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International tax disputes, such as transfer pricing cases between taxpayers and the 
DGT, are solved mainly by using provisions as stated in tax treaties between Indonesia 
(the host country—i.e., the source country of the business income) and the home country 
(i.e., the source country of the investment, sometimes called the domicile country of the 
income earner, or simply domicile country). A tax treaty is an agreement between two 
contracting states: a host country and a home country. It is designed to avoid double 
taxation or double non-taxation on certain incomes. Double taxation means that the same 
TI is taxed by both the home country and the host country. Double non-taxation refers to 
an income that is not taxed by both countries. For example, when a transfer pricing dispute 
occurs and it involves a related party domiciled in a country that is a tax treaty partner of 
Indonesia, the parties involved in the dispute can request tax relief according to the 
procedures agreed in the tax treaty. In Indonesia, a tax treaty is established based on ITL 
Article 32A and International Agreement Law No. 24 Year 2000. Table 3.2 shows the 
development of the Indonesian tax treaty network during 2009–2015. 
 
Table 3.2 
Tax Treaty Network of Indonesia, 2009–2015 
Description 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total 59 59 60 60 63 65 65 
Newly signed - - Iran - Croatia 
Morocco 
Hong Kong 
Suriname 
Papua New-
Guinea* 
- 
Revoked - - - - - - - 
Note: *The effective date of the tax treaty with Papua New Guinea was 1 January 2015. 
Source: DGT (2015b). See Appendix 2 for a list of Indonesia’s tax treaty partners as at 30 June 2018. 
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In general, three key tax avoidance provisions are included in a tax treaty between 
Indonesia and its partner countries. The three provisions are considered important and 
relevant to the issue discussed in this thesis because they are the three mechanisms that 
can be used to curb cross-border profit shifting by FOICs. The first mechanism is the 
exchange of information (EoI). By agreeing to include an EoI article on the tax treaty, the 
designated representatives from the governments of the two contracting states (i.e., the 
competent authorities) agree to exchange data on taxes by request, automatically or both. 
Data collected from the partner tax authority can be used as supporting evidence (in some 
cases as the main evidence) to resolve the ongoing dispute. Therefore, the EoI is 
considered an effective tool for solving cross-border tax disputes such as transfer pricing. 
In many cases, the information received from another tax authority may be useful and 
may be the key to preventing tax disputes. In a recent development in the EoI, Indonesia 
joined the agreement for Automatic EoI under the OECD Common Reporting Standard 
in 2015, which will be in effect by 2018 (OECD, 2016). According to the OECD (2016, 
p. 99), the critical objective of the agreement is ‘to improve the management of cross-
border activities through cooperation of tax administrations in today’s globalised 
economy’. The EoI for tax purposes is regulated under Government Regulation No. 74 
Year 2011 Article 56. 
The second feature is the mutual agreement procedure (MAP). According to the 
OECD (2007, p. 8), the MAP provision in tax treaties ‘allows the competent authorities62 
to interact with the intent to resolve international tax disputes. These disputes involve 
cases of double taxation (juridical and economic) as well as inconsistencies in the 
                                                 
62 According to the Minister of Finance Decree Number 188/KMK.01/2013, there are two competent tax 
authorities for the purposes of establishing and/or renegotiating a tax agreement between Indonesia and 
other countries: (1) Head of Fiscal Policy Office as the competent authority for establishing and/or 
renegotiating a Tax Treaty Agreement; and (2) Director General of Tax as the competent authority for 
establishing and/or renegotiating MAP and EoI. Like the DGT, the Fiscal Policy Office is an Echelon I unit 
under the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. 
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interpretation and application of a convention’.63 A tax treaty usually contains at least one 
article that specifically regulates MAP procedures, which allows competent authorities 
from both contracting states to solve any cross-border tax disputes. In Indonesia, a MAP 
plays an important role because it ‘provides opportunity for taxpayers in resolving tax 
disputes and is considered an alternative to settle the disputes other than objection and 
appeal’ (DGT, 2015b, p. 78). Thus, a MAP is a tool that can be used to solve international 
tax disputes, and it is therefore only useful after a dispute arises. In Indonesia, the legal 
basis for establishing a MAP is ITL Articles 55–59. 
The third feature is the APA. As explained earlier in this section, an APA is an 
agreement between the DGT and the taxpayer (or tax authority) regarding arm’s-length 
prices for transactions between related parties. Therefore, an APA is a tool that can be 
used to avoid disputes because the prices are agreed before the transactions occur. 
Indonesia regularly performs APA, EoI and MAP with several contracting states every 
year—particularly with countries that have a large number of companies in Indonesia, 
such as Singapore, Japan and the US. The legal foundation of forming an APA is ITL 
Article 18 (3a). 
As the Indonesian tax authority, the DGT is aware of the situation relating to 
international tax avoidance: 
DGT biggest challenges in the context of tax administration are transfer pricing, tax 
avoidance, and tax evasion. To overcome these challenges, in the coming years 
DGT will put more focus on tax intensification policy, improvement of taxpayers’ 
compliance, and improvement of human resource capacity building. (DGT, 2013, 
p. 26) 
Moreover, Arnold (2012) examines the performance of Indonesia’s tax system and 
suggests that although the DGT has managed to make some progress, it needs to improve 
its capacity in the area of MNEs’ profit shifting and transfer pricing, consistent with the 
                                                 
63 However, although the MAP article requires the competent authorities to reach an agreement, it does not 
compel them to reach an agreement and resolve their tax disputes (OECD, 2007). 
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DGT’s awareness. To date, it appears that the DGT is not sufficiently capable of tackling 
profit shifting, which magnifies the opportunity for FOICs to shift profits out of 
Indonesia. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the contextual literature of profit shifting by MNEs. It begins 
by elaborating the theories that explain tax avoidance by MNEs. Internalisation, which is 
defined as an opportunity to exploit products or processes internally among companies 
within the same ownership, is believed to be central in giving MNEs opportunities to 
avoid tax liability using their worldwide affiliates. They have opportunities to deploy 
certain prices for products they sell (buy) to (from) different companies but within the 
same ownership to supress the overall tax burden. Prior studies show that the main trigger 
for cross-border tax avoidance has been tax rate differences between countries. 
This chapter then analyses prior studies that examine the incidence of profit shifting 
in developed countries. Although there are ample studies both in terms of quantity and 
the variety of approaches used, they mostly focus on developed countries. Prior studies 
can be divided into two groups. The first group of studies detects the incidence of profit 
shifting by MNEs. Overall, they conclude that tax rate differences between countries 
create an incentive for MNEs to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions to suppress their tax 
liability. The second group of studies identifies the channels used by MNEs to shift their 
profits. Most empirical studies find that the two channels that MNEs use the most to shift 
profits are transfer pricing and high debt financing. 
Some prior studies suggest that developing countries also suffer from profit shifting 
by MNEs. While this suggestion is based on indirect indicators rather than actual data 
from developing countries, the occurrence of profit shifting by MNEs appears to be 
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genuine. As prior studies explain, the fact that developing countries heavily rely on 
revenue from corporate tax places them in a more vulnerable position compared with 
developed countries.  
Finally, Indonesia is also aware of the development of international tax avoidance. 
While there is little empirical evidence on profit shifting by FOICs, there is a strong 
indication of its existence. Therefore, ITL amendments always include some articles that 
strengthen international tax provisions. However, despite the country’s continuous 
efforts, Indonesia still appears to suffer from international corporate tax avoidance 
strategies. The most likely causes are insufficient anti-avoidance provisions and a lack of 
capability, both institutional arrangements and human resources, to tackle cross-border 
tax avoidance. 
To date, there is little empirical evidence regarding the existence of profit shifting 
by MNEs in Indonesia, which is a major developing nation that is actively involved in the 
OECD/G20 BEPS project. Therefore, it is important to find empirical evidence of cross-
border profit shifting in the country. This finding will support the statements made by two 
Indonesian ministers of finance and the suggestions made by prior studies and reports. 
Thus, this thesis presents three studies to fill the gap in the literature. Using Indonesian 
confidential tax return data obtained from the DGT, the three studies attempt to detect the 
incidence of profit shifting in Indonesia and identify how FOICs shift profits out of the 
country, as summarised below. 
Study 1, presented in Chapter 4, examines how tax rate differences between the 
parent country of an FOIC and Indonesia relates to profits reported by the FOIC in its 
Indonesian tax return. This is the first step needed to identify the existence of profit 
shifting by MNEs operating in Indonesia. The results of Study 1 lay the foundation for 
the other two studies of this thesis. 
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Study 2, presented in Chapter 5, reinforces the findings of Study 1 by using the 
Hines and Rice Approach (HRA), which is a well-recognised and widely used research 
method to detect the presence of profit shifting activities by MNEs. 
Study 3, presented in Chapter 6, attempts to determine how FOICs shift profits out 
of Indonesia by examining the channels they use for cross-border tax avoidance strategies. 
As explained in Section 3.1.1, transfer pricing arrangements and high debt financing are 
the two channels mostly used by MNEs to shift profits. Study 3 examines whether FOICs 
use these two intra-group profit shifting channels to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
RELATION BETWEEN TAX RATE DIFFERENCE AND 
THE PROFIT REPORTED IN INDONESIA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents Study 1 of this thesis. It attempts to provide preliminary 
evidence of the existence of cross-border profit shifting in Indonesia which is a major 
developing economy. Study 1 empirically examines the relation between the tax rate 
difference between the parent’s country of FOICs and Indonesia and the profit that FOICs 
report in their Indonesia annual tax return. Tax rate difference (defined as the corporate 
tax rate of the parent’s country of an FOIC minus the Indonesian corporate tax rate) 
motivates FOICs to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
After analysing a sample of around 6,000 firm-year observations over the period 
2009–2015, multivariate regressions find a positive relation between the tax rate 
difference and the profit reported in Indonesia, suggesting that FOICs shift profits out of 
Indonesia to lower tax countries. This finding provides preliminary empirical evidence of 
the incidence of profit shifting from a developing country’s perspective using confidential 
tax return data. This preliminary evidence leads to the next two related studies of this 
thesis. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the 
literature review and develops the hypothesis. Section 4.3 describes the research design 
of the study, including the sample selection procedure and the measurement of variables. 
Section 4.4 reports the empirical results of the study. Finally, Section 4.5 summarises the 
chapter. 
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4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
A number of studies have empirically examined the effect of tax rate differences on 
BEPS activities and have provided empirical evidence of profit shifting towards countries 
with lower tax rates (e.g. Hines & Rice, 1994; Collins, et al., 1998; Huizinga & Laeven, 
2008; Newberry & Dhaliwal, 2001). Recent studies (e.g., Clausing, 2016) find that TI is 
sensitive to corporate tax rates, which is consistent with the findings in previous studies. 
Therefore, as Beer and Loeprick (2015) conclude, the finding that MNEs shift profits to 
lower-tax jurisdictions appears to hold over different periods in the past two decades, 
even though the studies use different public and private databases at the national, regional 
and global levels. However, previous studies show that the incidence of BEPS may 
depend on the type of tax rate difference that has been used in the study. The following 
paragraphs briefly discuss two types of tax rate differences that are most commonly used 
in previous international tax avoidance studies and provide the reasons for the type of tax 
rate difference used in this study. 
The most important trigger used to detect profit shifting is the tax rate difference 
between the source country of the investment (home country) and the source country of 
the business income (host country). Based on existing literature, studies of profit shifting 
motivated by tax rate differences may use either statutory tax rate (STR) or effective tax 
rate (ETR) to compute tax rate differences to proxy for tax incentives to shift profits. 
Before discussing how the two tax rate differences are used in the profit shifting literature, 
it is necessary to define STR and ETR. 
The OECD (2013b, p. 19) defines corporate STR as ‘the rate specified in a country’s 
tax law that is applied to a corporation’s TI to determine the amount of the taxpayer’s tax 
liability’. However, this type of tax rate does not capture the real tax burden because it 
does not include several important factors, such as tax allowances deducted against the 
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tax base, timing issues (e.g., choice of depreciation method) and tax planning strategies 
that may be used to achieve a desired level of actual tax paid (OECD, 2013b). In contrast, 
ETR is defined as ‘the ratio of corporate income tax to a pre-tax measure of corporate 
profit over a given period of time… being based on measures of actual taxes paid, and 
therefore capturing the range of factors affecting actual tax liability (statutory provisions 
as well as tax planning)’ (OECD, 2013b, p. 19). 
The use of either STR or ETR difference is a topic of debate in the central issue of 
profit shifting. For example, Dowd, et al. (2017) suggest that using STR rather than ETR 
is a common practice in the profit shifting literature. In contrast, some researchers (e.g. 
Clausing, 2016; Grubert, 2012; Clausing, 2009; Grubert & Mutti, 1991; Grubert, 2003) 
argue that ETR is considered a more appropriate measure than STR. Some studies (e.g., 
Clausing, 2003; Dowd et al., 2017; Mills and Newberry, 2004) use both STR and ETR in 
their analyses. Although studies that use both STR and ETR in their analysis confirm the 
mainstream findings that MNEs shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions, some studies find 
mixed results. The next paragraph summarises these studies. 
Clausing (2003) obtains similar results using both STR and ETR to examine profit 
shifting by MNEs. Using US intra-firm international transaction data during 1997–1999, 
she finds that US MNEs use lower export prices and higher import prices for intra-firm 
transactions than for non-intra-firm trade transactions when the tax rate in the other 
country is lower than the US tax rate. The results are consistent either using STR or ETR. 
An example of a study that uses both STR and ETR and obtains slightly different results 
is that of Dowd, et al. (2017). In their log-linear model, they find that the semi-elasticity 
of the reported profit to the tax rate is 1.44 for STR and 1.08 for ETR. They conclude that 
the difference is insignificant. An example of a study that uses both STR and ETR and 
obtains completely different results is that of Mills and Newberry (2004). Using financial 
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data and confidential tax return data of foreign-controlled US corporations during 1987–
1996, they find that tax incentives affect foreign MNEs’ income reporting in their US 
subsidiaries when they define tax incentives as the difference between US STR and 
foreign parent ETR. In contrast, they do not find any tax incentive effects when they 
measure tax incentives as the difference between US STR and foreign parent STR. 
The OECD (2013b) compares STR with ETR regarding their capability in capturing 
the incidence of BEPS. According to the OECD (2013b), although ETR is a better 
measure of actual tax paid than STR, the use of ETR has the following issues. First, a low 
ETR does not necessarily mean aggressive tax planning strategies. It may result from a 
special tax provision introduced by the government as an incentive to promote certain 
policies. Second, the data needed to appropriately compute ETR (i.e., tax paid data as the 
numerator and pre-tax profit data as the denominator) are limited. As a result, the ETR 
derived from such limited data may be insufficient to indicate the existence of BEPS. 
Third, researchers tend to use different methods to calculate ETRs. Accordingly, similar 
studies may have different or even contradictory results. Given the flexibility in 
computing ETRs, some studies intentionally use certain ETR computation procedures to 
confirm the desired conclusion (OECD, 2013b). 
In a paper that reviews the literature of tax avoidance by MNEs, Dharmapala 
(2014a) finds that the corporate tax rate difference between the parent’s country and the 
affiliate’s country remain the foremost incentive for investigating the occurrence of profit 
shifting into or out of the affiliate. Further, he suggests that STR is a typical choice for 
computing the tax rate difference because unlike ETR, which can be influenced by a firm 
and hence is endogenous to the firm’s choice, STR is set by the government and hence is 
exogenous to the taxpayer’s choice. Therefore, STR provides a more reliable source of 
identification despite the fact that it does not completely capture the actual tax burden 
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(Dharmapala, 2014a). A number of studies confirm that the STR discrepancy between 
countries is a major incentive for MNEs to shift profits (e.g. Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003; 
Egger, Eggert, & Winner, 2010). Following Dharmapala’s suggestion and the OECD’s 
explanation above, this study chooses STR difference as the proxy for tax incentives for 
foreign MNEs operating in Indonesia through FOICs to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
Based on the findings from prior studies, and following the suggestion that 
developing countries also suffer from the BEPS strategy (e.g. Crivelli, et al., 2015; 
OECD, 2013b), FOICs are therefore predicted to shift profits from Indonesia to their 
parent’s country when the parent country’s STR is lower than the Indonesian STR. Table 
4.1 presents the tax rates of Indonesia and three major source countries of investment, 
namely, Singapore, Japan and South Korea for 2009–2015. 
 
Table 4.1 
Corporate Tax Rates of Indonesia, Singapore, Japan and Korea, 2009–2015 
Country 
Corporate Tax Rate (%) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Indonesia 28 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Japan 40.69 40.69 40.69 38.01 38.01 35.64 33.06 
Korea 24.2 24.2 22 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 
Singapore 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 
 
Japan and Singapore are two main origin countries of inflow FDI to Indonesia 
(Bank Indonesia, 2016). The two countries and South Korea head the list of parent 
countries in the sample used in this study. During 2009–2015, the Indonesian STR 
decreased from 28% in 2009 to 25% in 2010 and remained unchanged until 2015. During 
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the same period, corporate tax rates ranged from 33.06% to 40.69% in Japan (i.e., 
consistently significantly higher than the STR of Indonesia), 22%–24.2% in South Korea 
(i.e., consistently similar to the STR of Indonesia) and 17%–18% in Singapore (i.e., 
consistently lower than the STR of Indonesia). Consequently, it is predicted that 
Japanese-owned Indonesian companies do not have incentives to shift profits, Korean-
owned Indonesian companies have weak incentives to shift profits and Singaporean-
owned Indonesian companies have strong incentives to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
As mentioned in Section 1.1 and briefly discussed in Section 3.1.1, cross-border 
profit shifting is a book-tax conforming tax avoidance strategy that reduces TI and AP 
simultaneously. Therefore, profit in this study is represented by two measurements. In 
addition to TI as the main measurement of profit based on tax law reported by FOICs in 
their Indonesian tax returns, this thesis uses accounting profit before tax based on 
financial reporting standards (AP), which is also reported by FOICs in their Indonesian 
tax returns. If FOICs shift profits out of Indonesia to low tax countries, there should be a 
significantly positive relation between the tax rate difference and the two profit 
measurements reported by FOICs to the Indonesian tax authority. That is, the lower the 
corporate tax rate of the parent’s country, the lower the TI and AP reported by the FOIC 
in its Indonesian tax return. This prediction leads to the following two hypotheses, which 
are stated in the alternative form: 
H1:  TI reported by FOICs is positively related to STR differences between the residence 
countries of the parents and Indonesia (STRParent − STRIndonesia) after controlling for 
firm size, maturity and industry. 
H2:  AP reported by FOICs is positively related to STR differences between the 
residence countries of the parents and Indonesia (STRParent − STRIndonesia) after 
controlling for firm size, maturity and industry. 
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4.3 Research Design 
4.3.1 Sample Selection and Period of Study 
The final sample consists of FOICs registered in tax offices in Indonesia—most of 
them (72.62%) are registered in tax offices on the island of Java. All data are based on 
the Indonesian annual tax returns (Form 1771) reported by FOICs to the DGT and are 
confidential under the Indonesian tax law. The data were obtained under a data 
nondisclosure agreement. Firms are anonymised for privacy protection. 
The period of the study is 2009–2015. There are two important reasons for starting 
the study from 2009. First, as discussed in Chapter 2, the DGT started a tax administrative 
reform, better known as ‘modernisasi’ (modernisation) in Indonesia in July 2002. The 
reform was aimed at ‘promoting voluntary compliance among taxpayers, enhancing the 
efficiency of administration and restoring taxpayers’ trust in the tax administration 
system’ (OECD, 2010, pp. 42–43). The reform was completed at the end of 2008. The 
DGT claimed that the tax administration reform had equipped its tax office units 
nationwide with ‘more efficient, simplified and transparent business process, more 
advanced system and information technology, better human resources, improved good 
governance and more efficient structure of organisation’ (DGT, 2009, p. 38). That is, 
since 2009, the recording of tax return data has been more accurate, which in turn provides 
a more reliable database for research purposes. Second, according to De Boyrie, Pak, and 
Zdanowicz (2005), factors such as inflation, risk of default obligation, political risk and 
stability can erode a country’s tax base by means of capital flight. Indonesia managed to 
control these aspects during 2009–2015. The reason for ending the period of study in 
2015 is simply because that is the latest year for which data are available from the DGT 
when this study is conducted. 
Table 4.2 shows how the final sample of firm-year observations is derived. 
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Table 4.2 
Derivation of the Final Sample of Firm-year Observations—Study 1 
 TI AP 
Number of firm-years between 2009–2015 for which the 
dependent variable can be calculated 
 
11,281 
 
11,281 
Less: 
Number of firm-years with TI or AP less than zero 
 
3,351 
 
4,514 
Number of firm-years with TI/S or AP/S greater than one 1,957 1,393 
Number of firm-years with missing industry group 24 18 
Final sample of firm-year observations 5,949 5,356 
 
The distribution of countries in which the parents of FOICs are located can be found 
in Appendix 3. As part of the sample selection procedure, this study eliminates FOICs 
that reported losses in their tax return (i.e., if TI divided by total sales, TI/S, is less than 
zero or if AP divided by total sales, AP/S, is less than zero). The main reason is that this 
study aims to identify profit shifting activities by FOICs, and FOICs will not have profits 
to shift if they do not make profits. Although in some cases the losses reported in tax 
returns may be the result of profit shifting activities, it is impossible to distinguish 
artificial losses resulting from BEPS activities from genuine losses. Therefore, all 
observations with losses are excluded from the sample.64 Observations with TI or AP 
greater than sales (TI/S > 1 or AP/S > 1) are excluded because it is likely that either the 
sales figures are erroneous, or the profit includes a gain from the sale of a business or a 
                                                 
64 For different reasons, some previous studies exclude observations with losses from their final samples. 
For example, Mills and Newberry (2004, p. 96) exclude MNEs with losses from their sample because the 
losses ‘drive the average effective tax rate above 100 percent’. 
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major capital asset and the proceeds are not included in the sales revenue (including these 
extreme values would distort the regression results). 
There are 659 and 1,022 observations in the final sample of TI and AP, respectively, 
that use US dollar (USD) instead of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) as the reporting currency 
in their Indonesian tax returns. For consistency, all values with USD are converted to IDR 
using the exchange rates for tax purposes set by the Indonesian finance minister’s decrees. 
Appendix 4 shows the exchange rates and the corresponding finance minister’s decree 
numbers. 
 
4.3.2 Measurement of Variables and Regression Model 
The key dependent variable is TI, which is reported by FOICs in their Indonesian 
tax returns, deflated by sales (TI/S). TI is a key feature of tax returns that may not be 
found in financial statements. Income tax liability is calculated based on TI (i.e., income 
tax liability = TI × CIT rate). Therefore, if companies want to avoid income tax, they need 
to supress the TI reported on their tax returns. In most cases, TI reported by FOICs in 
their tax returns is different from the AP they report in their income statements because 
of some adjustments required by ITL. In short, TI is AP plus positive adjustments minus 
negative adjustments.65 Company taxpayers report both AP and TI in their tax returns. 
Therefore, in addition to the key dependent variable TI/S, this thesis also uses AP scaled 
by sales (AP/S) as a dependent variable to find further evidence regarding whether FOICs 
successfully shift profits out of Indonesia. Nonetheless, this thesis does not discuss AP/S 
model in detail as TI/S model to avoid duplication. 
The independent variable is the tax rate difference (TRdiff) measured by the 
difference between the STR of the parent’s country of an FOIC and the Indonesia STR. 
                                                 
65 See Appendix 1, 1771—Corporate Annual Income Tax Return: Attachment I for the details of positive 
and negative adjustments according to ITL. 
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Focusing on the tax rate difference between the parent’s country and Indonesia can 
address potential confounding effects of STR (Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013).66 TRdiff is 
expected to capture the incentives for FOICs to shift profits out of Indonesia by means of 
several profit shifting channels, such as intra-group transfer pricing for goods and 
services, including licence fees for the use of intangible assets and management fees, and 
debt financing.67 The STRs for different parent countries over the study period can be 
found in Appendix 5. Consistent with hypothesis H1 that FOICs shift profits to lower tax 
countries, the sign of the regression coefficient for TRdiff is predicted to be positive. 
Four control variables are used in this study. First, total sales are used to proxy for 
the size of firms. Total sales are in a natural logarithmic form (lnSales) to transform a 
most likely skewed variable—total sales—into a more approximately normal variable. 
An advantage of using sales rather than assets as a proxy for the size of firms is that sales 
might capture the size of firms better than assets when there are companies that have large 
sales but only a small quantity of assets. Given the inconsistent findings in the literature, 
following prior studies (e.g. Mills & Newberry, 2004), no sign is predicted for lnSales. 
Second, Age is used as a proxy for maturity of firms and is the number of years 
between an FOIC registering with a tax office and lodging its tax return. Prior studies 
(e.g. Mills & Newberry, 2004; Grubert, 1998) provide evidence of the so-called 
maturation effect, which theorises that mature companies report higher levels of income. 
Accordingly, the relation between profit (TI/S or AP/S) and Age is predicted to be positive.  
                                                 
66 Dharmapala and Riedel (2013, pp. 95-96) explain that: ‘While statutory corporate tax rate changes are 
likely to be exogenous with respect to firms' behaviour, interpreting the estimated effect of corporate tax 
rate changes may not be straightforward for a number of reasons. Corporate tax rate changes impose a 
common shock to all firms in a country, and so may potentially be correlated with unobserved variables 
that also determine the profitability, transfer prices, and financing choices of MNEs. In addition, changes 
in the corporate tax rate may not only affect the MNE's incentive to engage in profit shifting, but may also 
affect other decision margins. A rise in the corporate tax rate may, for example, dampen incentives to exert 
effort and consequently lower corporate profitability’. 
67 Chapter 6 of this thesis focuses on the channels used by FOICs to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
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Third, Industry is a series of indicator variables to control for industry effects. This 
study uses the two-digit industry classifications for Indonesian taxpayers set by the DGT.  
Finally, this study controls for Year to provide a control for annual fluctuations in 
profit that may not be explained by other explanatory variables. This includes 
macroeconomic conditions that may differ from year to year and that are likely to affect 
the magnitude of profits reported by FOICs in tax returns. 
Two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, represented by Equations 
(4.1) and (4.2), are used to examine the effect of the tax rate differences on the TI and AP 
reported by FOICs: 
𝑇𝐼/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−64𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽65−70𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (4.1) 
𝐴𝑃/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−64𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽65−70𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (4.2) 
where: 
𝑇𝐼/𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the TI divided by total sales for firm i in year t; 
𝐴𝑃/𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the AP divided by total sales for firm i in year t; 
𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the tax rate difference (the STR of the residence country of the parent 
minus the STR of Indonesia) for firm i in year t; 
ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of total sales for firm i in year t; 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of years since registered with a tax office for firm i in year 
t; 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a set of 61 dummy variables representing industry grouping of firm i in 
year t; 
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𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a set of six dummy variables that is expected to account for annual 
fluctuations in TI/S or AP/S (the dependent variable) that were not caused 
by TRdiff (the independent variable) or any of the control variables; 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error term. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Descriptive statistics on the key variables are provided in Table 4.3. Panel A of 
Table 4.3 shows that the mean of TI/S is 0.085, indicating that, on average, FOICs in the 
sample reported TI of 8.5% of their sales. The mean of TRdiff is 0.013, indicating that, on 
average, the tax rate in the parent’s country is 1.3 percentage points higher than that of 
Indonesia. The distribution of the final sample by industry groups for the TI/S regression 
model can be found in Appendix 6. 
Panel B of Table 4.3 shows that AP/S has a mean of 0.109, indicating that, on 
average, FOICs in the sample reported AP of nearly 11% of their sales, which is 
2.4 percentage points higher than TI/S. Similar to the TI/S regression model, the mean of 
TRdiff is 0.015, indicating that, on average, the tax rate in the parent’s country is 
1.5 percentage points higher than that of Indonesia. 
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Table 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics—Study 1 
A. TI 
Variable No. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
TI/S 5,949 0.085 0.050 0.107 0 1 
TRdiff 5,949 0.013 0 0.090 −0.28 0.3 
lnSales 5,949 24.431 24.732 2.571 13.479 31.9 
Age 5,949 10.275 8 8.645 0 40 
Notes: TI/S is taxable income (before loss carried forward) deflated by sales reported in Indonesian tax 
returns (TI and sales are obtained from Indonesian tax return 1771 Sections A1 and I1a, respectively). 
TRdiff is the tax rate difference between the FOIC parent country’s STR and Indonesia’s STR (e.g., for 
Company A, whose parent’s country is located in Singapore, the TRdiff in 2009 is 18% − 28% = −10%). 
See Appendix 5 for the STRs of countries over the study period. lnSales is the natural log of sales. Age 
measures the maturity of the FOIC. It is obtained by subtracting the year in which the FOIC was 
incorporated and registered with a tax office in Indonesia from the year of observation. 
 
B. AP 
Variable No. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
AP/S 5,356 0.109 0.067 0.134 0 1 
TRdiff 5,356 0.015 0 0.092 −0.28 0.3 
lnSales 5,356 24.806 25.071 2.365 14.576 31.9 
Age 5,356 11.036 9 8.752 0 40 
Notes: AP/S is the pre-tax accounting profit reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns (total of 
commercial net income in the Indonesian tax return 1771-I Section 3 plus Income tax in the Indonesian tax 
return 1771-I Section 5f) deflated by sales. See Panel A for definitions of other variables. 
 
Overall, the summary statistics show that, on average, FOICs report higher AP than 
TI in their Indonesian tax returns. This seems to be plausible given (a) book-tax 
differences and (b) that the average parent’s tax rate in the AP/S regression model is 
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slightly higher than that in the TI/S regression model. The distribution of the final sample 
by industry groups for the AP/S regression model is similar to that for the TI/S regression 
model in Appendix 6, so it is not separately tabulated. 
Table 4.4 presents the Pearson correlation between variables. 
 
Table 4.4 
Pearson Correlation Matrix—Study 1 
A. TI 
 
TI/S TRdiff lnSales Age 
TI/S 1     
 
 
TRdiff 0.0955 *** 1    
 
 
lnSales 0.1032 *** 0.1248 *** 1  
 
 
Age 0.1207 *** 0.1432 *** 0.5854 *** 1 
 
B. AP 
 
AP/S TRdiff lnSales Age 
AP/S 1     
 
 
TRdiff 0.0443 *** 1    
 
 
lnSales −0.1151 *** 0.1141 *** 1  
 
 
Age 0.0025  0.1425 *** 0.5640 *** 1 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
As shown in Panel A, the tax rate difference between the FOIC’s parent’s country 
and Indonesia (TRdiff) is positively correlated with TI/S reported by FOICs in their tax 
returns and is significant at the 1% level. The Pearson correlation also indicates a 
significant positive association between FOICs’ maturity (Age) and TI/S, consistent with 
the prediction. 
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Panel B shows that TRdiff is positively correlated with AP/S reported by FOICs in 
their Indonesian tax returns and is significant at the 1% level. However, unlike with TI, 
lnSales is negatively correlated with AP. In addition, Age is not significantly correlated 
with AP. 
To examine whether there is a harmful correlation between independent variables, 
this study conducts a test of collinearity. Perfect multicollinearity occurs when one of the 
regressors is a perfect linear function of another regressor. This makes it impossible to 
compute the OLS estimator. In an OLS regression analysis, the level of multicollinearity 
can be quantified by the variance inflation factor (VIF). Basically, it is an index that shows 
how collinearity increases the variance of an estimated regression coefficient. The general 
rule is that a VIF of greater than 10 indicates that the variable is a linear combination of 
other independent variables. As shown in Appendix 7, the VIFs are in the range of 1.17–
5.66 and 1.18–4.79 for TI/S and AP/S regression models, respectively, which is lower 
than the general tolerance value of 10, indicating that both regression models are not 
adversely affected by multicollinearity. 
 
4.4.2 Regression Results 
Regression analyses in this study are analyses of pooled cross-sectional data. Panel 
data analyses such as fixed-effects models are not used for the following reasons. First, 
the data in this study are unbalanced panel data, as reported in Appendix 9,68 and the 
missing years in the dataset result from losses reported by companies, so the missing years 
are more systemic than random. Second, and more importantly, the statutory tax rates of 
most parents’ countries did not vary over the study period (see Appendix 5). This means 
that the within-firm variation in TRdiff, which is the key explanatory variable, is mostly 
                                                 
68 Appendix 9 reports only the unbalanced panel data for the TI/S regression model because the unbalanced 
panel data for the AP/S regression shows a similar pattern. 
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zero. As the fixed-effects estimator requires a within-firm variation of the independent 
variable, which is absent in this study, fixed-effects models are not appropriate. 
Unlike cross-sectional data,69 regression models that use pooled cross-sectional 
data may violate the independent error assumption of the OLS regression. To adjust for 
the potential correlation of errors within clusters of data (firms), this study runs 
regressions by clustering the errors by firm for both TI/S and AP/S models.70 Table 4.5 
presents the results of the regressions with cluster-robust standard errors. 
The tax rate difference between the parent’s country and Indonesia is found to be 
positively associated with the level of TI/S and AP/S reported by FOICs. The findings 
support hypotheses H1 and H2. The estimates of the coefficient for TRdiff are 0.099 and 
0.087 for the TI and AP models, respectively, and both are significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, a parent’s STR that is one percentage point lower than the Indonesian tax rate is 
associated with a nearly 0.1 (0.09) percentage point decrease in the TI (AP) to sales ratio 
reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns. These results provide evidence 
consistent with FOICs shifting profit out of Indonesia to low-tax countries. 
The coefficient of lnSales is insignificant in the TI model, suggesting that firm size 
does not affect the magnitude of TI reported by the company. The coefficient of lnSales 
is negatively significant at the 1% level in the AP model, suggesting that the larger the 
firm size, the lower the AP as a ratio of sales that the company reports. 
The coefficients of Age are positively significant at the 5% level in both models, 
suggesting that the more mature the company, the higher TI/S and AP/S they report. 
                                                 
69 Cross-sectional data is defined as data consisting of different entities in a single period. 
70 This thesis uses STATA14 as the statistical data analysis software. In STATA, the standard error 
estimates are robust to disturbance being heteroscedastic and autocorrelated when the option ‘cluster ()’ is 
used (Hoechle, 2007).  
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Table 4.5 
Regression Results—Effect of Tax Rate Differences on Profit Reported by FOICs 
in Indonesian Tax Return—Using Clustered Standard Errors 
𝑇𝐼/𝑆𝑖𝑡 or 𝐴𝑃/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−64𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽65−70𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Expected 
sign 
Dependent variable: 
TI/S 
Dependent variable: 
AP/S 
TRdiff 
 
+ 0.099 
(3.57) 
*** 0.087 
(2.67) 
*** 
lnSales 
 
? 0.002 
(1.39) 
 −0.010 
(−3.50) 
*** 
Age 
 
+ 0.001 
(2.23) 
** 0.001 
(2.36) 
** 
Industry# 
 
?     
Year      
2010 ? −0.009 
(−2.24) 
** −0.008 
(−1.81) 
* 
2011 ? −0.013 
(−3.33) 
*** −0.013 
(−2.81) 
*** 
2012 ? −0.011 
(−2.53) 
** −0.013 
(−2.48) 
** 
2013 ? −0.016 
(−3.47) 
*** −0.000 
(−0.07) 
 
2014 ? −0.033 
(−7.23) 
*** 0.005 
(0.82) 
 
2015 ? −0.043 
(−9.25) 
*** −0.003 
(−0.40) 
 
Constant  0.062 
(1.93) 
 0.350 
(4.74) 
 
R²   0.153  0.156  
n   5,949  5,356  
Notes: t-statistics appear in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
in a two-tailed test, respectively. See Table 4.3 for variables definitions.  
# Regression result for Industry for the TI/S regression is presented in Appendix 8. 
 
The regression results for the industry indicators can be found in Appendix 8. There 
are 62 industry groups in the final sample. Industry group 10 (food manufacturing 
industry) is the base industry. Of the 61 industry groups represented by indicators or 
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dummy variables, there are 17 and 13 industry groups with significantly negative and 
positive coefficients, respectively. The coefficients of the remaining 31 industry groups 
are insignificantly different from zero.  
In the regression models, 2009 is used as the base year to compare with other years. 
The coefficients for Year from 2010 to 2015 are negative and significant at the 1% and 
5% levels, suggesting that FOICs reported a lower TI/S ratio during 2010–2015 than what 
they reported in 2009, and the magnitude of the gaps between 2009 and later years shows 
an increasing trend. The coefficients for Year in the AP model are mostly insignificant 
and do not show similar patterns. 
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, Year is expected to control for annual fluctuations 
in profit that may not be explained by any of the explanatory variables other than Year, 
including macroeconomic conditions that may differ from year to year. Figure 4.1 shows 
that Indonesian GDP was consistently increasing at a double-digit rate during the period 
2009–2015. The increasing trend of GDP cannot explain the decreasing trend of TI 
reported by FOICs in the same period. 
Further, as explained in Chapter 2, there have been no significant changes in the 
Indonesian tax system since the DGT completed the tax administration reform in 2008. 
Therefore, changes in the tax system also cannot explain the decreasing trend in the 
magnitude of TI reported by FOICs during 2010–2015 compared with the base year of 
2009. 
As shown in Figure 2.4 (Chapter 2, p.40), the contribution of CIT revenue to the 
total tax revenue collected by DGT decreased from 22.09% in 2009 to 15.1% in 2014. 
The decreasing trend of CIT revenue contribution is consistent with FOICs reported lower 
and lower TI/S in 2010–2015 compared with 2009, and may indicate a general rise in tax 
avoidance and/or tax evasion in the Indonesian corporate sector during this period. 
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Figure 4.1 
Indonesian GDP at Current Prices, 2009–2015 
 
Source: Key Statistics, 2007–2016 (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2017b) 
 
As foreign MNEs can legally avoid Indonesian CIT by shifting profits, it is less 
likely that they engage in illegal tax evasion activities. A rise in tax avoidance by FOICs 
as indicated by the coefficients of the year dummies means that foreign MNEs might 
expand their profit shifting activities in Indonesia during the study period. As a member 
of the G20 countries, Indonesia took part in the OECD/G20 BEPS project. However, up 
to 2015, the Indonesian government did not take sufficient effective action to fight BEPS, 
so FOICs might increase their profit shifting activities as a result. 
 
4.4.3 Further Analyses 
The descriptive statistics of the main variables presented in Table 4.3 indicate that 
the distributions of the dependent variables (TI/S or AP/S) are likely skewed. To address 
this issue, the dependent variables are log-transformed. Table 4.6 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the main variables after the log-transformation procedure. 
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Table 4.6 
Descriptive Statistics After Log-transforming the Dependent Variable 
A. TI 
Variable No. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
lnTI/S 5,007 −2.9 −2.707 1.37 −21.154 0 
TRdiff 5,007 0.015 0 0.093 −0.28 0.3 
lnSales 5,007 24.942 25.158 2.25 14.576 31.9 
Age 5,007 11.363 9 8.602 0 40 
 
B. AP 
Variable No. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
lnAP/S 5,347 −2.851 −2.696 1.276 −11.004 0 
TRdiff 5, 347 0.015 0 0.092 −0.28 0.3 
lnSales 5, 347 24.814 25.077 2.358 14.576 31.9 
Age 5, 347 11.05 9 8.753 0 40 
Note: lnTI/S is the natural log of TI/S. lnAP/S is the natural log of AP/S. See Table 4.3 for definitions of 
other variables. 
 
The difference between the means and medians is now much smaller than before, 
indicating that the dependent variables are more normally distributed. The number of final 
samples is further reduced because of firms that have zero dependent variables (942 and 
nine for TI/S and AP/S, respectively). The results after log-transforming the dependent 
variables (and clustering the errors by firm) are shown in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7 
Regression Results—Effect of Tax Rate Differences on Profit Reported by FOICs 
in Indonesian Tax Returns—Using Clustered Standard Errors and Log-
transforming the Dependent Variable 
ln𝑇𝐼/𝑆𝑖𝑡 or ln𝐴𝑃/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−64𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽65−70𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Expected 
sign 
Dependent variable: 
Natural log of TI scaled 
by sales 
Dependent variable: 
Natural log of AP 
scaled by sales 
TRdiff 
 
+ 1.682 
(4.95) 
*** 1.268 
(6.69) 
*** 
lnSales 
 
? −0.048 
(−2.53) 
** −0.071 
(−7.62) 
*** 
Age 
 
+ 0.011 
(2.44) 
** 0.016 
(6.56) 
*** 
Industry # 
 
?     
Year      
2010 ? −0.088 
(−2.02) 
** −0.100 
(−1.51) 
 
2011 ? −0.155 
(−3.22) 
*** −0.167 
(−2.56) 
** 
2012 ? −0.125 
(−2.60) 
*** −0.173 
(−2.71) 
*** 
2013 ? −0.222 
(−4.06) 
*** −0.116 
(−1.84) 
* 
2014 ? −0.077 
(−1.37) 
 −0.025 
(−0.40) 
 
2015 ? −0.234 
(−2.54) 
** −0.100 
(−1.57) 
 
Constant   −1.548 
(−3.06) 
 −1.229 
(−4.83) 
 
R²   0.136  0.163  
n   5,007  5,347  
Notes: t-statistics appear in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
in a two-tailed test, respectively. See Table 4.3 for variables definitions.  
# Regression results for Industry are not presented because they have a similar pattern to the results reported 
in Appendix 8. 
 
Consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2, TRdiff is found to be significantly positively 
associated with the level of TI/S and AP/S. The coefficients indicate that, on average, one 
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percentage point lower tax rate of the parent’s country relative to Indonesia is associated 
with a 1.68% (1.27%) decrease in the TI (AP) scaled by sales reported by FOICs. This 
result is consistent with the findings reported in Table 4.5. 
The coefficients of lnsales are now negative in both models and significant at the 
5% and 1% levels for TI and AP models, respectively. The coefficients of Age remain 
positive and are significant at the 5% level in the TI model but are now significant at the 
1% level for the AP model. 
The coefficients for the Year dummy variables in the TI model are similar to those 
before log-transforming TI/S, except in 2014. For 2014, the coefficient of Year is negative 
but insignificant. The results suggest that FOICs report a lower TI/S ratio for most later 
years compared with 2009 (the base year). Similarly to the results reported in Table 4.5, 
the magnitudes of the gaps between 2009 and later years show an increasing trend. 
Another test of collinearity is conducted to detect whether, after log-transforming 
the dependent variables and clustering the standard errors, the regression models contain 
any significant collinearity among the regressors. The results of the test (as shown in 
Appendix 7) indicate no harmful collinearity. 
 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
Developing countries heavily rely on revenue from CIT. Therefore, developing 
countries will be hit more severely than developed countries if MNEs shift profits out of 
the country. Prior studies and international organisations suggest that developing 
countries also suffer from profit shifting strategies by MNEs. However, these studies base 
their suggestions on observations rather than analysing data that are directly collected 
from the developing countries. In short, few empirical studies have investigated the 
117 
presence of cross-border profit shifting in developing countries using data collected from 
developing countries—particularly tax return data. 
This study fills the gap in the literature by providing empirical evidence of cross-
border profit shifting from the perspective of a developing country. It uses confidential 
Indonesian tax return data of FOICs during 2009–2015 to investigate the relation between 
tax rate difference (i.e., FOIC’s parent country’s STR – Indonesian STR) and TI/S (AP/S) 
reported by Indonesian affiliates of foreign MNEs. If the relation is found to be positive, 
that is, a negative tax rate difference (i.e., when the corporate tax rate of the parent’s 
country is lower than the Indonesian corporate tax rate) is associated with lower TI and 
AP reported by FOICs, then the evidence is consistent with cross-border profit shifting 
by MNEs out of Indonesia. 
After controlling for the size of firms, the age of firms, industry groups and years, 
the regression results show that the relation between profit and tax rate difference is strong 
and positive, providing evidence consistent with BEPS occurring in Indonesia. FOICs are 
likely to shift profits out of Indonesia when the tax rates in the parent’s country are lower 
than the tax rate in Indonesia.  
The regression results for the Year dummy variables are consistent with the 
decreasing trend of CIT revenue contribution to total tax revenue and suggest an increase 
in the level of tax avoidance and/or tax evasion in the corporate sector in general. FOICs 
might have increased profit shifting from Indonesia because of the lack of regulations and 
resources to tackle BEPS in Indonesia even though the BEPS program was introduced in 
2013 by the OECD and the G20. Log-transforming the independent variables prove that 
the results of the OLS estimates are robust. 
Overall, the results of Study 1 of this thesis indicate the presence of cross-border 
profit shifting in Indonesia. Arguably, this is the first study that focuses on profit shifting 
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from a developing country using tax return data. Therefore, further studies are needed to 
test the robustness of the evidence provided in this chapter. Chapter 5 further examines 
the existence of profit shifting in Indonesia by adopting the HRA, which is a widely 
accepted approach for detecting the occurrence of cross-border profit shifting. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
DETECTING PROFIT SHIFTING IN INDONESIA USING 
THE HINES AND RICE APPROACH 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The incidence of profit shifting by MNEs in developed countries has been 
confirmed by many empirical studies over several decades. In contrast, similar studies 
that focus on developing countries have only emerged in the past few years. Fuest and 
Riedel (2012) argue that the reason why knowledge on profit shifting in developing 
countries is limited is because the data and method used to measure profit shifting are not 
reliable. 
This chapter extends Chapter 4 and investigates whether FOICs shift profits out of 
Indonesia using the HRA, which is an approach introduced by Hines and Rice (1994) 
with some modifications. Hines and Rice (1994) pioneer study on profit shifting by MNEs 
‘established a conceptual framework that continues to be highly influential’ (Dharmapala, 
2014a, p. 424).71 Dowd, Landefeld, and Moore (2017) suggest that the HRA has become 
a standard in the literature. 
As in Chapter 4, this chapter measures profit in two ways: (1) TI based on tax law 
and (2) AP based on financial reporting rules. However, unlike Chapter 4, this chapter 
reports AP first because the study in this chapter adopts Hines and Rice (1994), which 
uses AP as the dependent variable. However, both AP and TI will be discussed equally 
given that TI is the key feature in this thesis because it directly reflects the loss of tax 
revenue (CIT is based on TI). 
                                                 
71 As reviewed in Chapter 3, Grubert and Mutti (1991) also published a widely cited study. 
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Despite the fact that the results in studies that adopt the HRA vary, they are 
consistent with the hypothesis that there is a negative relation between the level of CIT 
rates in the host countries and the magnitude of profits reported by MNEs in different 
host countries. However, few studies have adopted the HRA to measure the extent to 
which the tax rate of the parent’s country of a foreign-owned company operating in a 
developing country influences the profits reported by the foreign-owned company. This 
study is one of the early studies that uses the HRA to examine the existence of profit 
shifting by MNEs in a developing country using tax return data. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly describes 
the HRA, reviews some prior studies that use the HRA and develops the hypothesis to be 
tested in this study. Section 5.3 describes the research design of the study. Section 5.4 
reports the empirical results. Section 5.5 summarises the chapter. 
 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
5.2.1 Hines and Rice’s Approach to Detecting Cross-border Profit Shifting 
According to the basic tax competition model, governments commit to a tax system 
and capital owners choose where to invest their capital (Wilson, 1999). However, once 
location decisions are made, firms or capital become partially immobile. Some firms may 
leave a region after the initial tax break has expired and choose to seek tax breaks in other 
regions (Wilson, 1999). From an international tax avoidance perspective, moving to other 
regions may not be necessary if MNEs have an opportunity to reallocate TI from countries 
with high tax rates to countries with low tax rates (Hines Jr, 1999). This international tax 
avoidance strategy is known as profit shifting. 
In their seminal paper, Hines and Rice (1994) develop an economic approach to 
investigate the effect of tax rate variation on profits reported by MNEs. As Dharmapala 
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(2014a) explains, the basic premise of the HRA is that pre-tax income consists of two 
elements: (1) ‘true’ income (i.e., income produced using capital and labour inputs); and 
(2) ‘shifted’ income (i.e., income shifted across borders because of a tax incentive in the 
form of a tax rate difference between the parent and the affiliate). Equation (5.1) 
represents the original HRA: 
log𝜋𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏𝑖 + 𝛽2 log 𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3log𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4log𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖     (5.1) 
where: 
log𝜋𝑖 the dependent variable, is the logarithm of the pre-tax income of all US MNEs’ 
foreign affiliates in host country i calculated based on confidential US Department 
of Commerce survey data; 
𝜏𝑖 the independent variable, is the average tax rate in host country i; the HRA bases 
the average tax rate on the effective tax rate or the statutory tax rate whichever is 
lower. The effective tax rate is CIT paid by all US affiliates in the local country i 
divided by their total net income before tax; 
𝐾𝑖 is the capital input in host country i; 
𝐿𝑖 is the labour input in host country i; 
A is the level of productivity in host country i (proxied by income per capita); 
𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
Using country-level aggregate data on US-owned MNE affiliates operating in 59 
countries in 1982, Hines and Rice (1994) use Equation (5.1) to estimate the effect of tax 
rate variation in the host countries on the reported profits by MNEs in those countries. In 
calculating 𝐾𝑖, the HRA includes real/economic capital and excludes financial capital. 
For 𝜋𝑖, the HRA removes financial earnings (i.e., interest received and interest paid) from 
reported profits because available financial data are not as reliable or as comprehensive 
as the data used to estimate 𝐾𝑖 (Hines & Rice, 1994, p. 161). Hines and Rice (1994) find 
122 
a negative effect of tax rates of host countries on measures of the profitability of US 
MNEs’ affiliates. The effect is considerably large—that is, a tax rate in a host country 
that is one percentage point higher is associated with a 2.83% reduction in the before-tax 
profitability reported in that host country. 
The HRA has been widely adopted by numerous subsequent studies that examine 
the existence of profit shifting activities by MNEs. Despite the results showing some 
deviations from the original study, the subsequent studies prove that the HRA is a 
vigorous method for investigating how tax rate disparities can influence MNEs’ 
behaviour in reporting profits in different countries. Three studies that adopt the HRA are 
reviewed below. 
Swenson (2001) studies how import tariff variations across products give other 
countries’ MNEs operating in the US an incentive to shift profits by means of transfer 
pricing (i.e., by deliberately underpricing or overpricing affiliated firm transactions) over 
the period 1981–1988. The source countries of the investments are Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan and the UK. Swenson (2001) adopts some existing approaches—one of 
which is the HRA—to build a model of transfer pricing incentives with some 
modifications. While she finds significant evidence that the tariff variation creates 
incentives for underpricing or overpricing affiliated firm transactions, she concludes that 
the manipulation of product transfer prices is not the main channel used to shift profits. 
Using micro-level data relating to the operations of Europe-based MNEs in many 
European countries, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) adopt the HRA to investigate the 
opportunities and incentives created by cross-border profit shifting. They find that the 
effect of a tax rate variation of one percentage point higher on pre-tax profit is 1.08%, 
which is much lower than the 2.83% obtained by Hines and Rice (1994). They argue that 
the much higher percentage found by Hines and Rice (1994) is because they included 
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THCs outside Europe that presumably do not have effective cross-border profit shifting 
regulations. 
A recent study by Dowd, et al. (2017) not only adopts the HRA, but also states that 
the semi-log specification introduced by Hines and Rice (1994) has become a standard in 
the literature. Using a panel dataset of US tax returns, Dowd et al. (2017) scrutinise the 
profit shifting behaviour of US MNEs over the period 2002–2012 and suggest the 
consideration of a nonlinear relation between the tax rate and reported profits. 
 
5.2.2 Empirical Evidence of Profit Shifting in Developing Countries and 
Hypothesis 
In contrast to the considerable empirical evidence available from developed 
countries, there is limited empirical evidence from developing countries regarding the 
extent to which multinational tax evasion and tax avoidance cause tax revenue losses 
(Fuest & Riedel, 2009; Crivelli, et al., 2015). The limited empirical evidence of profit 
shifting strategies used by MNEs in developing countries is extensively discussed by 
Fuest and Riedel (2012), who review the literature on income shifting in developing 
countries and conclude that while developing countries suffer from profit shifting 
strategies, there is inadequate knowledge regarding the extent of the revenue losses. The 
outcomes of most of the existing studies are difficult to interpret, mainly because of 
problems regarding the reliability of the data and method used to measure income shifting 
(Fuest & Riedel, 2012). This argument is reasonable given that the extant literature on 
developing countries mostly consists of unrefereed reports that have not been exposed to 
critical peer review (e.g. Christian Aid, 2009; Oxfam, 2000; Baker, 2005).72 In addition, 
                                                 
72 For example, Cobham (2005) estimates that developing countries lose USD50 billion per year because 
the corporate sector shifts profits to lower-tax jurisdictions. However, as Fuest and Riedel (2009) suggest, 
this claim is not based on rigorous empirical analysis. Cobham (2005) based his estimation on an Oxfam 
(2000) report that contains several issues. A major drawback is that its estimation is based on an average 
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poor data availability—both in terms of quality and quantity—has led to limited empirical 
research into profit shifting in developing countries (OECD, 2015a). 
In the past few years, the number of empirical studies that focus on finding evidence 
of profit shifting by MNEs in developing countries has increased. However, none of these 
studies have adopted the HRA, despite the fact that the HRA has been identified as a 
primary approach to the empirical estimation of cross-border profit shifting (Dharmapala, 
2014a). 
A study that includes developing countries in its analysis is that of Crivelli, et al. 
(2015), who use panel data for 173 developed and developing countries to determine 
whether profit shifting is an important issue for developing countries. The results of the 
study suggest that profit shifting disadvantages developing countries at least as much as 
it disadvantages developed countries. However, the authors acknowledge that the 
conclusion may not be robust to some extent because there is scarce firm-level data for 
developing countries. This suggests that recent research that focuses on developing 
countries still encounters data-related issues.  
Johannesen, Tørsløv, and Wier (2016) use a global dataset of 102 countries and find 
that less developed economies are more sensitive to profit shifting by MNEs than more 
developed economies. A brief summary is presented below of two recent studies that 
attempt to find evidence of profit shifting by MNEs in a particular developing country. 
Janský and Prats (2015) examine whether more than 1,500 MNEs operating in 
India73 shifted profits in 2010 and find that MNEs associated with THCs reported lower 
profits and paid less Indian income taxes than MNEs with no such association. The 
                                                 
corporate tax rate of 30%, while in fact many developing countries offer low or zero tax rates as incentives 
for corporate investment (Fuest & Riedel, 2009). As Oxfam’s (2000) estimation ignores the incentives, its 
claim on the magnitude of the tax losses due to profit shifting in developing countries is likely to be 
overestimated (Fuest & Riedel, 2009). 
73 According to the WB’s economy classifications (as explained in Section 3.1.1), similar to Indonesia, 
India and Malaysia have consistently been categorised as developing countries. 
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authors conclude that MNEs have incentives to shift profits to THCs because of lower tax 
rates and the secrecy provisions offered by those countries. 
Using financial data for 100 Malaysian-listed corporations for 2009–2011, Salihu, 
et al. (2015) examine the relationships between foreign investors’ interests and tax 
avoidance by means of profit shifting in Malaysia. Using a generalised method of moment 
(GMM) estimator, they demonstrate that the relationship between foreign investors’ 
interests and tax avoidance is significantly positive among large Malaysian corporations. 
Despite differences in the quantity and quality of the evidence, the four studies 
discussed above demonstrate that MNE affiliates operating in developing countries that 
have a parent country with a lower tax rate tend to shift profits. This suggests that MNEs 
in developing countries shift profits similarly to developed countries. Applying the 
findings of the prior studies to the case of Indonesia, it is likely that FOICs with parents 
located in countries with higher tax rates will report higher profits in their Indonesian tax 
returns than FOICs that have parents located in countries with lower tax rates. This leads 
to the following hypothesis stated in the alternative form: 
H1:  The parent’s tax rate of an FOIC is positively associated with the FOICs’ reported 
AP in their Indonesian tax returns after controlling for capital and labour inputs. 
As mentioned earlier, profit shifting is a book-tax conforming tax avoidance 
strategy: profit shifting lowers AP as well as TI. Therefore, if FOICs report lower AP, 
they should also report lower TI in their Indonesian tax returns. As in Study 1, profit in 
this study is represented by both TI and AP. This leads to another hypothesis stated in the 
alternative form: 
H2:  The parent’s tax rate of an FOIC is positively associated with the FOICs’ reported 
TI in their Indonesian tax returns after controlling for capital and labour inputs. 
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5.3 Research Design 
5.3.1 Sample Selection and Period of Study 
This study uses a sample that includes all foreign-owned Indonesian companies 
with tax return data supplied by the DGT under a data nondisclosure agreement. For 
privacy protection, firms are anonymised. The study period covers the seven years from 
2009 to 2015. The final sample consists of 3,361 (3,188) observations for the regression 
model using AP (TI) as the dependent variable—most of which (about 73% for both 
models) are registered in tax offices located on the island of Java. Table 5.1 presents the 
final sample derivation for both dependent variables. 
As in Study 1, Study 2 excludes FOICs that reported a loss in their tax returns. 
Although losses reported in tax returns may have resulted from profit shifting activities, 
it is impossible to distinguish a genuine business loss from a loss caused by profit shifting. 
Moreover, it is a common practice in the literature to exclude loss-making firms from the 
sample (Dharmapala, 2014a). There is a significant number of missing data (or zero) for 
the calculations of the natural logarithm of capital and labour and, to a lesser extent, for 
the calculations of the natural logarithm of the two profit measurements. 
The reason for starting the study from 2009 is because the DGT’s data recording 
and administration have been more reliable since 2009, after the completion of a thorough 
tax administration reform in Indonesia in 2008 (DGT, 2009). The reason for ending the 
period of study in 2015 is simply because that is the latest year for which data are available 
from the DGT when this study is conducted. The distribution of countries in which the 
parents of FOICs are located can be found in Appendix 10. 
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Table 5.1 
Derivation of the Final Sample of Firm-Year Observations—Study 2 
 AP TI 
Number of firm-years between 2009–2015 for which the 
dependent variable is available 
 
11,281 
 
11,281 
Less:   
 Number of firm-years that report loss (AP < 0 or TI < 0) 4,514 3,351 
 Number of firm-years of which natural log of capital 
cannot be calculated (i.e., zero or missing) 
 
2,193 
 
2,596 
 Number of firm-years of which natural log of labour 
cannot be calculated 
 
1,175 
 
1,285 
 Number of firm-years of which natural log of AP or TI 
cannot be calculated 
 
9 
 
861 
Final sample of firm-year observations 3,390 3,188 
 
5.3.2 Measurement of Variables and Regression Model 
This study investigates whether FOICs shift profits out of Indonesia in response to 
variations in their parents’ tax rates (see Appendix 5 for STRs of the countries in which 
the parents of FOICs are located over the study period). This study examines whether 
MNEs from various countries operating in Indonesia shift profits out of Indonesia to low-
tax jurisdictions. It is different from the study of Hines and Rice (1994) which examines 
whether US MNEs operating in various host countries shift profits to low-tax 
jurisdictions. The HRA is suitable for this study for the following reasons.74 First, the 
                                                 
74 In fact, the HRA is likely to be more suitable for examining profit shifting by MNEs based in different 
countries that have affiliates operating in a single country because a single-country study does not need to 
consider the real price of capital and labour, which may differ between countries. This is one concern of 
the HRA (Hines & Rice, 1994). 
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model of Hines and Rice (1994) is based on the Cobb–Douglas production function, 
which represents the relationship between output (in terms of income or profit) and input 
(mainly in terms of capital and labour). Therefore, the HRA is suitable for both firm- and 
country-level studies. Second, the basic premise of the HRA is that the observed profit 
consists of two components: the ‘true’ profit and the ‘shifted’ profit. This premise is 
applicable to all MNE affiliates, either in many countries or in a single country. 
However, this study modifies the original HRA in Equation (5.1) in several ways. 
The first modification is related to the dependent variable. This study uses pre-tax profit 
(both AP and TI)75 rather than pre-tax nonfinancial income (i.e., earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT)) as the dependent variable because it focuses on finding indirect 
evidence of cross-border profit shifting in Indonesia by investigating the effect of the 
parents’ tax rate variation on the profits reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns. 
The estimated effect is expected to capture potential cross-border profit shifting activities 
through all possible channels, including transfer pricing and high debt financing. 
Employing earnings before interest and taxes is likely to be necessary when one tries to 
disentangle the transfer pricing and debt shifting channels (Dharmapala & Riedel, 
2013).76 Therefore, as in prior studies (e.g. Markle, 2015; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008; 
Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013), this study uses pre-tax profit as the dependent variable to 
detect the existence of cross-border profit shifting in Indonesia. 
The second modification is related to the independent variable. This study uses the 
parent’s tax rate (PTR) rather than the average tax rate in the host country (τ in Equation 
                                                 
75 The explanation in Section 4.3.2 of the usage of both TI and AP to measure profit in Study 1 of this thesis 
applies to the current study. In their seminal paper, Hines and Rice (1994) use reported EBIT (i.e., an 
accounting profit measure) as the dependent variable. Therefore, unlike Study 1 of this thesis, in the current 
study, AP comes before TI, and both AP and TI are discussed equally. Nevertheless, as in Study 1 of this 
thesis, the current study considers TI as the most important measure of profit because, as mentioned in 
Section 1.1, any reduction in TI is a direct measurement of income tax base erosion. 
76 As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, Hines and Rice (1994) exclude interest because they do not have reliable 
data. 
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(5.1)) as the independent variable because this study focuses on incoming investment as 
opposed to Hines and Rice’s study, which focuses on outgoing investment. Using PTR as 
the independent variable is expected to provide evidence of the effect of the parent’s tax 
rate on the AP and TI reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns. This study 
predicts that the coefficient of PTR is positive—that is, the higher (lower) the tax rate of 
the parent’s country, the higher (lower) the AP and TI reported in Indonesia. This study 
uses STR instead of ETR as the PTR. As discussed in Section 4.2, while there has been a 
debate regarding which one is a better proxy for tax incentives to shift profits, STR may 
act as a better proxy for an incentive to shift profits because it is set by the government 
and is therefore exogenous to firms’ choice (Dharmapala, 2014a). 
The third modification concerns the control variables for the level of productivity 
in the local country (A), which is excluded from this study. This variable is excluded 
because the data used in this study are about MNE affiliates in only one host country (i.e., 
Indonesia) as opposed to affiliates in multiple host countries as in the study by Hines and 
Rice (1994). 
These modifications lead to the two regression models presented in Equations (5.2) 
and (5.3), which this study uses to examine the effect of the parent’s tax rate variation on 
AP and TI, respectively, reported by the FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns. 
ln𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3ln𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (5.2) 
ln𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3ln𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (5.3) 
where: 
𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the pre-tax AP reported by FOIC i for year t; 
𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡  is the TI reported by FOIC i for year t; 
𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the parent’s STR of FOIC i for year t; 
𝐾𝑖𝑡  is the capital input of FOIC i in year t, proxied by fixed tangible assets; 
130 
𝐿𝑖𝑡  is the labour input of FOIC i in year t, proxied by employment 
compensation; 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a set of six dummy variables that is expected to account for annual 
fluctuations in lnAP or lnTI (the dependent variable) that were not caused 
by PTR (the independent variable) and K and L (the control variables); 
𝜀𝑖  is the error term. 
As discussed in Section 4.4.3, pooled OLS regressions may contain a bias because 
of the heterogeneity issue. Unfortunately, as in Study 1 presented in Chapter 4, the panel 
data for Study 2 in this chapter are also highly unbalanced.77 For example, only 61 firms 
of 1,229 (about 5%) have data for all seven years and the missing years may not be 
random. More importantly, the key independent variable, PTR, tends to be constant over 
the study period. Therefore, panel data analysis may not be appropriate. 
As Section 4.4.3 explains, regressions of pooled cross-sectional data should be run 
by clustering the errors by firm to allow the regression errors to have heteroscedasticity 
across firms and correlation within a firm. Therefore, as in Study 1, this study reports 
regressions that include adjustments for errors clustered by firms.78 Year dummies are 
again included to control for changes in profitability reported by FOICs across years (e.g. 
general macroeconomic conditions) that are not covered by other explanatory variables. 
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample used in this study.  
  
                                                 
77 See Appendix 11 for a summary of the distribution of the unbalanced panel data for Study 2 of this thesis. 
78 In STATA software, using the option ‘cluster ()’ will generate standard error estimates that are robust to 
disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (Hoechle, 2007). 
131 
Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics—Study 2 
A. AP 
Variable No. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
lnAP 3,390 22.073 22.123 2.566 11.967 29.948 
PTR 3,390 0.267 0.25 0.092 0 0.55 
lnK 3,390 23.498 23.807 2.651 9.821 30.359 
lnL 3,390 22.669 22.885 2.008 13.160 28.438 
Notes: lnAP is the natural log of AP reported by FOICs in Indonesian tax returns (total of commercial net 
income in the Indonesian tax return 1771-I Section 3 plus Income tax in the Indonesian tax return 1771-I 
Section 5f). PTR is the parent’s STR. lnK is the natural log of tangible fixed assets reported in Indonesian 
tax returns (Indonesian tax return 1771, Special attachment, Transcript of elements citation of financial 
statement Sections I13—land and buildings and I14—other fixed assets). lnL is the natural log of 
compensation reported in Indonesian tax returns (Indonesian tax return 1771 Section II2.6—total salaries, 
wages, bonuses, gratifications, honorariums and other compensations). 
 
B. TI 
Variable No. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
lnTI 3,188 22.095 22.132 2.620 0 33.170 
PTR 3,188 0.267 0.25 0.092 0 0.55 
lnK 3,188 23.599 23.868 2.551 9.821 30.359 
lnL 3,188 22.750 22.960 1.947 13.160 28.438 
Notes: lnTI is the natural log of TI reported in Indonesian tax returns (Indonesian tax return 1771 Section 
A1—fiscal net income. Fiscal net income is TI before loss carried forward). See Panel A for definitions of 
other variables. 
 
The mean value of lnAP (lnTI) is 22.073 (22.095), suggesting that the sample of 
FOICs reported AP (TI) of almost Rp4 billion, which is equivalent to approximately 
USD300,000 using 2015 exchange rates for tax purposes. The PTR ranges from zero to 
55%. Examples of countries in the sample that have zero STR are the British Virgin 
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Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands and Marshall Islands. A country in the sample 
that has STR of 55% is the United Arab Emirates. 
Table 5.3 shows the Pearson correlation between variables. Parent’s tax rate (PTR) 
is positively correlated with both the natural log of AP (lnAP) and the natural log of TI 
(lnTI) and is significant at the 1% level, consistent with the prediction. 
 
Table 5.3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix—Study 2 
A. AP 
 
lnAP PTR lnK lnL 
lnAP 1     
 
 
PTR 0.192 *** 1   
 
 
lnK 0.726 *** 0.098 *** 1 
 
 
lnL 0.761 *** 0.134 *** 0.773 *** 1 
B. TI 
 
lnTI PTR lnK lnL 
lnTI 1     
 
 
PTR 0.211 *** 1   
 
 
lnK 0.709 *** 0.121 *** 1 
 
 
lnL 0.746 *** 0.138 *** 0.777 *** 1 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
A test of collinearity is conducted by regressing both dependent variables on all of 
the independent variables and calculating the VIFs for each variable. Appendix 12 shows 
the VIFs when using both AP and TI as the dependent variables. The result shows that 
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VIFs are in the range of 1.02–2.59, which is much lower than the general tolerance value 
of 10, suggesting the absence of the multicollinearity issue (i.e., no variable is considered 
a linear combination of other variables). In conclusion, all VIFs are fine for both AP and 
TI regression models. 
 
5.4.2 Regression Results 
After controlling for capital and labour inputs, the regressions display a positive 
relationship between the parent’s tax rate and both AP and TI, consistent with the 
hypotheses H1 and H2. The regression results are presented in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 
Regression Results—Effect of Parent’s Tax Rate on Reported AP and TI 
ln𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡/ln𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3ln𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Expected 
sign 
Dependent variable: 
Natural log of AP 
Dependent variable: 
Natural log of TI 
PTR (parent’s tax rate) 
 
+ 2.555 
(4.97) 
*** 2.894 
(5.80) 
*** 
lnK (nat. log of capital) 
 
+ 0.329 
(11.00) 
*** 0.326 
(10.11) 
*** 
lnL (nat. log of labour) 
 
+ 0.615 
(14.76) 
*** 0.651 
(14.30) 
*** 
Year      
2010 ? −0.158 
(−2.14) 
** −0.104 
(−1.47) 
 
2011 ? −0.214 
(−2.79) 
*** −0.153 
(−2.16) 
** 
2012 ? −0.281 
(−3.33) 
*** −0.234 
(−2.94) 
*** 
2013 ? −0.062 
(−0.60) 
 −0.102 
(−1.00) 
 
2014 ? −0.110 
(−1.16) 
 −0.092 
(−0.97) 
 
2015 ? −0.345 
(−3.77) 
*** −0.471 
(−3.74) 
*** 
Constant   −0.090 
(−0.17) 
 −1.005 
(−1.70) 
 
R²   0.637  0.612  
n   3,390  3,188  
Notes: t-statistics appear in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
in a two-tailed test, respectively. See Table 5.2 for definitions of variables. 
 
The coefficients of PTR are significant at the 1% level in both regressions, 
suggesting that the parent’s tax rate is a significant incentive for FOICs to report a higher 
or lower profit in their Indonesian tax returns. The estimated coefficients indicate that one 
percentage point lower tax rate of the parent’s country is associated with 2.56% (2.89%) 
decrease in the AP (TI) reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns. This figure is 
similar to Hines and Rice’s finding that the tax rate of the host country that is one 
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percentage point higher is associated with a 2.83% decrease in reported profits by US 
MNEs in that host country. 
The results are consistent with the hypotheses H1 and H2 which predict that the 
parent’s tax rate of an FOIC is positively associated with the profit reported by the FOIC 
in its Indonesian tax return. The empirical results are consistent with, and reinforce, the 
findings from Study 1. 
The coefficients of lnK and lnL are both positive and significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, the regression model represented by Equations (5.2) and (5.3) have an adjusted 
R-squared of 63.7% and 61.2%, respectively. The high explanatory power of the 
regression models is consistent with the notion that capital and labour are the inputs to 
generate the ‘true’ profits, and tax incentives determine the direction and magnitude of 
profit shifting. 
All coefficients for the Year dummy variables are negative, but only the coefficients 
for the years 2010 (for AP model only), 2011, 2012 and 2015 are significantly different 
from zero at the 1% or 5% level, suggesting that FOICs report significantly lower AP and 
TI in the said years compared with 2009 which is the base year. With the exception of 
2013 and 2014, the increasing magnitudes of the year fixed effects in Study 2 are similar 
to the pattern of year fixed effect found in the TI model of Study 1 which has been 
discussed in detail in subsection 4.4.2, so the interpretation is not repeated here. 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
Profit shifting by MNEs is a global concern because many large MNEs are accused 
of using profit shifting strategies to avoid taxes worldwide. This chapter examines the 
existence of profit shifting by foreign MNEs in Indonesia. In particular, it uses the HRA 
with some modifications to examine the effect of the parent’s tax rate variation on the AP 
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and TI reported by FOICs from 2009 to 2015. The HRA is adopted because it is one of 
the most-recognised approaches for detecting the presence of tax-motivated profit 
shifting. This study uses the AP and TI reported by FOICs in their confidential Indonesian 
tax returns rather than the financial statement data. 
The regression results indicate that one percentage point lower tax rate of the 
parent’s country reduces the AP and TI reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns 
by 2.56% and 2.89%, respectively. The findings are similar to that of Hines and Rice 
(1994). The coefficients for the Year dummies seem suggest that before the OECD 
introduced the BEPS project in 2013, FOICs demonstrated an increasing trend of shifting 
profits out of the country. However, once Indonesia joined the BEPS project, the 
magnitude of profit shifting was held back for two years, 2013 and 2014. In 2015, the 
size of profit shifting resumed its upwards trajectory. This phenomenon might be due to 
the lack of effective actions taken by the Indonesian government to fight profit shifting 
by foreign MNEs after joining the BEPS project. 
Overall, the results of this study reinforce the empirical evidence found in Study 1 
by providing more evidence to show that profit shifting is occurring in Indonesia. 
Therefore, it is expected that the two studies reported in Chapters 4 and 5 have provided 
sufficient empirical evidence indicating that FOICs use profit shifting strategies to avoid 
Indonesian CIT, consistent with the suggestion in prior studies that developing countries 
also suffer from profit shifting by MNEs. The next question is: How do FOICs—the 
Indonesian affiliates of foreign MNEs—shift profits? Study 3 reported in the following 
chapter is conducted to address this question.
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CHAPTER 6:  
HOW DO FOREIGN-OWNED INDONESIAN COMPANIES 
SHIFT PROFITS OUT OF INDONESIA? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The empirical identification of the existence and magnitude of cross-border profit 
shifting is inherently characterised by difficulty (Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013). As a 
result, most existing studies focus on finding an indirect identification strategy that 
measures the effect of corporate tax rate differences on the profitability reported by 
subsidiaries of MNEs in different countries, and only a small number of studies attempt 
to find more direct evidence, such as the channels used by MNEs to shift profits. 
MNEs can use several channels to shift profits to lower their income tax liabilities. 
The two most common channels used are cross-border transfer pricing arrangements and 
high debt financing. Most prior studies (e.g. Clausing, 2003; Swenson, 2001; Buettner & 
Wamser, 2007, 2013; Vicard, 2015) investigate profit shifting channels used by MNEs 
by relying on corporate tax rate variations between the country in which the parent 
company is located and the country in which the subsidiary operates. Moreover, most 
prior studies use data from developed countries to examine profit shifting channels used 
by MNEs. Few studies use data from developing countries. 
This chapter investigates whether FOICs (i.e., Indonesian affiliates of foreign 
MNEs) use intra-firm transfer pricing and/or debt financing by related parties to shift 
profits out of Indonesia—a major developing country—using a different approach. The 
analysis includes comparisons between FOICs and comparable DOICs in terms of two 
indicators that are expected to capture the two profit shifting channels. Specifically, this 
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study compares earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total sales (EBIT/S) and long-
term liabilities with related parties79 scaled by total assets (LTL_RP/TA) to capture the 
transfer pricing and high debt financing channels, respectively. 
This study uses tax return data provided by the DGT, which is the tax authority of 
Indonesia, rather than data from financial reports.80 Analysis using paired t-tests and OLS 
regressions on the matched samples of FOICs and DOICs obtained from the PSM 
procedure find that FOICs shift profits out of Indonesia primarily by means of transfer 
pricing and, to a lesser extent, debt financing. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses prior 
research and develops the hypotheses. Section 6.3 describes the research design, while 
Section 6.4 reports the empirical results. Section 6.5 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
6.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
6.2.1 Definitions of Transfer Pricing, Arm’s-length Principle and Debt Financing 
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, internalisation is the most decisive factor for many 
MNEs to establish foreign subsidiaries in different host countries. Cross-border profit 
shifting is a good example of the benefits of internalisation. MNEs can use various 
channels to shift profits from one subsidiary to others that are located in different tax 
jurisdictions. Two profit shifting channels are extensively studied in the literature. The 
first channel is intra-group transfer pricing, whereby MNEs set the prices for cross-border 
transactions between affiliates within the same group to shift profits to avoid taxes. Given 
that MNEs often misuse transfer prices by setting prices that do not satisfy the ‘arm’s-
                                                 
79 See Appendix 13 for definitions of related parties according to Indonesian Income Tax Law. 
80 Unlike countries such as Australia, in which a dividend imputation system is adopted to integrate CIT 
and personal income tax, Indonesia adopts a classical tax system whereby income tax is payable on both 
corporate profits and the dividend income of shareholders. Further, consolidation only applies to financial 
reporting and is not adopted for tax purposes in Indonesia. Appendix 14 describe the way of identifying 
whether a business entity needs to lodge a tax return in practice. 
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length principle’ to lower the tax liability, a number of studies refer to it as transfer 
mispricing (e.g. Spencer, 2012; Bastin, 2014), abusive transfer pricing (e.g. Schindler & 
Schjelderup, 2013; Wickham, 1991) or transfer price management (e.g. Jacob, 1996; 
Pendse, 2012, October). The widely accepted definitions of ‘transfer pricing’ and ‘arm’s-
length principle’ are presented below: 
‘Transfer pricing’ is the general term for the pricing of cross-border, intra-firm 
transactions between related parties. Transfer pricing therefore refers to the setting 
of prices for transactions between associated enterprises involving the transfer of 
property or services. These transactions are also referred to as ‘controlled’ 
transactions, as distinct from ‘uncontrolled’ transactions between companies that 
are not associated and can be assumed to operate independently (‘on an arm’s length 
basis’) in setting terms for such transactions. (UN, 2013c, p. 2) 
Based on the above definition, transfer pricing appears to have negative 
associations: MNEs are likely to use transfer pricing as a strategy to avoid income taxes 
by arranging the prices used for intra-firm cross-border transactions. 
The ‘arm’s-length principle’ refers to prices used for transactions between 
independent or non-related parties. Tax convention models such as the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model) and the UN Model Double 
Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (UN Model) require 
MNEs to use the ‘arm’s-length principle’ for pricing intra-firm transactions (UN, 
2013c).81 Both tax conventions place the authoritative statement about the arm’s-length 
principle in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in relation to ‘Associated Enterprises’, as follows: 
Where: 
(a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting 
State, or 
                                                 
81 The UN Model and the OECD Model are the two tax convention models that are adopted by most 
countries in the world. Thus, they have a profound influence on international tax treaty practice. Both 
models define the ‘arm’s-length principle’ in a similar way. Indeed, other similarities can be found in most 
articles of the two models. According to the UN (2011, p. vi), ‘the similarities between these two leading 
Models reflect the importance of achieving consistency where possible.’ 
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(b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, 
control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of 
the other Contracting State, 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in 
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be 
made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those 
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise 
and taxed accordingly (UN, 2011; OECD, 2014c). 
The ‘arm’s-length principle’ treats the members of an MNE group ‘as separate 
entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business’ (OECD, 2009, p. 33) 
and it ‘essentially is an approximation of market-based pricing’ (UN, 2013c, p. iii). That 
is, the arm’s-length principle requires MNEs to use market prices for intra-firm 
transactions rather than arranging or managing the transfer prices to avoid income taxes 
in high-tax jurisdictions. However, in the real world, there are difficulties in applying the 
arm’s-length principle, especially in situations where the goods or services involved are 
unique and where market-based prices in transactions between independent parties are 
absent. 
The second channel that MNEs use to shift profits is high debt financing, especially 
financing by loans from related parties.82 A company may deliberately finance its 
business activities by debt rather than by equity. For instance, companies may deliberately 
restructure their financing arrangement of capital so it is recognised as debt under the tax 
rules. This is often referred to as ‘thin capitalisation’ in the tax literature. From a taxation 
point of view, the reason why companies tend to do so is that debt financing (also known 
as leveraging) is more beneficial than equity financing because the payment of interest 
                                                 
82 From the viewpoint of the country from which profit is shifted away (e.g., Indonesia), the practice is high 
debt financing. From the viewpoint of the MNE headquarters, the practice is debt shifting within the group 
or debt management (i.e., high debt financing for affiliates in high-tax countries and low debt financing or 
even acting as lenders for affiliates in low-tax countries), as can be found in some studies that focus on the 
viewpoint of MNE headquarters (e.g. Riedel, 2014; Schindler & Schjelderup, 2012). 
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on debt is deductible for tax purposes, whereas the payment of dividends on equity is not 
(UN, 2013c). 
Both FOICs and DOICs can use transfer pricing and debt financing as the channels 
to shift profits between related parties. However, when DOICs shift profits between 
related parties, the group as a whole will likely end up with indifferent tax liability 
because the members of the group are taxed under Indonesian tax rules. In contrast, 
FOICs can shift profits out of Indonesia because their parent and affiliates are located in 
different tax jurisdictions. For example, an FOIC that requires substantial capital to 
finance its operations, such as a mining FOIC, has incentives to be financed by intra-
group debts from its parent or an affiliate located in a low-tax jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
the interest expense paid on the intra-group debt by the FOIC will lead to higher tax 
benefits in Indonesia83 than the tax cost associated with the interest income in the low-tax 
country where the lender is located. Cross-border profit shifting out of Indonesia by 
foreign MNEs—either by transfer pricing or debt financing—can lower the total tax 
payable by the group as a whole. 
 
6.2.2 Prior Studies and Hypotheses Development 
Some prior studies focus on transfer pricing arrangements, some focus on debt 
financing and some examine both. This section presents three examples of studies that 
focus on transfer pricing. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) examine whether MNEs shifted 
profits among OECD countries during the period 1979–1997. Unlike prior studies that 
examine income shifting from developed countries to low-tax jurisdictions, the authors 
focus on profit shifting by MNEs among OECD countries and base their empirical 
analysis solely on the manufacturing sector. They control for the effects of taxes and 
                                                 
83 This study covers the period 2009–2015. During this period, the statutory CIT rate in Indonesia was 28% 
in 2009, decreased to 25% in 2010, and remains unchanged ever since. 
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unobserved productivity on the scale of real economic activity by regressing the ratio of 
total value added to wage payments on tax rate differences and claim that this novel 
method can isolate the pure effects of income shifting. They find significant tax-motivated 
transfer price arrangements by MNEs. Specifically, they find that a unilateral tax increase 
decreases the reported income tax base, and they estimate that the decrease is more than 
65% of the additional revenue expected from the unilateral tax increase. 
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) examine how US-based MNEs set prices that 
differ across related and unrelated party buyers. Using US international trade transaction 
data provided by the US Census Bureau and the US Customs Bureau between 1992 and 
2000, the authors find that US exporters set substantially higher prices for their arm’s-
length customers than for related parties. These differences exist even for the same 
transaction characteristics (i.e., same product, same exporter, same time of shipping and 
same mode of shipment). This finding suggests that US-based MNEs have used transfer 
pricing arrangements as a channel for shifting profits out of the US. 
Using firm-level trade data for France in 2008, Vicard (2015) examines whether 
MNEs in France avoid French income tax by means of transfer pricing in trade with 
related parties, as well as documents that the MNEs use to manipulate their transfer prices 
to shift profits to affiliates located in low-tax jurisdictions to reduce their tax expenses. 
The author finds that if France has a corporate tax rate that is one percentage point higher 
than that of its trade partner, intra-firm export prices reduce by 0.22% and intra-firm 
import prices increase by 0.24%. Therefore, consistent with the findings of the previous 
studies, French-based MNEs also use the transfer pricing strategy. 
The next three studies examine whether MNEs shift profits by means of debt 
financing. Mills and Newberry (2004) investigate how tax rate differences affect income 
reporting by MNEs and examine whether tax incentives affect the debt policy of foreign 
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MNEs. They use two different measures of foreign tax incentives. First, they define tax 
incentives as the difference between the US STR and the foreign MNE parent’s ETR. 
Second, they refer to tax incentives as the difference between the US STR and the foreign 
MNE parent’s STR. They find that the use of debts in US affiliates is higher for foreign 
MNEs with lower foreign tax rates than for foreign MNEs with higher foreign tax rates 
for both measures of tax incentives, suggesting that MNEs finance their US affiliates with 
higher debt only when the parent’s country of the US affiliate has a lower income tax rate 
than that of the US. 
Huizinga, et al. (2008) use firm-level data for European MNEs and their affiliates 
over the period 1994–2003 to examine whether MNEs’ indebtedness in a country depends 
on tax rate differences. They find that a subsidiary increases debt financing by 2.4% in 
response to a 10% increase in the tax rate in that country, relative to a subsidiary that does 
not experience a tax increase. This finding suggests that European MNEs use high debt 
financing to shift profits out of high-tax host countries. 
Buettner and Wamser (2013) confirm that MNEs use debt financing to shift profits. 
Using panel data on German MNEs, they examine whether tax rate differences in 145 
countries have been used to facilitate internal debt financing by MNEs to shift profits to 
low-tax jurisdictions during 1996–2005. They find that a foreign affiliate tends to use 
more internal debt financing if (1) the parent controls another affiliate that operates in a 
low-tax jurisdiction and (2) if the tax rate difference between the foreign affiliate and the 
affiliate with the lowest tax rate within the group is significant. While the effect is small 
(partly, they find, because of the German CFC rules), this result suggests that German 
MNEs shift profits out of high-tax countries by means of intra-group debt financing. 
The studies mentioned above investigate the channels (either transfer pricing or 
high debt financing) used by MNEs to shift profits by relying on the effect of tax rate 
144 
differences. In a different study, Egger, et al. (2010) examine both channels by comparing 
foreign-owned companies with comparable domestic-owned companies. Specifically, the 
authors use data on more than 500,000 plants in 31 European economies between 1999 
and 2004 to identify causal effects of foreign ownership on profit tax savings compared 
with domestic firms. Egger, et al. (2010) argue that comparing foreign-owned 
corporations with comparable domestic-owned corporations will not only help them to 
estimate tax savings through foreign ownership, but will also enable them to appropriately 
identify the important channels used by foreign-owned corporations to avoid income 
taxes. Two such channels that they explore are ‘the direct shifting of profits from high-
tax to low-tax countries (e.g., by transfer pricing, royalty and license fee payments, and 
other measures) and the indirect shifting of the tax base by shifting debt to countries where 
corporate tax rates are relatively high’ (Egger, et al., 2010, p. 100). The authors find that 
profit shifting through transfer pricing or royalty and license payments is much more 
significant and is therefore more important than that of debt shifting in European 
economies. 
While all prior studies discussed in this section focus on channels used by MNEs 
to shift profits from the perspective of a developed country, cross-border profit shifting 
by means of transfer pricing and debt financing is also likely to occur in Indonesia—a 
developing country—for the following two reasons. First, FOICs have a competitive 
advantage over DOICs because, as explained in Section 2.1, FOICs are affiliates of 
foreign MNEs and therefore can use the international network of affiliates (the 
internalisation factor) to avoid Indonesian CIT. Second, prior studies (e.g. Crivelli, et al., 
2015; Fuest & Riedel, 2010; OECD, 2013b) allege that developing countries also suffer 
from profit shifting by MNEs. While these studies do not specifically investigate how 
MNEs shift profits out of developing countries, the allegation appears to be plausible. In 
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the case of Indonesia, as discussed in Section 3.4, two statements from two different 
finance ministers indicate that thousands of FOICs have not paid CIT for many years, and 
that companies have used transfer pricing and intra-group debt financing to avoid 
Indonesian CIT. While the two statements are not empirical evidence of the existence of 
cross-border profit shifting in Indonesia per se, they are statements made by authoritative 
persons. 
This study attempts to provide empirical evidence of the channels used by FOICs 
to shift profits out of Indonesia by comparing FOICs and DOICs. Specifically, this study 
uses two measures to detect the channels used by FOICs to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
First, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to sales ratio (EBIT/S) is expected to 
capture profit shifting through transfer pricing arrangements. If foreign MNEs arrange 
FOICs to artificially suppress selling prices, inflate purchase costs, management fees, 
royalties and licence fees paid to affiliates overseas, their EBIT/S will be lower than 
comparable DOICs (in terms of industry sector, firm size and maturity). Thus, the lower 
EBIT/S of FOICs relative to comparable DOICs indicates the incidence of profit shifting 
by means of transfer mispricing of goods and services.  
Second, long-term liability to related parties to total assets ratio (LTL_RP/TA) is 
expected to capture profit shifting through intra-group debt financing. The higher 
LTL_RP/TA of FOICs relative to comparable DOICs indicates the incidence of profit 
shifting by means of intra-group debt financing. Transfer pricing and debt financing can 
be complementary to, or a substitute for, each other as channels to shift profits (Saunders-
Scott, 2015).  
Therefore, this study predicts a negative relation between FOIC (an indicator 
variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if the Indonesian company is an FOIC, and ‘0’ for a 
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DOIC) and EBIT/S, and a positive relation between FOIC and LTL_RP/TA. These lead to 
the two hypotheses stated in the alternative form as follows: 
H1: FOICs report lower EBIT/S than comparable DOICs. 
H2: FOICs report higher LTL_RP/TA than comparable DOICs. 
 
6.3 Research Design 
6.3.1 Sample Selection and Period of Study 
This study uses confidential tax return data obtained from the DGT under a data 
nondisclosure agreement. However, the DGT only supplies tax return data for DOICs 
registered in the Jakarta tax offices. Given the variation in the quality of tax return data 
processed by the Jakarta tax offices and regional tax offices, this study only includes 
companies (FOICs and DOICs) registered in Jakarta tax offices to ensure a consistent 
quality of data. This study uses data reported in company tax returns because, according 
to the OECD (2015a), tax return data can better capture the existence of profit shifting by 
MNEs compared with financial data. As in Study 1 and Study 2, all firms in the current 
study are anonymised for privacy protection. 
The period of the study is 2009–2015. A key reason for starting the study from 2009 
is related to the Indonesian tax administrative reform, better known as ‘modernisasi’ 
(modernisation), which began in July 2002. Completed at the end of 2008, the reform 
claimed to equip Indonesian tax office units nationwide with ‘more efficient, simplified 
and transparent business process, more advanced system and information technology, 
better human resources, improved good governance and more efficient structure of 
organisation’ (DGT, 2009, p. 38). As a result, the tax return data recording is expected to 
be more accurate than before, which will in turn provide more reliable data for research 
purposes from 2009. The reason for ending the period of study in 2015 is simply because 
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that is the latest year for which data are available from the DGT when this study is 
conducted. 
Table 6.1 presents the derivation of the final samples used in this study for the two 
dependent variables. 
 
Table 6.1 
Final Sample Size—Study 3 
 EBIT/S LTL_RP/TA 
Number of firm-years between 2009–2015 with data 
available for propensity score matching (PSM) procedure 
 
31,596 
 
33,099 
Number of firm-years between 2009–2015 in the matched 
sample available for paired t-tests and OLS regressions 
Consisting of:84 
FOICs 
DOICs 
 
5,272 
 
2,636 
2,636 
 
7,458 
 
3,729 
3,729 
 
The top five parent’s countries of FOICs in both samples are Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and the US. The distribution of countries in which the parents 
of FOICs are located can be found in Appendix 15.  
 
6.3.2 Measurement of Variables and Statistical Procedures 
This study examines whether FOICs use transfer pricing and debt financing to shift 
profits out of Indonesia by comparing their profitability and the extent of intra-group debt 
financing with those of comparable DOICs. Following Egger et al. (2010), it is important 
                                                 
84 As a result of the PSM procedure, the final samples have equal numbers of FOICs and DOICs. 
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to compare foreign-owned companies (as the treatment group) with comparable 
domestic-owned companies (as the control group) to identify the channels used to shift 
profits. This is done in two stages, as outlined below. 
 
Stage 1 
In the first stage, OLS regressions are used to investigate whether FOICs reported 
significantly lower EBIT/S and significantly higher LTL_RP than DOICs. More precisely, 
the two profit shifting channel indicators used in this study are: 
1. EBIT/S (earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total sales) to detect profit 
shifting by transfer pricing. The difference between the EBIT/S of FOICs and 
comparable DOICs captures suppressed selling prices, inflated purchase prices and 
inflated rent, royalties and management fees paid to associates overseas. 
2. LTR_RP/TA (long-term liabilities to related parties scaled by total assets) to detect 
profit shifting by intra-group debt financing. 
Equations (6.1) and (6.2) are the two OLS regression models used to analyse the 
differences between FOICs and comparable DOICs in terms of the two intra-group profit 
shifting indicators: 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−76𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽77−82𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6.1) 
𝐿𝑇𝐿_𝑅𝑃/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 
 𝛽5−77𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽78−83𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6.2) 
where: 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝑆𝑖𝑡 is earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales for firm i and year t; 
𝐿𝑇𝐿_𝑅𝑃/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is long-term liability to related parties divided by total assets for firm i and 
year t; 
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𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company in the sample is an FOIC, 
or 0 if the company in the sample is a DOIC; 
ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of total sales for firm i in year t; 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 is capital intensity, measured by net property, plant and equipment scaled 
by total assets for firm i and year t; 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of years the company has been registered in an Indonesian 
tax office for firm i and year t; 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a set of 61 dummy variables indicating the DGT industry classification 
of firm i and year t; 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a set of six dummy variables that is expected to account for annual 
fluctuations in EBIT/S or LTL_RP/TA (the dependent variable) that were 
not because of FOIC (the independent variable) and any of the above 
control variables; 
𝜀𝑖  is the error term. 
Equations (6.1) and (6.2) control for firm size by using total sales as a proxy. Total 
sales are in a natural logarithmic form (lnSales) to transform total sales that are likely 
skewed into a more approximately normal variable. An advantage of using sales rather 
than assets as a proxy for firm size is that sales might capture firm size better than assets 
for companies that have large sales but only a small quantity of assets. Firm size effects 
reported in the literature are not consistent; thus, following prior studies (e.g., Mills & 
Newberry, 2004), no sign is predicted for lnSales. 
Another control variable, Age, is the number of years since a taxpayer registered in 
a tax office in Indonesia until it lodges its tax return for the respective year in the study 
period. Prior studies (e.g., Mills & Newberry, 2004; Grubert, 1998) provide evidence of 
the so-called maturation effect, which theorises that mature companies report higher 
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levels of income. Accordingly, this study predicts a positive relation between EBIT/S and 
Age, but it does not predict any relation between LTL_RP/TA and Age. 
Equations (6.1) and (6.2) also control for Industry and Year. Industry is a series of 
indicator variables to control for industry effects. This study uses the two-digit industry 
classifications for Indonesian taxpayers set by the DGT. The Year dummy variables are 
included to provide a control for annual variations in the magnitude of EBIT and LTL_RP 
reported by company taxpayers due to factors other than FOIC and the other control 
variables, such as macroeconomic conditions, that may differ from year to year.  
This study follows prior studies (e.g. Mills & Newberry, 2004; Myers, 1977) and 
includes capital intensity (CapInt) as a control variable when examining whether FOICs 
shift profits by means of intra-group debt financing in Equation (6.2). As explained by 
Mills and Newberry (2004, p. 98), ‘capital structure theory suggests that debt usage is 
higher when firms have more assets–in–place (capital intensity)’. Consistent with the two 
prior studies, this study predicts a positive sign of the coefficient of CapInt. 
A company is defined as an FOIC if more than 50% of the equity in the company 
is held by non-residents for tax purposes. Conversely, a company in which the majority 
shares are owned by residents for tax purposes is defined as a DOIC. Consistent with 
hypotheses H1 and H2, the coefficients of FOIC for the EBIT/S and LTL_RP/TA models 
are predicted to be negative and positive, respectively. 
 
Stage 2 
In the second stage, the PSM technique is used to ensure that FOICs and DOICs are 
comparable in terms of firm size (proxied by lnSales), maturity (proxied by Age), industry 
(using the DGT two-digit industry classification) and year. For the debt financing model, 
in addition to the four variables mentioned above, this study also includes capital intensity 
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(CapInt, proxied by net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets) as one of 
the matching criteria. Using the above matching criteria as the independent variables to 
compute the propensity scores, an FOIC is matched to a DOIC with the nearest propensity 
score for comparison. This study follows the PSM procedure presented below (using the 
Stata statistical package) to match an FOIC to a DOIC before running paired t-tests and 
OLS regressions again: 
1. Run a regression with EBIT/S (LTL_RP/TA) as the dependent variable, and FOIC, 
lnSales, Age, Industry indicators, Year indicators (and CapInt when LTL_RP/TA is 
the dependent variable) as independent variables to set the e(sample). 
2. Use pstest to test the differences in means between the independent variables across 
the treatment group (FOICs) and the control group (DOICs). 
3. Use psmatch2 and logit regression to compute propensity scores using FOIC as the 
dependent variable, lnSales, Age, Industry indicators, Year indicators (and CapInt) 
as the independent variables, and match each FOIC to the DOIC with the nearest 
propensity score, without replacement. 
4. Use pstest to test the differences in terms of firm size, age (and capital intensity) 
between FOICs and the matched DOICs. If there is any significant difference 
between the two groups, specify a caliper (see Step 5). 
5. Set a caliper initially as 0.25 of the standard deviation of the generated propensity 
scores. 
6. Run psmatch2 to match treatment firms to their nearest neighbour control firms 
subject to the requirement that the propensity scores of the matched pairs are within 
the specified caliper, without replacement. 
7. Use pstest again to examine whether there remain any significant differences in terms 
of firm size, age (and capital intensity) between the two groups. If so, reduce the 
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caliper and repeat Step 6 until no significant differences in terms of firm size, age 
(and capital intensity) are found between the two groups. 
8. Run paired t-tests and the OLS regressions on the propensity score-matched sample. 
The matched samples obtained from the PSM techniques ensure that the FOICs and 
the DOICs are comparable in firm size, maturity, capital intensity, industry affiliation and 
year. Paired t-tests are run to examine whether the two groups (FOICs and the matched 
DOICs) are significantly different from each other in terms of the two outcome variables, 
EBIT/S and LTL_RP/TA. OLS regression models are run again on the matched sample to 
further investigate the channels used by FOICs to avoid Indonesian CIT. 
As in Study 1 and Study 2 (presented in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively), the current 
study runs all regressions by clustering the errors by firms to allow for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation within a firm. A set of Year dummy variables is also included to 
capture some of the annual variations that cannot be controlled by the other explanatory 
variables. As in the previous two studies of this thesis, panel data analyses are not 
appropriate. For the current study, the main reason is simply because FOIC—the test 
variable—is an indicator variable (i.e., equals 1 if the firm is a foreign-owned Indonesian 
company, and 0 otherwise) and therefore does not vary across years for a firm. 
 
6.4 Empirical Results 
6.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables for the EBIT/S and 
LTL_RP/TA models in Panels A and B, respectively, after the matching procedure.  
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Table 6.2 
Descriptive Statistics—Study 3 
A. EBIT/S 
Variable No. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
EBIT/S 5,272 0.068 0.058 0.208 −0.997 1 
lnSales 5,272 24.902 25.022 2.130 13.996 31.901 
Age 5,272 12.231 10 8.436 0 40 
Notes: EBIT/S is earnings before interests and taxes scaled by total sales reported by firms in their 
Indonesian tax returns. Specifically, from the Indonesian annual tax return (form 1771), EBIT is derived 
from net book income domestic (1771-I 1.h) + income tax (1771-I 5.f) + interest expense (1771-II 6.6). 
lnSales is a natural log of the total sales reported in Indonesian tax returns (Indonesian tax return Form 
1771-I 1.a: Gross Income). Age is the number of years from the year the company is registered to the year 
of the observation. 
 
B. LTL_RP/TA 
Variable No. Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
LTL_RP/TA 7,458 0.027 0 0.115 0 0.999 
lnSales 7,458 25.074 25.228 2.258 9.955 31.901 
CapInt 7,458 0.254 0.195 0.230 0 0.999 
Age 7,458 13.353 11 8.572 0 40 
Notes: LTL_RP/TA is long-term liabilities to related parties scaled by total assets reported by firms in their 
Indonesian tax returns. CapInt is capital intensity proxied by net property, plant and equipment (PPE) scaled 
by total assets. Specifically, from the Indonesian annual tax return (Form 1771), PPE is derived from Land 
and Buildings (1771 Transcript of Financial Statement I.13) + other fixed assets (1771 Transcript of 
Financial Statement I.14) – accumulated depreciation (1771 Transcript of Financial Statement I.15). See 
Panel A for definitions of other variables. 
 
Panel A shows that EBIT/S has a mean of 0.068, suggesting that, on average, 
companies in the sample report an EBIT of 6.8% of their total sales. The mean of lnSales 
is 24.9, indicating that, on average, the companies in the sample report have annual sales 
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of around Rp75 billion, which is equivalent to approximately USD4.8 million using the 
31 December 2015 exchange rate for tax purposes.85 The age of companies in the final 
sample ranges from 0 (companies that are registered in the same year as the year of 
observation) to 40 years. The average Age is 12 years, indicating that, on average, 
companies in the sample are relatively mature. 
From Panel B, LTL_RP/TA has a mean of 0.027, suggesting that, on average, 
companies in the sample recorded long-term liability to related parties of 2.7% of their 
total assets. The mean of lnSales is 25.1, similar to that of EBIT/S. The age of companies 
in the LTL_RP/TA final sample shows a similar level of maturity as for EBIT/S. The mean 
of CapInt is 0.25, indicating that, on average, companies in the sample have 25% of their 
assets in the form of net PPE. CapInt ranges from zero to nearly one, demonstrating that 
some companies in the final sample have negligible PPE in their assets, and some have 
total assets almost entirely consisting of PPE. 
Table 6.3 shows the Pearson correlation between the main variables in this study. 
FOICs are negatively (positively) correlated EBIT/S (LTL_RP/TA) and are significant at 
the 1% level, which is consistent with the prediction. Firm size is positively correlated 
with EBIT/S but is not significantly correlated with LTL_RP/TA. Age has a significantly 
positive (negative) correlation with EBIT/S (LTL_RP/TA). As predicted, capital intensity 
is positively correlated with long-term liabilities to related parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 As shown in Appendix 4, for 31 December 2015, the exchange rate for USD1 is Rp13,640. 
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Table 6.3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix—Study 3 
A. EBIT/S 
 
FOIC EBIT/S lnSales Age 
FOIC 1       
EBIT/S −0.065 ***        1     
lnSales −0.008  0.132 ***            1   
Age −0.009  0.088 *** 0.331 *** 1 
 
B. LTL_RP/TA 
 
 FOIC LTL_RP/TA lnSales CapInt Age 
FOIC  1       
 
 
LTL_RP/TA  0.043 *** 1     
 
 
lnSales  0.004  0.008    1   
 
 
CapInt  −0.013  0.122 *** 0.133 ***     1 
 
 
Age  −0.014  −0.035 *** 0.321 *** 0.044 *** 1 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
As in Study 1 and Study 2, the current study runs a test of collinearity that calculates 
the VIFs for each variable to examine whether one of the regressors is a perfect linear 
function of another regressor. Appendix 16 shows that the VIFs are in the range of 1.01–
3.59 and 1.01–4.14 for the EBIT/S model and the LTL_RP/TA model, respectively. The 
VIFs are lower than the general tolerance value of 10, indicating the absence of 
collinearity issue in both models. 
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6.4.2 Results of Statistical Analyses 
Table 6.4 shows the key regression results for both profit shifting indicators of Stage 
1 (i.e., using the available dataset before matching an FOIC with a DOIC). 
The results show that FOICs report EBIT/S of around 4.4 percentage points lower 
and LTL_RP/TA of 1.6 percentage points higher than those of DOICs. The directions of 
both coefficients are consistent with the prediction and are significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that the results support hypotheses H1 and H2. 
The coefficient for lnSales is positively significant at the 1% level in the EBIT/S 
regression model but is negatively insignificant in the LTL_RP/TA regression model, 
suggesting that firm size is significantly associated with profitability, but not long-term 
liability to related parties. 
The coefficient for CapInt is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that the more capital-intensive the company, the higher the level of long-term borrowings 
from related parties. 
The coefficient for Age is insignificant in the EBIT/S regression model, and only 
significant at the 10% level in the LTL_RP/TA regression model, indicating that the 
maturity level of the companies is not associated with the magnitude of the profitability 
they report and the level of long-term borrowings from related parties. 
The coefficients of Year for the EBIT/S model suggest that Indonesian companies 
reported significantly less profits (before interest and tax) for 2011 to 2015 compared 
with 2009. The magnitude of the gaps between 2009 and later years show an increasing 
trend except 2014. The coefficients of Year for the LTL_RP/TA model do not show similar 
pattern. 
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Table 6.4 
Results of Regression Estimations before the Matching Procedure—How FOICs 
Differ from DOICs in Terms of EBIT and Long-term Liabilities to Related Parties 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−76𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽77−82𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐿𝑇𝐿_𝑅𝑃/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5−77𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽78−83𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 Expected 
Sign 
Dependent variable: 
EBIT/S 
Dependent variable: 
LTL_RP/TA 
FOIC 
 
− | + −0.044 
(−7.60) 
*** 0.016 
(4.63) 
*** 
lnSales 
 
 |  0.010 
(7.87) 
*** −0.001 
(−1.36) 
 
CapInt 
 
 | +   0.040 
(7.24) 
*** 
Age 
 
+ |  0.000 
(1.43) 
 −0.000 
(−1.65) 
  * 
Industry# ? | ?     
Year 
2010 
? | ?  
0.001 
(0.37) 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.24) 
 
 
2011    −0.011 
(−3.30) 
*** −0.003 
(−1.58) 
 
2012    −0.013 
(−3.86) 
*** −0.002 
(−1.17) 
 
2013    −0.021 
(−4.86) 
*** −0.003 
(−1.80) 
* 
2014    −0.015 
(−3.70) 
*** −0.003 
(−1.93) 
* 
2015    −0.047 
(−10.67) 
*** −0.003 
(−1.81) 
* 
Constant   −0.127 
(−3.43) 
 0.050 
(4.15) 
 
R²   0.243  0.042  
n   31,596  33,099  
Notes: t-statistics appear in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
in a two-tailed test, respectively. See Table 6.3 for definitions of variables. 
# Regression result for Industry is presented in Appendix 17. 
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The regression results for the industry dummy variables can be found in Appendix 
17. There are 74 industry groups in the final sample of both regression models. Industry 
group 10 (food manufacturing industry) is the base industry. Of the 73 industry groups 
represented by indicators or dummy variables, there are 35 (54) and 12 (1) industry groups 
with significantly negative and positive coefficients, respectively for EBIT/S 
(LTL_RP/TA) model. The coefficients of the remaining 26 (18) industry groups are 
insignificantly different from zero.  
Before the matching procedure, FOICs may concentrate in some industries, while 
DOICs may concentrate in other industries. Different industries may have different 
EBIT/S and different levels of capital intensity hence different degrees of reliance on 
debts. Also, FOICs and DOICs may have different firm sizes and ages. Even though the 
regression models before the matching procedure control for the effect of industry, firm 
size and age, the coefficients for FOIC in the two regression models may still not be 
reliable. Therefore, in Stage 2, the matching procedure described on pages 151 to 152 is 
carried out to match an FOIC with a DOIC to derive a final sample of FOICs and DOICs 
that are comparable in terms of industry, firm size, age (for both models) and capital 
intensity (for the LTL_RP/TA model only) for paired t-tests and further regression 
analyses.  
Table 6.5 presents the key results of Stage 2 (i.e. after the matching procedure) 
using the paired t-tests for both the EBIT/S and LTL_RP/TA models. 
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Table 6.5 
Results of Paired t-tests after the Matching Procedure—How FOICs Differ from 
DOICs in Terms of EBIT and Long-term Liabilities to Related Parties 
 Expected 
Sign 
Dependent variable: 
EBIT/S 
Dependent variable: 
LTL_RP/TA 
ATE—FOIC (1 vs 0) −     |     + −0.022 *** 0.009 *** 
n: FOICs (treatment)  2,636  3,729  
n: DOICs (control)  2,636  3,729  
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
ATE is the average treatment effect. 
 
The paired t-tests compare 2,636 FOICs with 2,636 matched DOICs and show that 
FOICs significantly report lower EBIT/S, which is consistent with hypothesis H1. The 
result of the paired t-test for LTL_RP/TA also confirms that FOICs use greater long-
term liabilities to related parties after comparing 3,729 FOICs with 3,729 matched 
DOICs, which is consistent with hypothesis H2. All results are significant at the 1% 
level. 
Table 6.6 presents the key results of the OLS regressions for both the EBIT/S and 
LTL_RP/TA models after the matching procedure.  
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Table 6.6 
Results of Regression Estimations after the Matching Procedure—How FOICs 
Differ from DOICs in Terms of EBIT and Long-term Liabilities to Related 
Parties 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−53𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽54−59𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐿𝑇𝐿_𝑅𝑃/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5−61𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽62−67𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
FOIC 
 
− | + −0.027 
(−3.85) 
*** 0.009 
(2.27) 
** 
lnSales 
 
 |  0.012 
(4.97) 
*** 0.000 
(0.41) 
 
CapInt 
 
 | +   0.054 
(4.99) 
*** 
Age 
 
+ |  0.002 
(3.16) 
*** −0.000 
(−1.48) 
 
Industry# ? | ?     
Year 
2010 
? | ?  
−0.020 
(−2.23) 
 
** 
 
−0.002 
(−0.52) 
 
 
2011    −0.024 
(−2.91) 
*** −0.003 
(−0.69) 
 
2012    −0.027 
(−2.91) 
*** −0.004 
(−0.93) 
 
2013    −0.023 
(−2.29) 
** −0.005 
(−0.94) 
 
2014    −0.031 
(−3.23) 
*** −0.005 
(−1.06) 
 
2015    −0.062 
(−5.92) 
*** −0.004 
(−0.86) 
 
Constant   −0.184 
(−2.76) 
 0.047 
(1.72) 
 
R²   0.085  0.050  
n   5,272  7,458  
Notes: t-statistics appear in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
in a two-tailed test, respectively. See Table 6.3 for definitions of variables.  
# Regression result for Industry is presented in Appendix 18. 
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The coefficients for FOIC after the PSM procedure are relatively consistent with 
those before the PSM procedure. After the matching procedure, the coefficients indicate 
that FOICs report EBIT/S of around 2.7 percentage points lower and LTL_RP/TA of nearly 
one percentage point higher than those of their matched DOICs. The negative relationship 
between FOIC and EBIT/S and the positive relationship between FOIC and LTL_RP/TA 
indicate that FOICs use both transfer pricing and debt financing strategies to shift profits 
out of Indonesia, which is consistent with the hypotheses and the results of Stage 1. 
The coefficients of FOIC are significant at the 1% level and the 5% level for the 
EBIT/S model and the LTL_RP/TA model, respectively. The fact that the significance 
level of the EBIT/S model is higher than that of the LTL_RP/TA model suggests that 
FOICs use transfer pricing more than debt financing as the main channel to shift profits 
from Indonesia. 
The coefficient for lnSales is positively significant at the 1% level in the EBIT/S 
regression model but is insignificant in the LTL_RP/TA regression model, suggesting that 
firm size is significantly associated with profitability, but not long-term liability to related 
parties. 
The coefficient for CapInt is positive and significant at the 1% level, which is 
consistent with the prediction that the more capital-intensive the company, the higher the 
level of long-term borrowings from related parties. 
Consistent with the prediction, the coefficient for Age is positive and significant at 
the 1% level in the EBIT/S regression model, indicating that more mature companies tend 
to report higher profitability. The coefficient for Age is insignificant in the LTL_RP/TA 
regression model, suggesting that the level of maturity is not associated with the level of 
long-term borrowings from related parties. 
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After the matching procedure, there are 51 (58) industry groups in the final sample 
of EBIT/S (LTL_RP/TA) model. Industry group 10 (food manufacturing industry) is the 
base industry. Of the 50 (57) industry groups represented by indicators or dummy 
variables, there are 21 (38) and 5 (0) industry groups with significantly negative and 
positive coefficients, respectively for EBIT/S (LTL_RP/TA) model. The coefficients of 
the remaining 24 (19) industry groups are insignificantly different from zero.  
Finally, the coefficients of Year for the EBIT/S model suggest that Indonesian 
companies reported less profits (before interest and tax) in later years compared with 
2009, and the gaps between 2009 and the later years show an increasing trend except 
2013. These results are consistent with the results of the previous two studies of this thesis 
as well as the decreasing trend of CIT contribution to total tax revenue depicted in Figure 
2.4. As discussed in subsection 4.4.2, in the case of FOICs, decreasing EBIT to sales ratio 
may indicate increasing profit shifting by transfer pricing. These results provide further 
evidence that a lack of effective action taken by the Indonesian government after joining 
the BEPS project in 2013 may have led to an escalation of transfer pricing activities by 
FOICs.  
The coefficients of Year for the LTL_RP/TA model do not show similar pattern. 
 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
In an attempt to identify the channels used by FOICs (i.e., Indonesian affiliates of 
foreign MNEs) to shift profits, this study compares the FOICs with comparable DOICs 
in terms of two indicators. First, it uses EBIT/S to examine whether FOICs use transfer 
pricing to shift profits from Indonesia resulting in a lower EBIT to sales ratio compared 
to DOICs. By using EBIT/S as the proxy, this study examines transfer pricing in a broad 
sense to cover not only purchases and sales of goods, but also services (e.g., management 
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services and technical advice) and the right or licence to use associates’ properties (e.g., 
land and building—rent, intellectual properties—royalties). Second, it uses LTL_RP/TA 
to assess whether FOICs use intra-group debt financing to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
Restricting long-term liabilities to related parties only is in line with this study’s aim to 
investigate profit shifting by Indonesian affiliates of foreign MNEs. 
Using the PSM technique to generate a sample that contains a matched DOIC for 
each FOIC, this study conducts paired t-tests and OLS regressions and finds that FOICs 
report significantly lower EBIT/S and significantly higher LTL_RP/TA relative to 
comparable DOICs, indicating that FOICs use both transfer pricing and debt financing as 
their profit shifting strategies to avoid Indonesian income tax. The results also indicate 
that FOICs use transfer pricing as the primary strategy rather than debt financing to avoid 
Indonesian CIT, similarly to the findings of Egger, et al. (2010). 
This study is arguably the first study to use information reported by Indonesian 
companies in their tax returns to investigate profit shifting channels used by MNEs 
operating in Indonesia—a developing country—using domestic-owned companies as a 
control group. Therefore, the results of this study not only corroborate the suggestion of 
prior studies that developing countries may suffer from profit shifting strategies adopted 
by foreign MNEs, but they also fill a gap in the literature by providing empirical evidence 
of how MNEs shift profits out of a developing country. 
The results of this study indicate that the Indonesian government may need to 
improve its transfer pricing and debt financing regulations to curtail the profit shifting 
activities of FOICs that have been ongoing since the completion of the Indonesian tax 
administration reform in 2009.
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CHAPTER 7:  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Overview and Conclusions of the Thesis 
The more globally integrated economy, aggravated by the escalating expertise of 
tax planners in recognising and exploiting legal arbitrage opportunities and boundaries of 
acceptable tax planning, gives MNEs more confidence in taking aggressive tax positions 
(OECD, 2013c). Tax rules that do not keep pace with today’s business environment 
exacerbate the circumstances. In particular, MNEs are alleged to avoid taxes by shifting 
their profits to low-tax jurisdictions. For example, in the past few years, media around the 
world have alleged that giant MNEs such as Google, Starbucks, McDonalds, Amazon and 
Apple have used cross-border profit shifting strategies to reduce their tax burdens. These 
tax avoidance strategies are known as BEPS. 
The issue of profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions by MNEs has been discussed in 
profit shifting literature for decades. In particular, in the past few years, the issue has 
attracted considerable global attention. Financial media, tax authorities, international 
institutions—notably the OECD—and global forums—notably the G20—have expressed 
their concerns about tax avoidance strategies used by MNEs as a means of shifting profits 
(Kelley, Koontz, & Kadet, 2016). According to Beuselinck, et al. (2015), the reason 
behind these concerns is that people now better understand that MNEs operate 
internationally and that cross-border business operations allow them to exploit tax system 
differences between countries to decrease their overall corporate tax burden. 
A theory that explains why MNEs establish subsidiaries overseas is the OLI 
framework introduced by Dunning (1977). According to the OLI framework, MNEs have 
advantages over companies that operate at the domestic level because MNEs have more 
165 
power, such as patents, trademarks, international reputation (ownership), more flexibility 
to choose locations for better access to customers, lower tariffs (location) and, most 
importantly, more opportunities to set up intra-firm prices and processes (internalisation). 
Many empirical studies have discussed the cross-border profit shifting phenomenon 
from the perspective of developed countries. Most of these studies find that MNEs avoid 
income tax in the host country by shifting their profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Some 
studies have focused on finding the ways in which MNEs shift their profits. These studies 
have identified two main channels that are most commonly used: transfer pricing and debt 
financing. Profit shifting by means of transfer pricing and debt financing are two good 
examples of internalisation of the OLI framework. 
Transfer pricing is a tax avoidance strategy that allows MNEs to suppress revenue 
and/or inflate expenses in a high-tax country by setting certain prices for intra-firm 
transactions. Debt financing is another tax avoidance strategy that allows MNEs to record 
high interest expense in a high-tax country by financing their business activities using 
debt rather than equity. The final goal of these cross-border tax avoidance strategies is to 
reduce the MNEs’ global tax liability. 
Indonesia has undertaken two major tax reforms. First, the 1983 tax reform 
successfully transformed the taxation system in Indonesia from a complicated and old-
fashioned structure into a simpler, technology-based system. Second, the 2002 tax 
administration reform drastically improved the taxation business process from slow and 
error-prone tax file recording and inefficient human resources into more reliable data 
provisions and more professional tax officials. Nevertheless, taxation in Indonesia has 
still been overshadowed by a low tax-to-GDP ratio (i.e., the proportion of GDP collected 
by the government as tax revenue) and low tax compliance (i.e., many people do not 
follow the law). Moreover, Indonesian tax law does not have effective provisions for 
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dealing with international taxation—particularly transfer pricing and debt financing 
provisions. 
The fact that the Indonesian taxation system appears to suffer from a lack of 
capability—both institutionally and legally—makes the country vulnerable to tax 
avoidance attacks, including cross-border profit shifting strategies. In fact, there is a 
strong indication that Indonesia is suffering from MNEs’ profit shifting strategies. For 
example, two Indonesian finance ministers stated that thousands of FOICs (i.e., entities 
through which foreign MNEs operate in Indonesia) have not paid income tax for many 
years and that those companies have used transfer pricing to avoid paying tax. 
However, only a few empirical studies on profit shifting by MNEs have used data 
from developing countries. Moreover, existing studies that focus on developing countries 
are deemed to have a doubtful quality because they are not peer-reviewed. In the case of 
Indonesia, while there have been strong allegations that Indonesian affiliates of foreign 
MNEs have been using cross-border profit shifting strategies to avoid Indonesian CIT for 
many years, there are no peer-reviewed studies about the existence of profit shifting by 
MNEs in the country. 
This thesis attempts to fill this gap in the literature by choosing Indonesia as the 
focus of the study. In addition to the strong allegations that FOICs shift profits out of 
Indonesia, the fact that Indonesia is a major developing economy makes it suitable to be 
the focus of this thesis. Further, none of the few existing studies that focus on developing 
countries have used tax return data which is deemed to help tax researchers provide more 
reliable evidence of the presence of BEPS. This thesis uses confidential income tax return 
data for the period 2009–2015 from the DGT (the Indonesian tax authority) to investigate 
the issue of profit shifting in Indonesia. 
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Through BEPS, MNEs reduce their TI and book/accounting income 
simultaneously, which makes BEPS a book-tax conforming tax avoidance strategy 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Therefore, profit in this thesis is represented by two 
measurements. In addition to TI as the main measurement of profit based on tax law 
reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns, this thesis uses AP based on financial 
reporting standards, which is also reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns. 
The empirical evidence provided by this thesis is expected to fill the gap in the 
literature. Specifically, this thesis attempts to detect the existence of profit shifting by 
FOICs and identify how FOICs shift their profits out of Indonesia by conducting three 
related studies. 
Study 1 tests whether FOICs shift profits out of Indonesia by examining the effect 
of the difference in STR between the source country of investment and Indonesia (i.e., 
the STR of the parent’s country of the FOIC minus Indonesian STR) on TI and AP (both 
scaled by total sales) reported by FOICs in their Indonesian tax returns. The regression 
results show that the lower the parent’s STR, the lower the TI and AP reported by FOICs. 
This provides evidence that is consistent with FOICs shifting profits to low-tax countries. 
This empirical result is consistent with profit shifting occurring in Indonesia. 
Study 2 further investigates whether FOICs shift profits out of the country by 
following an approach introduced by Hines and Rice (1994) based on the Cobb–Douglas 
production function with some modifications. The HRA has been widely used by studies 
that focus on detecting the presence of cross-border profit shifting by MNEs. Again, this 
study uses both AP and TI reported by FOICs in their Indonesian confidential tax return 
data supplied by the Indonesian tax authority. After analysing a final sample of more than 
3,000 firm-year observations, this study finds that one percentage point lower tax rate of 
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the parent’s country is associated with a 2.56% decrease in the AP and a 2.89% decrease 
in the TI reported by FOICs to the Indonesian tax authority. 
Study 3 attempts to provide more direct evidence of the existence of cross-border 
profit shifting in Indonesia by investigating whether FOICs use the two most commonly 
used channels to shift profits: transfer pricing and intra-group debt financing. This can be 
done by comparing FOICs with comparable DOICs using two profit shifting indicators: 
(1) EBIT scaled by total sales as the proxy to capture profit shifting using the transfer 
pricing channel; and (2) long-term debt to related parties scaled by total assets as the 
proxy to capture profit shifting using the intra-group debt financing channel. Study 3 uses 
the PSM technique to match a DOIC to an FOIC. The final sample that contains the 
matched FOICs and DOICs is then analysed using paired t-tests and OLS regressions. 
The results show that while FOICs use both channels to shift profits, transfer pricing plays 
a more significant role than that of debt financing. 
The results for the year fixed effects that are included in the regression models of 
the three studies in this thesis suggest some changes in the behaviour of FOICs in 
reporting their TI to the Indonesian tax authority during the study period. Compared with 
2009, FOICs reported significantly less TI up to 2012, similar TI in 2013 and 2014, and 
the lowest TI in 2015. In the absence of any downturn of macroeconomic conditions and 
significant changes in the tax system during 2009–2015, a possible explanation for the 
changes in the behaviour of FOICs is because Indonesia, as one of the G20 countries, 
took part in the OECD/G20 BEPS project from 2013, so in 2013 and 2014 FOICs held 
back their trend of reporting less and less TI. FOICs resumed their trend of reporting less 
TI in Indonesia in 2015 because the Indonesian government did not take effective action 
after joining the BEPS project in 2013. 
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In conclusion, this thesis provides empirical evidence consistent with the profit 
shifting occurring in Indonesia. Moreover, this thesis finds that FOICs use transfer pricing 
and, to a lesser extent, debt financing as the channels to shift profits out of Indonesia. 
Therefore, Indonesia needs to take effective action to fight profit shifting by FOICs to 
reduce the revenue erosion from the CIT sector. 
 
7.2 Contributions of the Study 
This thesis is one of the first empirical studies to examine the incidence of profit 
shifting in a developing country by analysing the corporate tax return data obtained from 
the tax authority of Indonesia. The empirical results provided by this thesis are therefore 
expected to contribute to the knowledge of international tax avoidance and tax 
administration practice. Specifically, this thesis is expected to fill the gap in the BEPS 
literature in at least two ways. First, this thesis is one of the first studies to use firm-level 
data to examine the existence of profit shifting tax avoidance strategies by MNEs in a 
developing economy. Dharmapala (2014a) argues that using a firm-year dataset rather 
than an aggregate country-level dataset enhances the credibility of BEPS estimation. 
Consistent with Dharmapala (2014a), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2015a, p. 28) states that using firm-level data is important because ‘firm-
level data is needed for the best analysis of BEPS’. Therefore, this thesis not only fills the 
gap in the literature, but is also expected to provide more reliable evidence of BEPS from 
the perspective of Indonesia. 
Second, this thesis uses Indonesian confidential tax return data supplied by the 
DGT. The OECD (2015a) states that, unlike publicly available financial databases that 
can only capture the presence of BEPS indirectly, tax return data can provide more 
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reliable information about the incidence of BEPS.86 By using tax return data, the findings 
of this thesis are expected to provide more reliable results and facilitate a deeper 
understanding of the BEPS issue, especially from the perspective of a developing country. 
The data used in this thesis are expected to be reliable because they are related to the years 
2009–2015 and were recorded after the completion of the 2002 tax administration reform. 
This thesis also contributes to tax administration practices in Indonesia by providing 
evidence of the characteristics of profit shifting in this developing country. The empirical 
evidence provided by this thesis is expected to help policymakers improve the tax system 
in general and profit shifting supervision in particular. 
 
7.3 Limitations of the Study 
This thesis contains at least two limitations. The first limitation concerns 
determinants other than tax rate differences that may encourage MNEs to shift profits. 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) note that cross-border profit shifting activities are 
perceived to be the main threat to the tax base of high-tax economies around the world. 
However, they observe that the existing literature generally employs indirect 
identification methods to evaluate profit shifting behaviour by assessing firm responses 
(e.g., adjustments in reported pre-tax profitability, intra-firm transfer prices, debt–equity 
structure) to changes in the corporate tax rate or the difference in tax rates between home 
and host countries. Identification is therefore based on rather infrequent changes in STRs, 
which are difficult to differentiate from contemporaneous fluctuations of other dynamics 
in the home and/or host country, such as political, social and economic environments. 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) also underline that changes in tax rates may confound the 
                                                 
86 However, the OECD (2015a, p. 22) observes that tax return data ‘is not a panacea for all the problems 
facing an analysis of BEPS’. 
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profit shifting estimation because such changes can influence other profitability factors 
such as management efforts. This study potentially contains the above weaknesses. 
Second, this thesis does not capture profit shifting to a third country. Let us take 
Apple, a giant multinational information technology company, as an example. Apple Inc. 
(US) owns Apple (China) and Apple Operations International (AOI, Ireland). AOI 
(Ireland) controls Apple (Indonesia). Therefore, the immediate parent of Apple Indonesia 
is AOI (Ireland) and the ultimate parent is Apple Inc. (US). While the US (i.e., the third 
country) may play an important role in shifting profits from Indonesia to Ireland, 
comparing the tax rates between Ireland and Indonesia is more appropriate than 
comparing the tax rates between the US and Indonesia. Thus, this study uses the tax rate 
differences between the ultimate parent’s country and Indonesia. In the case of Apple, 
this thesis uses the tax rate differences between Ireland and Indonesia to detect whether 
Apple (Indonesia) shifts profits out of Indonesia to Ireland. Figure 7.1 uses Apple to 
illustrate the scope of Study 1. 
 
Figure 7.1 
Scope of the Study 
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In profit shifting strategies, the ultimate parent establishes an immediate parent to 
be used as an SPV to shift profits from a host country by exploiting the low tax rate in the 
country of the immediate parent. For example, the CIT rate in Ireland is 12.5%, which is 
much lower than the CIT rate in the US and Indonesia (40% and 25%, respectively). In 
the case of Apple, AOI does not pay any tax because the company is not a resident of 
Ireland, as the Irish definition of corporate tax residence is determined solely by the 
location of a company’s central management and control. Further, AOI is not a resident 
of the US because US tax law defines the residence of a company solely in terms of the 
place of incorporation (Ting, 2014). Therefore, while the possibility of shifting profits to 
a third country exists, focusing on the STR differences between the immediate parent’s 
country (Ireland) and the host country (Indonesia) to examine whether FOICs (Apple 
Indonesia) shift profits is reasonable and will cover profit shifting in most cases. 
 
7.4 Future Research 
This thesis provides empirical evidence that Indonesia suffers from profit shifting 
by foreign MNE affiliates operating in Indonesia by analysing tax return data from 2009 
to 2015. Since 2016, Indonesia has taken action to fight profit shifting activities. In 
addition, according to some experts, Indonesia is likely to adopt a general anti-avoidance 
rule soon (Shelepov, 2017). Among other actions, Indonesia has made two major 
improvements. First, Indonesia introduced Finance Minister Regulation No. 169 (PMK 
169), which came into effect on 1 January 2016. The new rule partially reflects the 
recommendations of the OECD BEPS Action 4 (interest deductions). The word ‘partially’ 
is used because PMK 169 is basically a thin capitalisation rule based on a debt-to-equity 
approach rather than the fixed or group ratio endorsed by BEPS Action 4. Second, 
following PMK 169, Finance Minister Regulation No. 213 (PMK 213) was introduced 
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and came into effect on 30 December 2016. PMK 213, which regulates transfer pricing 
documentation, is in line with BEPS Action 13 (Viray, 2017), which requires 
(1) taxpayers to keep the three-tiered transfer pricing documentation—namely the master 
file, the local file and the country-by-country report; and (2) the tax authority to specify 
the types of additional documents and information regarding related party transactions 
that taxpayers must keep. 
These developments are examples of how the Indonesian government is trying to 
keep pace with today’s business environment, which is characterised with progressive 
development, and to catch up with the rapid tax avoidance strategies used by FOICs. The 
newly introduced regulations are important events subsequent to the period of study 
covered in this thesis because they came into effect after 2015. It has been a typical issue 
in Indonesia that most regulations are implemented without adequate research. Therefore, 
ongoing research is needed to further examine whether the newly introduced profit 
shifting regulations will reduce the magnitude of profit shifting in Indonesia. The results 
of the research will provide insights into whether the government should fully or partially 
implement the recommendations listed in the BEPS Action Plan given that it partially 
adopted the recommendations advocated by BEPS Action 4 (interest deductions), but 
fully adopted BEPS Action 13 (transfer pricing documentation). 
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis confirms that Indonesia—a developing country—suffers from profit 
shifting strategies by foreign MNEs. Further, this thesis provides empirical evidence of 
how FOICs shift profits from Indonesia. Previous studies suggest that MNEs use two 
channels to shift profits: transfer pricing and debt financing. Indonesia is not an exception. 
This thesis indicates that FOICs (i.e., Indonesian affiliates of foreign MNEs) also use 
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transfer pricing and debt financing as the channels to shift profits from Indonesia. 
However, in the case of Indonesia, transfer pricing plays a more important role than debt 
financing. By focusing on a developing country, the empirical evidence provided by this 
thesis is expected to contribute to efforts to provide a clear picture of cross-border profit 
shifting by MNEs operating in developing countries. 
Similarly to policymakers in other developing countries, the Indonesian 
government appears to encounter difficulties in controlling profit shifting by foreign 
MNE affiliates. According to Dourado (2015), developing countries face difficulties in 
addressing profit shifting issues and joining tax cooperation because they lack technical 
and human resources. This is likely to be the source of the problem in Indonesia, and the 
country should start taking action to overcome the problem; otherwise, profit shifting by 
MNEs will continue to erode the government’s revenue from the CIT sector.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Indonesian Corporate Tax Return Form 
ATTENTION h FOLLOW INSTRUCTION IN THE MANUAL
h PRINT OR TYPE WITH CAPITAL LETTER OR BLACK INK
h MARK "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX AMENDED RETURN
T I N :
TAXPAYER'S NAME :
BUSINESS CLASIFICATION : KLU :
TELEPHONE NUMBER : - FACSIMILE NO. -
ACCOUNTING PERIOD :
FOREIGN DOMICILE OF HEAD OFFICE (Permanent Establisment only) :
  FINANCIAL STATEMENT : AUDITED AUDIT OPINION UNAUDITED
  NAME OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT FIRM :
  TIN OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT FIRM :
  NAME OF CPA :
  TIN OF CPA :
  NAME OF TAX CONSULTANT FIRM :
  TIN OF TAX CONSULTANT FIRM :
  NAME OF TAX CONSULTANT :
  TIN OF TAX CONSULTANT :
  *) The filling of coloumns of Rupiahs must be without decimal value (see example in the manual book page.3)
1. FISCAL NET INCOME
(Copy from Form 1771-1 line 8 column 3)…………………………………..
2. FISCAL LOSS CARRIED FORWARD
(Copy from Special Attachment 2A Total of Column B) …………………..
3. TAXABLE INCOME (1 - 2) ………………………………………………………
4. INCOME TAX DUE (Choose one of these Rates according to Taxpayer criteria. See manual book)
a.  Tax Rate Article 17 paragraph (1) letter b X line 3) …………………
b. Tax Rate Article 17 paragraph (2b) X line 3………………….
c. Tax Rate Article 31E paragraph (1)
5. ADJUSTMENT FOR FOREIGN TAX CREDIT REFUNDED THAT HAD
BEEN CREDITED IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR'S RETURN
(Income Tax Art.24)
6. TOTAL TAX DUE  (4 + 5) …………………………………………………………
7. INCOME TAX BORNE BY THE GOVERNMENT (Foreign Aid Project)
8.  a. DOMESTIC TAX CREDIT
(Copy from Form 1771-III Total of Column 5)
 b. FOREIGN TAX CREDIT
(Copy from Special Attachment 7A Total of column 7)
 c. TOTAL  (8a + 8b) ……………………………………………………………….
9.  a.  TAX DUE AFTER CREDIT
 b.  TAX OVERLY WITHHELD
10. PREPAID TAX :
 a. MONTHLY INSTALLMENT TAX ARTICLE 25………………………………
 b. NOTICE OF TAX COLLECTION (Principal only)
 c.  TAX ARTICLE POINT 8 / DEPARTURE TAX ………………………………….
d.  TOTAL  (10a + 10b + 10c) ……………………………….. 
11.  a.  UNDERPAID TAX (INCOME TAX ARTICLE 29)
 b.  OVERPAID TAX (INCOME TAX ARTICLE 28A)
12. UNDERPAID TAX ON NUMBER 11.a SETTLED ON…………………………………………………
13. OVERPAID AMOUNT STATED IN 11.b WOULD BE :
 a. REFUNDED b. COMPENSATED WITH OUTSTANDING TAX PAYABLE
Refund for a Taxpayer with Certain Criteria only : Preliminary Refund (Tax Law on Article 17C or 17D)
 F.1.1.32.14
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FORM 1771 Page 2
14.  a.   INCOME BASE FOR CALCULATION OF MONTHLY TAX
  INSTALLMENT ……………………………………………………..
 b.   FISCALL LOSS CARRIED FORWARD :
 (From Special Attachment 2A Total of Column 9)
 c. TAXABLE INCOME (14a - 14b) ……………………………………………
 d. TAX DUE
 (Tax Rate from Part B line 4 X 14c) …………………………………………..
 e. WITHOLDING TAX PAID BASED ON NUMBER 14a
 f.  INCOME TAX MUST BE PAID (14d - 14e) ……………………….
 g.  INCOME TAX ARTICLE 25 : (1/12 x 14f) ……………………………………………………….
15.  a.   FINAL TAX :
(From Form 1771-IV Total Part A Column 5) ……………………………
 b. NON-TAXABLE INCOME :
GROSS INCOME
(From Form 1771-IV Total Part B of Column 3) ……………………………….
16. a. There is a Transaction in Related Parties and/or with Tax Haven Country Resident
(Compulsory to submit Special Attachment 3A, 3A-1. and 3A-2 Manual Book of Annual Return)*
b. There is not a Transaction in Related Parties and/or with Tax Heaven Country Resident.
17. OTHER THAN FORM OF 1771-I, 1771-II, 1771-III, 1771-IV, 1771-V, AND 1771-VI
WITH THIS ALSO ATTACHED :
 a.   THIRD COPY OF TAX PAYMENT RECEIPT OF INCOME TAX ARTICLE 29
 b.   FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
c.   TRANSCRIPT OF ELEMENTS FROM FINANCIAL STATEMENT (Special Attachment 8A-1 /8A-2 /8A-3 /8A-4 /8A-5 /8A-6)*
d.    DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION TABLES (Special Attachment 1A of the Annual Income Tax Return Manual)*
e.    CALCULATION OF FISCAL LOSS CARRIED FORWARD (Special Attachment 2A of Income Tax Return Manual)*
f.    INVESTMENT FACILITIES PROVIDED (Special Attachment 4A of the Income Tax Return Manual)
g.    LIST OF MAJOR BRANCHES (Special Attachment 5A of the Income Tax Return Manual)
h.    THIRD COPY OF PAYMENT RECEIPT OF INCOME TAX ARTICLE 26 PARAGRAPH (4) (For Permanent Establishment only)
i.    CALCULATION OF INCOME TAX ART.26 PARAGRAPH (4) (Permanent Establishment only) (Special Attachment 6A of Income Tax Return Manual)*
j.    FOREIGN TAX CREDITS (Special Attachment 7A Income Tax Return Manual)*
k.    POWER OF ATTORNEY (if needed)
l.   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
m.   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
n.   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Understanding All The Sanctions Provided by The Law and Regulations, I Hereby Declare that The Information Stated in this Return, Including
All Attachments Provided, are True, Complete, Clear, and Under No Circumstances Wharsoever.
a.   TAX PAYER b. AUTHORIZED c. d.
REPRESENTATIVE
SIGNATURE AND COMPANY SEAL
: e.
T I N : f.
 F.1.1.32.14
REPRESENTATI VE
FULL NAME MANAGEMENT/
(place) date month year
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T I N :
TAXPAYER'S NAME :                         
ACCOUNTING PERIOD :
DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL NET INCOME :
 a.   GROSS INCOME …………………………………………………………………………………..
1a
 b.   COST OF GOOD SOLD …………………………………………………………………………………….
1b
 c.   OTHER EXPENSE ………………………………………………………………………………………………...
1c
 d.   NET INCOME FROM BUSINESS (1a - 1b - 1c) …………………………………………………………………...
1d
 e.   INCOME FROM SIDE BUSINESS …………………………………………………………………………….
1e
 f.   EXPENSE FROM SIDE BUSINESS …………………………………………………………………………………………..
1f
 g.   NET INCOME FROM SIDE BUSINESS  (1e - 1f) …………………………………………………………….
1g
 h.   TOTAL  (1d + 1g) ………………………………………………………………………………………………...
1h
  FOREIGN COMMERCIAL NET INCOME
  (From Special Attachment 7A Column 4)……………………………………………….. .
 TOTAL OF COMMERCIAL NET INCOME (1h + 2) ………………………………………. 3
  INCOME SUBJECT TO FINAL TAX
  AND NON-TAXABLE INCOME………………………………………………………….. .
  POSITIVE FISCAL ADJUSTMENT :
 a. EXPENSE CHARGED OR INCURRED FOR THE PERSONAL BENEFIT OF
 SHAREHOLDERS, PARTNERSHIP OR MEMBERS... ………………………………………...
 b.  FORMATION OR ACCUMULATION OF ALLOWANCES ……………………….. .
5b
 c.  CONSIDERATION OR REMUNERATION RELATED TO EMPLOYMENT OR
 SERVICES GIVEN IN THE FORM OF A BENEFIT IN KIND…………………………...
 d.  EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION PAID TO SHAREHOLDERS OR OTHER
 ASSOCIATED PARTIES AS A CONSIDERATION OF WORK PERFOMED…………..
 e. GIFTS, AIDS, OR DONATION ………………………………………… .
5e
 f.  INCOME TAX …………………………………………………………………………….
5f
 g. SALARIES PAID TO A MEMBER OF AN ASSOCIATION, FIRMA, OR LIMITED
 PARTNERSHIP WHICH CAPTAL DOES NOT CONSIST OF STOCKS………………..
 h.  ADMINISTRATION SANCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………..
5h
 i.  LESS COMMERCIAL DEPRECIATION OVER FISCAL DEPRECIATION ………………………………...
5i
 j.  LESS COMMERCIAL AMORTIZATION OVER FISCAL AMORTIZATION ………………………………...
5j
 k.  DEFERRED EXPENSES ………………………………………………………………...
5k
 l.  OTHER POSITIVE FISCAL ADJUSTMENTS …………………………………………………...
5l
 m.  TOTAL 5a s.d. 5l  ………………………………………………………………………………….
5m
 NEGATIVE FISCAL ADJUSTMENT :
 a.   LESS COMMERCIAL DEPRECIATION UNDER FISCAL DEPRECIATION …………………………………………………………………………………..
6a
 b.  ESS COMMERCIAL AMORTIZATION UNDER FISCAL AMORTIZATION ………………………………...
6b
 c.  DEFERRED INCOME ………………………………………………………………………………………………...
6c
 d.  OTHER NEGATIVE FISCAL ADJUSTMENTS …………………………………………………...
6d
 e.   TOTAL  6a s.d. 6d  …………………………………………………………………………….
6e
 FACILITIES OF INVESTMENT ALLOWANCES
…… YEAR 7a  (From Special Attachment 4A line 5b) ………………………...
 FISCAL NET INCOME   (3 - 4 + 5m - 6e - 7b) …………………………………………. .
8
 NOTES : Copy Total of Line 8 to Form 1771 Letter A Line 1.
      D.1.1.32.31
8.
7.
7b
6.
5g
5a
5c
5d
3.
4.
4
5.
2. 2
1.
NO DESCRIPTIONS IDR
(1) (2) (3)
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T I N : TAXPAYER'S NAME :                      
ACCOUNTING PERIOD :
NO
(1)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Note :
Number 1 for Trading Company fill with Inventory, for industry fill with purchase of material, indirect material and finished good.
Number 7 includes management fee, technical assistance fee, and other services.
Line 11 includes total expenses not covered in Line 1 to 10.
Line 12 and 13 for tradingcompanies, filled with beginning/ending balances of merchandise inventory, for industrial companies, filled with beginning/ending balances of raw materials,
indirect materials, work in process, and finished goods inventory.
D.1.1.32.54
h
h
h
h
ENDING INVENTORY  (-/-)
TOTAL OF LINE 1 TO 12 MINUS LINE 13
OTHER EXPENSES
BEGINNING INVENTORY
ROYALTIES EXPENSE
MARKETING AND PROMOTION EXPENSE
EXPENSE RELATED TO SERVICE
BAD DEBT EXPENSE
RENT EXPENSES
INTEREST EXPENSES
TRANSPORTATION EXPENSE
DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION 
EXPENSE
PURCHASE OF MATERIAL/MERCHANDISE
SALARIES, WAGES, BONUSES, 
GRATIFICATION, HONORARIUM, AND 
OTHERS
DETAILS COST OF GOOD SOLD (IDR) OTHER OPERATING EXPENSE (IDR) NON-OPERATING EXPENSE (IDR) TOTAL (IDR)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) = (3) + (4) + (5)
  
s.d.ID
E
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T
IT
Y      
0
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
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T I N : TAXPAYER'S NAME :                      
ACCOUNTING PERIOD :
Notes :
Filled with calculation of each Withholding Tax Receipt. Page - from page Attachment-III
Copy of Total Income Tax Article 22, Income Tax Article 23 and Income Tax Article 26 column (5) to Form 1771 Letter C Line 8.a.
D.1.1.32.32
h
h
TOTAL TTL
TYPES OF 
INCOME/TRANSACTION
(IDR) NUMBER DATE
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NAME AND TIN WITHHOLDING AGENT
WITHHOLDING OBJECT
INCOME TAX WITHHELD (IDR)
WITHHOLDING RECEIPT/TAX PAYMENT SLIP (SSP)/SSPCP
      
2 0
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
FOREIGN TAX CREDITDIRECTORATE GENERAL OF TAXES
IF NEEDED. ADDITIONAL PAGES MAY BE ADDEED
1771 - III
ATTACHMENT- III
T
A
X
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E
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R
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T I N :
TAXPAYER'S NAME :                         
ACCOUNTING PERIOD :
  PART A : FINAL INCOME TAX
a.
b.
c.
PART B : NON-TAXABLE INCOME
Copy of Form 1771 letter F line 15 point a
Copy to Form 1771 letter F line 15 point b
Page - from page Attachment-IV
    D.1.1.32.34
7.                        
etc
TOTAL PART B TPB
IF NEEDED. ADDITIONAL PAGES MAY BE ADDEED
5.
6. EXCESS INCOME RECEIVED BY NONPROFIT AND REGISTERED 
EDUCATION INSTITUTION OR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
ESTABLISHMENT WHICH ARE REINVESTED IN THE FORM OF FACILITIES 
AND IN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR EDUCATIONAL AND/OR R&D ACTIVITIES
SHARES OF PROFIT RECEIVED BY VENTURE CAPITAL COMPANIES FROM 
ITS PARTNERS
3. DIVIDEND FROM INVESTMENT/OWNERSHIP OF SHARES OF THE INDONESIAN
BUSINESS ENTITIES (Article 4 Paragraph (3) Item f of Income Tax Law)
4. CONTRIBUTION AND SPECIFIC INCOME RECEIVED BY A PENSION FUND
1. AID/DONATION
2. GRANT
NO TYPES OF INCOME GROSS INCOME (IDR)
(1) (2) (3)
14.                        
etc
TOTAL PART A TPA
12. REVALUATION OF FIXED ASSETS\
13.
DERIVATIVE TRANSACTION TRADE IN 
CAPITAL MARKET
10.
GROSS INCOME OF FOREIGN 
SHIPPING/AIRLINES COMPANY
11.
GROSS INCOME OF DOMESTIC SHIPPING 
COMPANY
CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISOR
9. GROSS SALES OF REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE
CONTRUCTOR
DESIGNER
7.
INCOME FROM LEASE/RENT VALUE OF 
LAND/BUILDING
8. CONSTRUCTION RELATED FEE :
5.
INCOME FROM 
DISTRIBUTOR/DEALER/AGENT OF OIL 
PRODUCTS
6.
INCOME FROM TRANSFER VALUE OF RIGHT 
ON LAND/BUILDING
3.
INCOME FROM SALES VALUES OF SHARE 
TRADED IN STOCK EXCHANGE
4.
INCOME FROM SALES VALUE OF VENTURE 
CAPITAL SHARE
1.
INTEREST INCOME ON TIME 
DEPOSITS/OTHER SAVINGS AND DISCOUNT 
OF CENTRAL BANK'S 
SERTIFICATE/SECURITIES STATE
2. INTEREST/DISCOUNT OF BOND
NO TYPES OF INCOME TAX BASE (IDR) RATE (%) INCOME TAX PAYABLE (IDR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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h LIST OF SHAREHOLDERS/CAPITAL OWNERS AND TOTAL DIVIDENDS DISTRIBUTED
h LIST OF DIRECTORS AND COMMISSIONERS
T I N :
TAXPAYER'S NAME :                           
ACCOUNTING PERIOD :
PART A : LIST OF SHAREHOLDERS/CAPITAL OWNERS AND TOTAL DIVIDENDS DISTRIBUTED
PART B : LIST OF DIRECTORS AND COMMISSIONERS
Page - from page Attachment-V
  D.1.1.32.35
9.
10.                        
dst
IF NEEDED. ADDITIONAL PAGES MAY BE ADDEED
7.
8.
5.
6.
3.
4.
1.
2.
NO NAME AND ADDRESS  T I N POSITION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTAL PART A  TPA 100%
10.                        
dst
9.
8.
7.
6.
5.
4.
3.
2.
1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NO NAME AND ADDRESS  T I N 
TOTAL PAID IN SHARES
DIVIDEND (IDR)
(IDR) %
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h LIST OF CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION IN AFFILIATION COMPANIES
h LIST OF ACCOUNT PAYABLE FROM SHAREHOLDERS AND/OR AFFILIATION COMPANIES
h LIST OF ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS AND/OR AFFILIATION COMPANIES
T I N :
TAXPAYER'S NAME :                           
ACCOUNTING PERIOD :
PART A : LIST OF CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION IN AFFILIATION COMPANIES
PART B : LIST OF ACCOUNT PAYABLE FROM SHAREHOLDERS AND/OR AFFILIATION COMPANIES
PART C : LIST OF ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS AND/OR AFFILIATION COMPANIES
Page - from page Attachment-VI
  D.1.1.32.36
dst
IF NEEDED. ADDITIONAL PAGES MAY BE ADDEED
12
11.
10.
9.
8.
7.
6.
5.
4.
3.
2.
1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NO NAME AND ADDRESS T I N TOTAL LOAN (IDR) YEAR
INTEREST/
YR %
etc
12
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10.
9.
8.
7.
6.
5.
4.
3.
2.
1.
INTEREST/
YR %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TOTAL  TTL 
NO NAME AND ADDRESS T I N TOTAL LOAN (IDR) YEAR
4.
5.                        
etc
2.
3.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1.
NO NAME AND ADDRESS T I N 
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION
(IDR) %
to
ID
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   T I N :
   TAXPAYER'S NAME :
NO. NO.
1. 1.
2. 2.
3. 3.
4. 4.
5. 5.
6. 6.
7. 7.
8. 8.
9. 9.
10. 10.
11. 11.
12. 12.
13. 13.
14. 14.
15. 15.
16. 16.
17. 17.
18. 18.
19. 19.
20. 20.
NO.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
III. TRANSACTION ELEMENTS WITH  RELATED PARTIES UNDER FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD GUIDELINES (PSAK) NUMBER 7
NO.
b. TAXPAYER AUTHORIZED/REPRESENTATIVE
c. FULL NAME OF MANAGEMENT/REPRESENTATIVE
SPECIAL ATTACHMENT 8A-1
8A-1
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATE ANNUAL INCOME TAX RETURN TAXABLE YEAR
COMPANIES TRANSCRIPT OF ELEMENTS CITATION
2 0
OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT
I. ELEMENTS FROM BALANCE SHEET
DESCRIPTION VALUE (IDR) DESCRIPTION VALUE (IDR)
CASH AND EQUIVALENT ACCOUNT PAYABLE - THIRD PARTIES
TEMPORARY INVESTMENTS ACCOUNTS PAYABLE-RELATED PARTIES
ACCOUNT RECEIVABLES-THIRD PARTIES INTEREST PAYABLE
ACCOUNT RECEIVABLES-RELATED PARTIES TAXES PAYABLE
ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE-THIRD PARTIES DIVIDENDS PAYABLE
OTHER RECEIVABLE - RELATED PARTIES ACCRUED EXPENSES
ALLOWANCE FOR DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS SHORT-TERM BANK LOANS
INVENTORIES LONG TERM DEBTS-CURRENT MATURITIES
PREPAID EXPENSES ADVANCES
ADVANCES OTHER CURRENT-LIABILITIES
OTHER CURRENT ASSETS LONG-TERM DEBT-BANK LOANS
LONG - TERM RECEIVABLES LONG-TERM DEBT-THIRD PARTIES
LAND AND BUILDINGS LONG-TERM DEBT-RELATED PARTIES
OTHER FIXED ASSETS DEFERRED TAX LIABILITIES
LESS : ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION OTHER NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES
INVESTMENT IN ASSOCIATES CAPITAL STOCK
OTHER LONG -TERM INVESTMENTS ADDITIONAL PAID-IN CAPITAL
INTANGIBLE ASSETS RETAINED EARNING FROM PREVIOUS YEAR
DEFERRED TAX ASSETS RETAINED EARNINGS
OTHER NON-CURRENT ASSETS OTHER EQUITY
TOTAL ASSETS TOTAL LIABILITIES AND OWNER'S EQUITY
II. ELEMENTS FOM INCOME STATEMENT
DESCRIPTION VALUE (IDR)
NET SALES
     MATERIALS
     DIRECT LABOUR
     FACTORY OVERHEAD
MANUFACTURING COST (2 + 3 + 4)
     WORK IN PROCESS-BEGINNING
     WORK IN PROCESS-ENDING
COST OF GOOD MANUFACTURE (5 + 6 - 7)
     FINISHED GOODS-BEGINNING
     FINISHED GOODS-ENDING
COST OF GOOD SOLD (8 + 9 - 10)
GROSS PROFIT (1 - 11)
SELLING EXPENSES
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
PROFIT (12 - 13 - 14)
OTHERS INCOME (EXPENSES)
NET EARNINGS OF ASSOCIATES
INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAX BENEFIT/(EXPENSE) (15 + 16 + 17)
INCOME TAX BENEFIT/(EXPENSE)
NET EARNINGS FROM NORMAL ACTIVITIES (18 - 19)
EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS
INCOME BEFORE MINORITY INTEREST IN NET EARNINGS OF SUBSIDIARIES (20 + 21)
MINORITY INTEREST IN NET EARNINGS OF SUBSIDIARIES
NET PROFIT (22 - 23)
PARTIES TYPES OF TRANSACTION TRANSACTION VALUE (IDR)
DECLARATION
Understanding All The Sanctions Provided by The Law and Regulations, I Hereby Declare that The Information Stated in this Return, Including All Attachments
Provided, are True, Complete, Clear, and Under No Circumstances Whatsoever.
a.
……………………………………., (date) (month) (year)
(d. Signature and Company Seal)
(Place)
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Appendix 2 
Tax Treaty Network of Indonesia as at 30 June 2018 
No. Partner Countries Effective Date 
1 Algeria 1 January 2001 
2 Armenia 1 January 2017 
3 Australia 1 July 1993 
4 Austria 1 January 1989 
5 Bangladesh 1 January 2007 
6 Belarus 9 May 2018 
7 Belgium 1 January 2002 
8 Brunei Darussalam 1 January 2003 
9 Bulgaria 1 January 1993 
10 Canada 1 January 1980 
11 China 1 January 2004 
12 Czech 1 January 1997 
13 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1 January 2005 
14 Denmark 1 January 1987 
15 Egypt 1 January 2003 
16 Finland 1 January 1990 
17 France 1 January 1981 
18 Germany 1 January 1992 
19 Hong Kong 1 January 2013 
20 Hungary 1 January 1994 
21 India 1 January 1988 
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No. Partner Countries Effective Date 
22 Iran 1 January 2011 
23 Italy 1 January 1996 
24 Japan 1 January 1983 
25 Jordan 1 January 1999 
26 Kingdom of Morocco 1 January 2013 
27 Kuwait 1 January 1999 
28 Luxembourg 1 January 1995 
29 Malaysia 1 January 1987 
30 Mexico 1 January 2005 
31 Mongolia 1 January 2001 
32 Netherlands 1 January 2004 
33 New Zealand 1 January 1989 
34 Norway 1 January 1991 
35 Pakistan 1 January 1991 
36 Papua New Guinea 1 January 2015 
37 Philippines 1 January 1983 
38 Poland 1 January 1994 
39 Portuguese 1 January 2008 
40 Qatar 1 January 2008 
41 Republic of Croatia 1 January 2013 
42 Republic of Korea 1 January 1990 
43 Republic of Suriname 1 January 2014 
44 Romania 1 January 2000 
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No. Partner Countries Effective Date 
45 Russia 1 January 2003 
46 Saudi Arabia 1 January 1985 
47 Seychelles 1 January 2001 
48 Singapore 1 January 1992 
49 Slovakia 1 January 2002 
50 South Africa 1 January 1999 
51 Spain 1 January 2000 
52 Sri Lanka 1 January 1995 
53 Sudan 1 January 2001 
54 Sweden 1 January 1990 
55 Switzerland 1 January 1990 
56 Syria 1 January 1999 
57 Taiwan 1 January 1996 
58 Thailand 1 January 2004 
59 Tunisia 1 January 1994 
60 Turkey 1 January 2001 
61 Ukraine 1 January 1999 
62 United Arab Emirates 1 January 2000 
63 United Kingdom 1 January 1995 
64 United States 1 February 1997 
65 Uzbekistan 1 January 1999 
66 Venezuela 1 January 2001 
67 Vietnam 1 January 2000 
Source: Armenia and Belarus: DGT officials; Other countries: List of Indonesia’s Tax Treaty 
Network (Directorate General of Tax, 2016a, pp. 145-146) 
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Appendix 3 
Final Sample by Country of Parent, 2009–2015 (Study 1—TI Model) 
Country 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Japan 173 179 185 207 197 246 148 1,335 
Korea, Republic of 111 131 148 171 207 268 261 1,297 
Singapore 97 105 109 118 124 137 98 788 
Malaysia 29 31 38 43 52 69 50 312 
China 15 16 23 33 38 77 75 277 
Taiwan 25 25 27 27 29 36 32 201 
United States 26 24 26 31 30 37 27 201 
Netherlands 27 28 27 25 24 30 29 190 
Australia 19 17 18 23 26 36 25 164 
British Virgin Islands 21 21 23 24 22 26 17 154 
United Kingdom 17 20 23 24 24 24 14 146 
Germany 13 15 18 18 17 23 21 125 
Hong Kong, SAR 13 13 16 14 19 21 17 113 
France 10 11 10 13 19 19 16 98 
India 6 10 11 14 18 22 16 97 
Switzerland 11 9 10 9 13 12 5 69 
Thailand 3 3 5 3 7 10 4 35 
Canada 5 4 4 5 4 3 3 28 
Luxembourg 4 3 4 4 5 5 3 28 
Italy 2 1 3 3 3 7 5 24 
Belgium 2 2 3 3 4 6 3 23 
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Country 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Mauritius 4 4 3 3 2 4 3 23 
Spain 0 2 0 4 4 7 4 21 
Sweden 3 4 3 4 2 3 2 21 
Pakistan 2 2 1 3 2 5 1 16 
Austria 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 15 
Samoa 0 2 1 2 2 3 2 12 
Denmark 1 2 1 1 1 4 1 11 
New Zealand 0 1 1 3 2 2 2 11 
Philippines 1 0 1 1 2 3 2 10 
Guinea 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 9 
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Marshall Islands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Norway 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Brunei 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 5 
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 
Channel Islands 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Liberia 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Panama 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 5 
Poland 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Jordan 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Kenya 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 
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Country 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Iran 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 
Liechtenstein 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
Argentina 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Maldives 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Nigeria 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Seychelles 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
United Arab Emirates 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Congo 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Mali 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 652 696 754 849 918 1,175 905 5,949 
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Appendix 4 
USD—IDR Exchange Rates for Tax Purposes, 2009–2015 
Year 
Exchange Rate Finance Minister 
Decree USD1 to IDR Date 
2009 IDR 9,502 31-Dec-09 1397/KM.1/2009 
2010 IDR 9,044 31-Dec-10 1145/KM.1/2010 
2011 IDR 9,069 31-Dec-11 1529/KM.1/2011 
2012 IDR 9,708 31-Dec-12 27/KM.11/2012 
2013 IDR 12,194 31-Dec-13 64/KM.11/2013 
2014 IDR 12,441 31-Dec-14 59/KM.11/2014 
2015 IDR 13,640 31-Dec-15 61/KM.11/2015 
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Appendix 5 
Statutory Tax Rates, 2009–2015 
Location 
Tax Rate % 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Argentina 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Australia 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Austria 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Belgium 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 
British Virgin Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brunei 
 
23.5 22 21 20 20 18.5 
Canada 33 31 28 26 26 26.5 26.5 
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Channel Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Congo 
   
40 35 35 35 
Cyprus 10 10 10 10 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Czech Republic 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Denmark 25 25 25 25 25 24.5 23.5 
Egypt 20 20 20 25 25 25 25 
Estonia 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 
Finland 26 26 26 24.5 24.5 20 20 
France 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 
Germany 29.44 29.41 29.37 29.48 29.55 29.58 29.65 
Guinea 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Hong Kong, SAR 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 
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Location 
Tax Rate % 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
India 33.99 33.99 32.44 32.45 33.99 33.99 34.61 
Indonesia 28 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Iran 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Iraq 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Italy 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 
Japan 40.69 40.69 40.69 38.01 38.01 35.64 33.06 
Jordan 25 14 14 14 14 14 20 
Kenya       30 30 30 30 
Korea, Republic of 24.2 24.2 22 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2 
Lebanon 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Liberia 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Liechtenstein     12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Luxembourg 28.59 28.59 28.8 28.8 29.22 29.22 29.22 
Malaysia 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Maldives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mali             30 
Marshall Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mauritius 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Netherlands 25.5 25.5 25 25 25 25 25 
New Zealand 30 30 28 28 28 28 28 
Nigeria 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Norway 28 28 28 28 28 27 27 
206 
Location 
Tax Rate % 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Pakistan 35 35 35 35 35 34 33 
Panama 30 27.5 25 25 25 25 25 
Philippines 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Poland 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Portugal 25 25 25 25 25 23 21 
Samoa 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Saudi Arabia 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Seychelles 40 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Singapore 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Spain 30 30 30 30 30 30 28 
Sweden 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 22 22 22 
Switzerland 18.96 18.75 18.31 18.06 18.01 17.92 17.92 
Taiwan 25 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Thailand 30 30 30 23 20 20 20 
Turkey 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
United Arab Emirates 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
United Kingdom 28 28 26 24 23 21 20 
United States 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Vietnam 25 25 25 25 25 22 22 
Sources: British Virgin Islands: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Worldwide_corporate_tax_ 
guide_2015/$FILE/Worldwide%20Corporate%20Tax%20Guide%202015.pdf; Brunei (2010–2011): 
http://www.rd.go.th/publish/fileadmin/user_upload/AEC/AseanTax-Brunei.pdf, (2012–2015): 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-corporate-tax-rates-
2012-2016.pdf; Channel Islands: http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/uk/taxsummaries/wwts.nsf/ID/ 
Jersey-Corporate-Taxes-on-corporate-income; Guinea: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/guinea/ 
corporate-tax-rate; Iran: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/iran/paying-taxes/; Iraq 
(2009–2012): http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iraq/corporate-tax-rate; Lebanon (2009–2012): 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/lebanon/corporate-tax-rate; Liberia: http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
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data/exploreeconomies/liberia/paying-taxes/; Maldives: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/maldives/ 
corporate-tax-rate; Mali: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/guinea/paying-taxes/; 
Marshall Islands: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/marshall-islands/paying-taxes; 
Seychelles: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/seychelles/corporate-tax-rate; other locations/year: 
https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-
rates-table.html. 
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Appendix 6 
Final Sample by Two-digit Industry Primary Group, 2009–2015 (TI Model) 
Industry Primary Groups    
Year 
   Total 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
10 (food industry) 28 30 27 37 32 28 16 198 
11 (beverage industry) 5 5 6 5 8 7 3 39 
12 (tobacco industry) 9 8 11 12 9 9 8 66 
13 (textile industry) 22 24 23 25 23 26 18 161 
14 (confection industry) 23 29 34 34 37 47 40 244 
15 (leather and foot-ware) 15 18 20 20 26 30 33 162 
16 (wood, non-furniture) 8 9 10 8 9 12 8 64 
17 (paper industry) 5 4 5 5 9 8 8 44 
18 (printing industry) 3 2 3 5 2 8 6 29 
19 (coal and oil refinery) 1 1 1 0 1 4 2 10 
20 (chemical industry) 44 49 51 52 57 50 43 346 
21 (pharmaceutical) 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 26 
22 (rubber industry) 39 42 39 44 43 46 37 290 
23 (minerals non-metal) 18 18 15 18 21 22 9 121 
24 (basic metal) 18 16 19 21 16 16 4 110 
25 (metal goods) 22 27 28 30 27 37 23 194 
26 (computers, electronics) 33 36 37 40 34 32 19 231 
27 (electrical) 13 13 12 14 14 12 8 86 
28 (industrial machinery) 29 29 29 38 38 38 34 235 
29 (automobile) 35 39 42 45 39 44 21 265 
30 (transport equipment 18 19 18 17 14 17 7 110 
31 (furniture) 10 10 11 13 18 23 13 98 
32 (processing) 7 7 9 11 11 13 14 72 
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Industry Primary Groups    
Year 
   Total 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
33 (repair-machinery) 6 5 7 9 10 9 10 56 
35 (electricity and gas sup) 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 7 
36 (water supply) 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 13 
38 (waste management) 0 0 2 1 2 3 2 10 
41 (non-civil construction) 7 9 9 12 15 29 22 103 
42 (civil construction) 14 13 12 15 19 24 16 113 
43 (special construction) 9 8 7 11 10 12 11 68 
45 (automobile trading) 6 7 10 10 8 12 4 57 
46 (non-automobile trad) 81 89 110 133 158 248 232 1,051 
47 (non-automobile retail) 5 8 7 12 10 25 14 81 
50 (water transport) 3 3 2 3 3 7 3 24 
51 (air transport) 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 8 
52 (transportation support) 11 11 15 13 19 23 19 111 
55 (accommodation) 7 8 8 12 12 20 9 76 
56 (food and beverage) 4 3 4 5 13 23 21 73 
58 (publishing) 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 
61 (telecommunication) 3 3 4 2 2 7 5 26 
62 (programming) 6 5 5 5 9 11 14 55 
63 (information service) 2 1 3 4 2 11 12 35 
66 (supporting financial) 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
68 (real estate) 10 12 11 13 12 18 18 94 
70 (management consult) 19 27 27 32 50 66 58 279 
71(architecture service) 14 9 15 13 14 15 13 93 
72 (research and dev) 2 1 1 1 3 1 0 9 
73 (adv. and market rese) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
210 
Industry Primary Groups    
Year 
   Total 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
74 (other professional) 4 4 4 5 7 11 7 42 
77 (rental services) 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 14 
78 (employment services) 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 9 
79 (travel agencies) 3 3 3 3 3 4 1 20 
81 (bldg. and landscaping) 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
82 (administration) 2 2 3 2 5 5 1 20 
85 (education services) 1 0 1 1 2 3 3 11 
86 (health services) 2 2 1 1 1 5 1 13 
89 (other social services) 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 5 
91(library and archive) 9 9 11 10 13 20 8 80 
93 (sport services) 3 3 4 5 5 6 5 31 
95 (repair services) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
96 (other personal services) 0 1 2 4 2 5 3 17 
99 (international agencies) 3 3 2 4 6 4 5 27 
Total 652 696 754 849 918 1,175 905 5,949 
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Appendix 7 
Variance Inflation Factor—Study 1 
Variable 
VIF 
TI AP 
Pooled OLS 
with 
clustered 
errors 
Pooled OLS 
after log-
transforming 
the 
dependent 
variable + 
clustering 
errors 
Pooled OLS 
with 
clustered 
errors 
Pooled OLS 
after log-
transforming 
the 
dependent 
variable + 
clustering 
errors 
TRdiff 1.17 1.19 1.18 1.18 
lnSales 1.97 1.82 1.88 1.87 
Age 1.72 1.62 1.67 1.67 
Industry group (max) 5.66 4.60 4.79 4.78 
Year (max) 2.31 1.96 2.16 2.15 
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Appendix 8 
Regression Result for Industry Groups: Effect of Tax Rate Difference on TI 
𝑇𝐼/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−64𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽65−70𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
11 (beverage industry) 0.141 8.03*** 
12 (tobacco industry) 0.133 9.37*** 
13 (textile industry) −0.033 −3.09*** 
14 (confection industry) −0.042 −4.41*** 
15 (leather goods and foot-ware) −0.026 −2.48** 
16 (wood, non-furniture) −0.042 −2.92*** 
17 (paper industry) −0.030 −1.78* 
18 (printing industry) −0.005 −0.25 
19 (coal and oil refinery) 0.046 1.44 
20 (chemical industry) 0.011 1.21 
21 (pharmaceutical) −0.030 −1.46 
22 (rubber industry) −0.028 −3.04*** 
23 (minerals non-metal) −0.011 −0.93 
24 (basic metal) −0.019 −1.59 
25 (metal goods) 0.016 1.57 
26 (computers, electronics) −0.050 −5.21*** 
27 (electrical) −0.029 −2.20** 
28 (industrial machinery) 0.004 0.46 
29 (automobile) 0.008 0.88 
30 (transport equipment 0.020 1.68* 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
31 (furniture) −0.034 −2.73*** 
32 (processing) −0.030 −2.20** 
33 (repair-machinery) 0.024 1.56 
35 (electricity and gas supply) 0.018 0.47 
36 (water supply) 0.119 4.16*** 
38 (waste management) 0.021 0.65 
41 (non-civil construction) −0.081 −6.70*** 
42 (civil construction) −0.054 −4.57*** 
43 (special construction) −0.056 −4.00*** 
45 (automobile trading) −0.020 −1.36 
46 (non-automobile trading) −0.007 −0.86 
47 (non-automobile retail) −0.037 −2.78*** 
50 (water transport) −0.046 −2.12** 
51 (air transport) −0.026 −0.72 
52 (transportation support) 0.045 3.81*** 
55 (accommodation) −0.013 −0.98 
56 (food and beverage service) −0.014 −0.97 
58 (publishing) −0.063 −1.53 
61 (telecommunication) 0.033 1.60 
62 (programming) 0.029 1.92* 
63 (information service) −0.014 −0.78 
66 (supporting financial services) −0.013 −0.22 
68 (real estate) −0.022 −1.75 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
70 (management consulting) 0.047 4.84*** 
71(architecture service) −0.003 −0.23 
72 (research and development) 0.130 3.83*** 
73 (advertising and market research) −0.011 −0.11 
74 (other professional services) 0.046 2.72*** 
77 (rental services) 0.060 2.16** 
78 (employment services) 0.055 1.63 
79 (travel agencies) −0.037 −1.59 
81 (building and landscaping services) −0.016 −0.37 
82 (administration services) 0.017 0.74 
85 (education services) −0.008 −0.26 
86 (health services) −0.043 −1.49 
89 (other social services) −0.027 −0.60 
91(library and archive services) 0.086 6.51*** 
93 (sport services) 0.042 2.19** 
95 (repair-computer and households) −0.002 −0.03 
96 (other personal services) −0.051 −2.01** 
99 (international agencies) 0.042 2.05** 
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Appendix 9 
Unbalanced Panel Data—Study 1 (TI Model) 
Frequency % Cumulated Pattern 
255 13.81 13.81 . . . . . . 1 
214 11.59 25.39 . . . . . 1 . 
184 9.96 35.35 . . . . . 11 
158 8.55 43.91 1111111 
155 8.39 52.3 111111 . 
66 3.57 55.87 11111 . . 
56 3.03 58.91 . . . . 11 . 
52 2.82 61.72 . . . . 1 . . 
52 2.82 64.54 . . . . 111 
655 35.46 100 (other patterns) 
1,847 100 
 
XXXXXXX 
Notes: The panel is unbalanced: There are 1,847 firms with 5,973 firm-year observations. On average, a 
firm has 3.2 yearly observations. Some firms have data for only one year (e.g., 255 firms have data for 2015 
only; 214 firms have data for 2014 only). Only 158 firms out of 1,847 (less than 9%) have data for all seven 
years.
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Appendix 10 
Final Sample by Country of Parent, 2009–2015 (Study 2) 
A. AP 
Country 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Japan 98 108 116 125 80 144 116 787 
Korea, Republic of 77 91 114 112 44 92 186 716 
Singapore 55 59 70 63 37 60 65 409 
Malaysia 22 22 29 22 18 27 45 185 
China 11 13 19 13 5 14 50 125 
Taiwan 18 22 21 21 5 11 25 123 
United States 10 17 15 16 17 20 19 114 
Netherlands 19 19 14 12 9 15 15 103 
Australia 14 11 14 11 15 16 16 97 
Germany 10 13 15 15 13 14 17 97 
British Virgin Islands 14 16 19 13 8 10 12 92 
United Kingdom 12 13 16 13 8 10 10 82 
Hong Kong, SAR 11 11 10 9 6 7 14 68 
France 10 10 11 10 7 4 13 65 
India 6 6 11 6 4 5 14 52 
Switzerland 8 7 7 6 7 6 3 44 
Thailand 3 3 4 2 7 6 2 27 
Mauritius 4 4 4 3 2 4 5 26 
Luxembourg 1 2 4 4 3 4 3 21 
Spain 0 1 0 4 3 3 3 14 
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Country 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Italy 2 1 2 3 1 1 2 12 
Belgium 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 11 
Canada 1 2 3 4 0 0 1 11 
Sweden 0 2 1 2 2 1 3 11 
Austria 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 10 
Samoa 1 1 1 0 2 2 3 10 
Denmark 1 1 1 1 0 3 2 9 
Marshall Islands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Pakistan 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 6 
Cayman Islands 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Liberia 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Philippines 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 5 
Channel Islands 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Panama 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Poland 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 
Brunei 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
Finland 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 
Jordan 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 
Argentina 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Norway 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Seychelles 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
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Country 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
United Arab Emirates 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Guinea 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Iran 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
New Zealand 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 420 465 534 502 314 491 664 3,390 
 
B. TI 
Country 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Japan 99 108 120 126 73 129 76 731 
Korea, Republic of 89 97 127 118 44 83 150 708 
Singapore 62 64 74 69 42 53 41 405 
Malaysia 24 22 30 22 16 27 26 167 
Taiwan 17 21 22 20 6 10 15 111 
United States 12 17 18 18 17 19 10 111 
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Country 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Netherlands 20 18 14 11 10 11 10 94 
China 9 11 16 14 7 12 21 90 
Australia 15 11 16 12 12 9 12 87 
Germany 10 12 14 15 12 12 12 87 
United Kingdom 14 16 17 15 9 6 8 85 
British Virgin Islands 15 12 17 12 8 10 10 84 
Hong Kong, SAR 11 11 13 10 7 7 11 70 
France 9 9 10 9 8 3 5 53 
Switzerland 8 6 8 7 10 6 3 48 
India 6 7 11 6 5 4 6 45 
Thailand 3 3 4 3 6 6 2 27 
Mauritius 4 4 4 3 2 3 2 22 
Luxembourg 2 2 4 4 3 3 2 20 
Sweden 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 15 
Italy 2 1 3 3 2 1 2 14 
Canada 2 2 3 4 0 0 1 12 
Belgium 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 11 
Samoa 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 11 
Spain 0 1 0 3 2 2 3 11 
Austria 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 9 
Marshall Islands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Denmark 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 6 
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Country 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Pakistan 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 6 
Liberia 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Channel Islands 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Panama 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Brunei 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
Liechtenstein 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
Philippines 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Poland 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Jordan 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Norway 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Seychelles 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
United Arab Emirates 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Argentina 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Guinea 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Iran 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Kenya 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
New Zealand 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 447 470 562 521 314 430 444 3,188 
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Appendix 11 
Unbalanced Panel Data—Study 2 
A. AP 
Frequency % Cumulated Pattern 
299 24.33 24.33 . . . . . . 1 
86 7 31.33 . . . . . 1 . 
61 4.96 36.29 1111111 
52 4.23 40.52 . . . . . 11 
50 4.07 44.59 1111 . . . 
34 2.77 47.36 . . 1 . . . . 
33 2.69 50.04 111111 . 
32 2.6 52.64 . . . 1 . . . 
28 2.28 54.92 11111 . . 
554 45.08 100 (other patterns) 
1,229 100 
 
XXXXXXX 
Notes: The panel is unbalanced: There are 1,229 firms with 3,390 firm-year observations. On average, a 
firm has 2.8 yearly observations. Some firms have data for only one year (e.g., 299 firms have data for 2015 
only; 86 firms have data for 2014 only). Only 61 firms out of 1,229 (about 5%) have data for all seven 
years. 
 
B. TI 
Frequency % Cumulated Pattern 
170 15.81 15.81 . . . . . . 1 
75 6.98 22.79 . . . . . 1 . 
64 5.95 28.74 1111 . . . 
51 4.74 33.49 1111111 
49 4.56 38.05 111111 . 
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Frequency % Cumulated Pattern 
35 3.26 41.3 . . 1 . . . . 
35 3.26 44.56 11111 . . 
33 3.07 47.63 . . . 1 . . . 
31 2.88 50.51 . . . . . 11 
532 49.49 100 (other patterns) 
1,075 100 
 
XXXXXXX 
Notes: As in Study 1, the panel is unbalanced: There are 1,075 firms with 3,188 firm-year observations. On 
average, a firm has three yearly observations. Some firms have data for only one year (e.g., 170 firms have 
data for 2015 only; 75 firms have data for 2014 only). Only 51 firms out of 1,075 (less than 5%) have data 
for all seven years.
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Appendix 12 
Variance Inflation Factor—Study 2 
Variable 
VIF 
AP TI 
Parent’s tax rate 1.02 1.03 
Natural log of capital 2.54 2.56 
Natural log of labour 2.53 2.59 
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Appendix 13 
Related Parties under Indonesian Income Tax Law 
Income Tax Law No. 7/1983 as lastly amended by Law No. 36/2008 ITL Article 
18 (4a) refers to related parties as two companies or more that meet at least one of the 
following two criteria: 
a. Ownership 
If a taxpayer directly or indirectly owns at least 25% of the equity of another 
taxpayer, or if a relationship exists between two taxpayers through common ownership 
of at least 25% of equity by a third taxpayer, all taxpayers involved are related parties. 
Figure 1 illustrates related parties based on ownership according to the elucidation of ITL 
Article 18 (4a). 
 
Figure A13.1 
Illustration of Related Parties Based on Ownership 
 
 
 50% 25% 
 
 
 
 50% 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure A13.1, Company A directly owns 50% of shares of Company 
B. Company B owns 50% of shares of Company C. Company A therefore indirectly has 
ownership of 25% of shares of Company C. Further, Company A also has 25% of shares 
of Company D. Thus, Company A, Company B, Company C and Company D are 
considered related parties (e.g., Company A and Company B are related parties because 
Company A 
Company B 
 
Company C 
 
Company D 
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of direct ownership, Company A and Company C are related parties because of indirect 
ownership, and Company C and Company D are related parties because of common 
ownership by Company A. 
b. Management or technology 
Two companies or more are considered related parties if they are under the same 
management or technology. This provision implies that companies do not have to have 
ownership to be considered related parties. The presence of control of management and 
technology in one company by another company are sufficient to indicate that the two 
companies are related parties for tax purposes.
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Appendix 14 
Identifying the Obligation to Lodge Annual Tax Return by Looking at the Tax 
Identification Number 
A practical way to determine whether a business establishment is required to lodge 
an annual tax return is by examining its tax identification number (TIN, known as nomor 
pokok wajib pajak or NPWP in Indonesian). Below is an illustration of the numbering 
system of a TIN in Indonesia. 
00.000.001.2-003.004 
 
 ID number tax office code 
 check digit head office 
  or branch 
 
The first eight digits are the unique code of the taxpayer. The next digit is the check 
digit. The following three digits represent the tax office where the taxpayer is registered. 
The last three digits indicate whether the business establishment is a branch or the head 
office. If it is the head office, the last three digits will be ‘000’. If it is a branch, the last 
three digits will be given the number 001 for branch 1, 002 for branch 2 and so on. The 
last three digits determine whether the business establishment is obliged to lodge an 
annual tax return. Head offices (i.e., business establishments with a TIN ending in ‘000’) 
must lodge an annual tax return. Branches (i.e., those with a TIN ending in three digits 
other than ‘000’) are not required to lodge an annual tax return. 
Unlike branches, subsidiary companies are given TINs that are different from their 
parent company’s TIN. As a result, subsidiaries are required to lodge an annual tax 
return.87 The fact that companies do not consolidate for tax purposes allows this thesis to 
                                                 
87 However, to avoid double taxation, dividend income received by a parent company from its subsidiaries 
is excluded from dividend income tax under Article 23(4c) of the Indonesian Income Tax Law. 
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examine whether FOICs shift profits by means of intra-group debt financing by 
comparing the use of long-term liability to related parties between FOICs and DOICs. 
Under Indonesian Financial Reporting Standard No. 4 (Pernyataan Standar Akuntansi 
Keuangan/PSAK No. 4), companies are required to prepare consolidated financial 
statements for accounting purposes.  
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Appendix 15 
Final Sample by Country of Parent, 2009–2015 (Study 3) 
A. EBIT/S 
Country 
Year 
Total 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Japan 81 78 82 82 74 87 86 570 
Korea, Republic of 64 61 67 77 59 77 88 493 
Singapore 41 42 49 54 54 63 58 361 
Malaysia 17 21 21 20 22 30 34 165 
United States 15 12 16 14 18 23 15 113 
China 8 8 11 21 12 22 19 101 
Netherlands 12 13 12 11 13 20 20 101 
Taiwan 16 14 13 15 7 13 11 89 
Germany 7 11 9 10 9 13 12 71 
United Kingdom 8 8 11 7 14 13 9 70 
Australia 10 9 10 9 8 11 12 69 
British Virgin Islands 7 10 12 7 8 13 10 67 
Hong Kong, SAR 5 4 8 9 10 8 10 54 
France 9 10 9 7 4 4 6 49 
Switzerland 6 7 7 7 8 7 3 45 
India 4 4 6 5 5 6 5 35 
Thailand 4 5 5 2 6 4 4 30 
Mauritius 2 2 4 3 2 2 3 18 
Canada 2 2 1 3 2 1 4 15 
Luxembourg 1 1 2 1 2 5 3 15 
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Country 
Year 
Total 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Samoa 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 12 
Italy 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 11 
Spain 0 1 0 0 3 3 3 10 
Pakistan 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 9 
Liberia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Seychelles 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Philippines 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Austria 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 5 
Guinea 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Norway 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 
Liechtenstein 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 
Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Panama 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
United Arab Emirates 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Brunei 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Channel Islands 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Nigeria 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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Country 
Year 
Total 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 334 334 367 376 354 442 429 2,636 
 
B. LTL_RP/TA 
Country 
Year 
Total 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Japan 120 133 139 139 135 132 116 914 
Korea, Republic of 74 78 88 79 80 86 119 604 
Singapore 58 68 72 72 79 89 88 526 
Malaysia 20 26 33 26 27 28 50 210 
United States 13 20 22 22 24 28 20 149 
Netherlands 21 22 20 19 16 25 25 148 
China 12 14 18 9 9 11 47 120 
Taiwan 12 17 18 16 15 17 20 115 
British Virgin Islands 12 13 17 16 14 15 19 106 
United Kingdom 13 16 13 16 14 18 13 103 
Hong Kong, SAR 11 12 14 12 14 13 22 98 
Australia 12 10 14 15 15 12 16 94 
Germany 9 13 12 12 13 16 14 89 
France 10 11 11 11 12 14 8 77 
India 7 7 9 8 7 8 17 63 
Switzerland 9 8 8 7 8 8 5 53 
Thailand 5 5 4 3 6 5 9 37 
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Country 
Year 
Total 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Luxembourg 3 4 5 4 5 5 3 29 
Mauritius 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 25 
Canada 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 16 
Spain 0 1 1 3 3 3 5 16 
Pakistan 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 15 
Italy 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 13 
Denmark 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 10 
Sweden 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 10 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 9 
Samoa 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 9 
New Zealand 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 8 
Liberia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Austria 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
Channel Islands 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Liechtenstein 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 
Panama 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Philippines 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 
Seychelles 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 4 
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Jordan 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 
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Country 
Year 
Total 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Nigeria 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Norway 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Saudi Arabia 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
United Arab Emirates 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Guinea 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kenya 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 443 504 545 510 519 559 649 3,729 
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Appendix 16 
Variance Inflation Factor—Study 3 
Variable 
VIF 
EBIT/S LTL_RP/TA 
FOIC 1.01 1.01 
lnSales 1.39 1.31 
Age 1.38 1.37 
Capital intensity  1.28 
Industry group (max) 3.59 4.14 
Year (max) 1.93 2.22 
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Appendix 17 
Regression Result before the Matching Procedure for Industry Groups: How 
FOICs Differ from DOICs in Terms of EBIT and Long-term Liabilities to Related 
Parties 
A. EBIT/S 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−76𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽77−82𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
11 (beverage industry) -0.008 -0.13 
12 (tobacco industry) 0.076 3.22 
13 (textile industry) -0.082 -4.80 
14 (confection industry) -0.086 -6.54 
15 (leather goods and foot-ware) -0.066 -3.48 
16 (wood, non-furniture) -0.105 -4.10 
17 (paper industry) -0.070 -4.31 
18 (printing industry) -0.058 -3.89 
19 (coal and oil industry) -0.088 -4.58 
20 (chemical industry) -0.039 -2.79 
21 (pharmaceutical) -0.032 -1.97 
22 (rubber industry) -0.062 -4.79 
23 (minerals non-metal) -0.037 -2.40 
24 (basic metal) -0.100 -5.63 
25 (metal goods) -0.035 -2.38 
26 (computers, electronics) -0.089 -3.53 
27 (electrical) -0.058 -3.84 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
28 (industrial machinery) -0.021 -1.21 
29 (automobile) -0.023 -1.47 
30 (transport equipment -0.045 -2.84 
31 (furniture) -0.059 -4.21 
32 (processing) -0.013 -0.48 
33 (repair-machinery) -0.032 -1.35 
35 (electricity and gas supply) -0.026 -0.80 
36 (water supply) 0.105 3.41 
37 (industry-waste management) -0.024 -2.04 
38 (waste management) -0.019 -0.93 
41 (non-civil construction) -0.008 -0.44 
42 (civil construction) -0.017 -1.06 
43 (special construction) -0.011 -0.64 
45 (automobile trading) -0.090 -6.73 
46 (non-automobile trading) -0.066 -5.52 
47 (non-automobile retail) -0.072 -5.36 
49 (land transport) 0.020 0.83 
50 (water transport) 0.150 4.54 
51 (air transport) -0.123 -4.57 
52 (transportation support) -0.017 -0.96 
53 (post and courier) -0.074 -4.07 
55 (accommodation) 0.002 0.07 
56 (food and beverage service) -0.104 -4.88 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
58 (publishing) 0.033 0.87 
59 (audio and video) -0.063 -2.41 
60 (broadcasting) 0.101 2.13 
61 (telecommunication) -0.030 -1.04 
62 (programming) -0.034 -1.83 
63 (information service) 0.110 2.89 
64 (non-insurance and pension f. services) 0.307 14.30 
65 (insurance and pension) 0.250 6.02 
66 (supporting financial services) 0.302 13.62 
68 (real estate) 0.206 9.86 
69 (law and accounting) 0.099 4.62 
70 (management consulting) 0.032 1.61 
71(architecture service) -0.032 -1.96 
72 (research and development) 0.016 0.24 
73 (advertising and market research) -0.061 -3.43 
74 (other professional services) -0.023 -0.95 
77 (rental services) 0.191 5.42 
78 (employment services) -0.070 -5.17 
79 (travel agencies) -0.122 -9.26 
80 (security and investigation) -0.062 -4.96 
81 (building and landscaping) 0.047 0.76 
82 (administration services) -0.042 -2.02 
85 (education services) 0.001 0.06 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
86 (health services) -0.043 -2.19 
88 (social service) 0.701 60.30 
89 (other social services) -0.047 -2.18 
90 (entertainment and arts) -0.120 -2.64 
91 (entertainment and arts) -0.032 -1.45 
93 (sport services) -0.015 -0.28 
94 (organisation membership) -0.136 -1.52 
95 (repair-computer and households) 0.030 0.80 
96 (other personal services) 0.058 0.50 
99 (international agencies) -0.027 -1.11 
 
B. LTL_RP/TA 
𝐿𝑇𝐿_𝑅𝑃/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽5−77𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽78−83𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
11 (beverage industry) -0.014 -0.59 
12 (tobacco industry) 0.020 1.33 
13 (textile industry) -0.032 -2.12 
14 (confection industry) -0.035 -4.18 
15 (leather goods and foot-ware) -0.005 -0.15 
16 (wood, non-furniture) 0.010 0.45 
17 (paper industry) -0.035 -4.06 
18 (printing industry) -0.034 -4.28 
19 (coal and oil industry) -0.019 -1.18 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
20 (chemical industry) -0.028 -3.04 
21 (pharmaceutical) -0.016 -1.06 
22 (rubber industry) -0.040 -4.88 
23 (minerals non-metal) -0.021 -1.66 
24 (basic metal) -0.040 -4.88 
25 (metal goods) -0.023 -2.14 
26 (computers, electronics) -0.032 -2.64 
27 (electrical) -0.038 -4.63 
28 (industrial machinery) -0.027 -2.46 
29 (automobile) -0.035 -3.59 
30 (transport equipment -0.048 -5.91 
31 (furniture) -0.032 -3.05 
32 (processing) -0.031 -1.83 
33 (repair-machinery) 0.012 0.31 
35 (electricity and gas supply) 0.060 1.72 
36 (water supply) -0.042 -2.30 
37 (industry-waste management) -0.054 -7.15 
38 (waste management) -0.043 -5.32 
41 (non-civil construction) -0.031 -3.83 
42 (civil construction) -0.029 -3.54 
43 (special construction) -0.035 -4.44 
45 (automobile trading) -0.027 -3.15 
46 (non-automobile trading) -0.029 -3.88 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
47 (non-automobile retail) -0.034 -4.46 
49 (land transport) -0.035 -3.33 
50 (water transport) -0.006 -0.44 
51 (air transport) -0.029 -3.01 
52 (transportation support) -0.026 -2.88 
53 (post and courier) -0.043 -4.76 
55 (accommodation) 0.000 0.00 
56 (food and beverage service) -0.023 -1.81 
58 (publishing) -0.022 -1.81 
59 (audio and video) -0.037 -4.57 
60 (broadcasting) 0.008 0.40 
61 (telecommunication) -0.021 -1.94 
62 (programming) -0.027 -2.50 
63 (information service) -0.026 -2.47 
64 (non-insurance and pension f. services ) -0.017 -1.98 
65 (insurance and pension) 0.010 0.97 
66 (supporting financial services) -0.031 -4.03 
68 (real estate) -0.022 -2.64 
69 (law and accounting) -0.023 -1.90 
70 (management consulting) -0.015 -1.47 
71(architecture service) -0.020 -1.90 
72 (research and development) -0.011 -0.50 
73 (advertising and market research) -0.029 -3.43 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
74 (other professional services) -0.030 -2.82 
77 (rental services) -0.032 -3.16 
78 (employment services) -0.025 -2.69 
79 (travel agencies) -0.018 -1.04 
80 (security and investigation) -0.035 -4.58 
81 (building and landscaping) -0.041 -5.30 
82 (administration services) -0.042 -4.90 
85 (education services) -0.035 -3.59 
86 (health services) -0.031 -2.10 
88 (social service) -0.035 -4.69 
89 (other social services) -0.032 -3.13 
90 (entertainment and arts) -0.049 -5.99 
91 (entertainment and arts) -0.009 -0.76 
93 (sport services) -0.028 -1.57 
94 (organisation membership) -0.034 -4.58 
95 (repair-computer and households) -0.014 -0.88 
96 (other personal services) -0.049 -4.28 
99 (international agencies) -0.003 -0.20 
241 
Appendix 18 
Regression Result after the Matching Procedure for Industry Groups: How FOICs 
Differ from DOICs in Terms of EBIT and Long-term Liabilities to Related Parties 
A. EBIT/S 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇/𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−53𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽54−59𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
11 (beverage industry)         0.030  0.46 
12 (tobacco industry) - 0.028  -0.56 
13 (textile industry) - 0.055  -2.24** 
14 (confection industry) - 0.077  -3.60*** 
15 (leather goods and foot-ware) - 0.072  -3.20*** 
16 (wood, non-furniture) - 0.070  -2.72*** 
17 (paper industry) - 0.046  -1.63 
18 (printing industry) - 0.072  -2.30** 
20 (chemical industry) - 0.032  -1.57 
21 (pharmaceutical) - 0.065  -2.17** 
22 (rubber industry) - 0.049  -2.53** 
23 (minerals non-metal) - 0.043  -2.04** 
24 (basic metal) - 0.064  -2.88*** 
25 (metal goods) - 0.017  -0.69 
26 (computers, electronics) - 0.101  -3.51*** 
27 (electrical) -0.046  -1.91* 
28 (industrial machinery) -0.026  -1.07 
29 (automobile) -0.011  -0.43 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
30 (transport equipment -0.040  -1.90* 
31 (furniture) -0.042  -1.64* 
32 (processing) -0.029  -0.96 
33 (repair-machinery)      0.038  1.78* 
35 (electricity and gas supply)  0.025  0.45 
36 (water supply)         0.138  5.91*** 
41 (non-civil construction)         0.006  0.17 
42 (civil construction) -0.009  -0.24 
43 (special construction) -0.021  -0.63 
45 (automobile trading) -0.051  -2.28** 
46 (non-automobile trading) -0.042  -2.03* 
47 (non-automobile retail) -0.080  -3.12*** 
50 (water transport)         0.056  0.47 
51 (air transport) -0.213  -2.99*** 
52 (transportation support) -0.012  -0.35 
55 (accommodation) -0.027  -0.53 
61 (telecommunication) -0.062  -0.75 
62 (programming) -0.021  -0.78 
63 (information service)         0.219  2.49** 
68 (real estate)         0.226  4.30*** 
70 (management consulting)         0.022  0.80 
71(architecture service) -0.028  -1.07 
72 (research and development)         0.091  2.00** 
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Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
73 (advertising and market research) -0.166  -2.46** 
74 (other professional services)         0.035  0.75 
78 (employment services)         0.016  0.32 
79 (travel agencies) -0.077  -2.82*** 
85 (education services)         0.034  0.56 
86 (health services)         0.014  0.27 
89 (other social services) -0.069  -3.32*** 
91 (library and archive services) -0.010  -0.24 
99 (international agencies) -0.106  -2.35** 
 
B. LTL_RP/TA 
𝐿𝑇𝐿_𝑅𝑃/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽5−61𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽62−67𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
11 (beverage industry) -0.024 -0.73 
12 (tobacco industry) 0.037 0.92 
13 (textile industry) -0.046 -1.84* 
14 (confection industry) -0.053 -3.11*** 
15 (leather goods and foot-ware) 0.001 0.01 
16 (wood, non-furniture) 0.024 0.60 
17 (paper industry) -0.058 -3.49*** 
18 (printing industry) -0.054 -2.73*** 
20 (chemical industry) -0.044 -2.50** 
21 (pharmaceutical) -0.032 -1.40 
244 
Industry Group Estimated Coefficient t-statistic 
22 (rubber industry) -0.064 -3.81*** 
23 (minerals non-metal) -0.032 -1.41 
24 (basic metal) -0.064 -3.90*** 
25 (metal goods) -0.033 -1.50 
26 (computers, electronics) -0.051 -2.77*** 
27 (electrical) -0.056 -3.25*** 
28 (industrial machinery) -0.047 -2.71*** 
29 (automobile) -0.050 -2.84*** 
30 (transport equipment -0.070 -4.26*** 
31 (furniture) -0.026 -0.89 
32 (processing) -0.049 -2.20** 
33 (repair-machinery) 0.005 0.07 
35 (electricity and gas supply) -0.016 -0.39 
36 (water supply) -0.070 -3.91*** 
38 (waste management) -0.067 -3.35*** 
41 (non-civil construction) -0.043 -2.46*** 
42 (civil construction) -0.044 -2.48** 
43 (special construction) -0.059 -3.55*** 
45 (automobile trading) -0.048 -2.75*** 
46 (non-automobile trading) -0.041 -2.43** 
47 (non-automobile retail) -0.045 -2.40** 
50 (water transport) -0.027 -0.61 
51 (air transport) -0.055 -1.98** 
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52 (transportation support) -0.041 -2.04** 
55 (accommodation) -0.013 -0.31 
56 (food and beverage service) -0.045 -2.12** 
58 (publishing) -0.061 -3.39*** 
61 (telecommunication) -0.048 -2.55** 
62 (programming) -0.055 -3.30*** 
63 (information service) -0.050 -2.50** 
68 (real estate) -0.025 -1.14 
70 (management consulting) -0.033 -1.76* 
71(architecture service) -0.049 -2.75*** 
72 (research and development) 0.075 1.43 
73 (advertising and market research) -0.040 -1.75* 
74 (other professional services) -0.034 -1.14 
77 (rental services) -0.086 -5.13*** 
78 (employment services) -0.065 -3.87*** 
79 (travel agencies) -0.009 -0.16 
82 (administration services) -0.066 -3.65*** 
85 (education services) -0.049 -2.18** 
86 (health services) -0.066 -3.95*** 
89 (other social services) -0.095 -5.09*** 
91 (library and archive services) -0.019 -0.73 
95 (repair-computer and households) 0.021 0.35 
96 (other personal services) -0.066 -3.64*** 
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99 (international agencies) -0.019 -0.73 
 
